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To the memory of my father

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**ELITE SETTLEMENTS AND DEMOCRACY IN LATIN AMERICA:
THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC AND PERU,**

by

PETER MICHAEL SANCHEZ, B.A, M.A.

DISSERTATION

**Presented to the Faculty of the Graduate School of
The University of Texas at Austin
in Partial Fulfillment
of the requirements
for the Degree of
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY**

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the report includes the following topics

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Chapter 1

Democracy in Latin America: A Pathology?

One of the most intriguing social phenomena of the last century has been the emergence of democratic government. Despite the direct democracies of the ancient Greek city-states, democracy did not flourish as a common form of political system until this century. But at present, democracy has become the preferred form of government to such an extent that many social scientists perceive it as definitional of political development. As a result, one of the most pressing questions in the social sciences today is whether and how non-democratic nations can become democratic.

This question becomes especially timely when considering the nations of Latin America. Many of the countries that succumbed to military rule in the 1960s and 1970's have apparently turned to democracy in the 1980s, and in turn social scientists have taken up the task of explaining this apparent political transition. In particular, analysts want to discover whether the current trend is simply a recurrent cycle of change from authoritarianism to democracy and vice versa, or whether it represents a move toward a long-term institutionalization of democratic rule.¹

¹For recent studies, see John A. Peeler, Latin American Democracies: Colombia, Costa Rica, Venezuela (Chapel Hill, 1985;) Guillermo O'Donnell, Philippe C. Schmitter, and Lawrence Whitehead, editors, Transitions From Authoritarian Rule: Latin America (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1986;) James M. Malloy and Mitchell A. Seligson, editors, Authoritarians and Democrats: Regime Transition in Latin America

In this thesis, I explore the recent democratic transitions in the Dominican Republic and Peru. Unlike empirical democratic theorists who emphasized economic development and democratic culture, I focus on the choices of political and other national elites, viewing the emergence of democracy as the product of elite behavior and decisions.

This initial chapter introduces the literature that has explored the fleeting democratic experiences in Latin America. The literature as a whole has moved away from structural and cultural explanations and has (at least in part) tentatively redirected its focus on the autonomous actions of political and other elites. This new focus has placed increasing emphasis on "pacted"² democracies, and democratic transitions through "transactions."³ Before delving into these works, however, it is necessary to understand what we mean by democracy.

Political Democracy

We might think that the longer a concept is subject to examination and explanation the more precise and refined its definition will become. Unfortunately, through the years, the concept of democracy has become

(Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1987;) and, Enrique A. Baloyra, Comparing New Democracies: Transition and Consolidation in Mediterranean Europe and the Southern Cone (Boulder: Westview Press, 1987.)

²O'Donnell and Schmitter, Transitions From Authoritarian Rule: Tentative Conclusions About Uncertain Democracies (Baltimore: The John Hopkins University Press, 1987,) pp. 37-47.

³Donald Share, "Transitions To Democracy and Transitions Through Transaction," Comparative Political Studies 19, no. 4 (January 1987) pp. 525-548.

more and more controversial. Even though Giovanni Sartori has recently "revisited" democracy in order to clarify its meaning, democratic theory is still replete with misconceptions and unanswered questions.⁴ At the core of the controversy is the question of what is meant by "the rule or power of the people."⁵ Political leaders from "democratic," "authoritarian," and "totalitarian" regimes have all invoked the concepts of democracy and popular sovereignty. But politicians are not alone in this conceptual confusion. Social scientists as well disagree with each other by referring to political, economic, substantive, and other forms of democracy. In this study, we will rely upon the more traditional conception, agreeing with Sartori that democracy "is first and foremost a political concept."⁶

Robert Dahl has devised one of the most widely accepted methods to operationalize political democracy.⁷ First of all, Dahl does not employ the term democracy, but chooses to use the term polyarchy, to describe political systems normally called democracies. He foregoes the customary appellation, since democracy is primarily a theoretical ideal that is seldom attained by existing political systems.⁸

⁴Giovanni Sartori, The Theory of Democracy Revisited (Chatham: Chatham House Publishers, Inc., 1987.)

⁵Ibid, pg. 21.

⁶Ibid, pg. 11.

⁷Robert Dahl, Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1971,) pp. 1-16.

⁸Ibid, pg. 2.

According to Dahl, a political system becomes more polyarchic as it provides or increases three political opportunities to its citizens:

1. To formulate their preferences.
2. To signify their preferences to their fellow citizens and the government by individual and collective action.
3. To have their preferences weighed equally in the conduct of the government, that is, weighed with no discrimination because of the content or source of the preference.⁹

If these opportunities are available to all citizens, then citizens are able to effectively participate in and oppose the government. Additionally, Dahl asserts that for the above opportunities to exist, governments must provide the following institutional guarantees:

1. Freedom to form and join organizations.
2. Freedom of expression.
3. Right to vote.
4. Eligibility for public office.
5. Right of political leaders to compete for support.
- 5a. Right of political leaders to compete for votes.
6. Alternative sources of information.
7. Free and fair elections.
8. Institutions for making government policies depend on votes and other expressions of preference.¹⁰

Governments that provide these institutional guarantees allow citizens to contest political power freely, and to participate in political decisions. Thus, the minimal conditions of any democratic (or polyarchic) political system is the existence of political

⁹Ibid

¹⁰Ibid, pg. 3.

contestation and participation. And, as reflected in the eight institutional guarantees, these minimal conditions are best met by a political system that selects its leadership through competitive elections.

But while democracy is principally a political concept, it has substantive implications as well. The ability to contest political power and participate politically is perceived as a normative and empirical good because these minimal conditions allow citizens to get what they want by ensuring that governments are responsive. Dahl assumes that a political system that provides the minimal conditions for democracy is necessarily responsive to its citizenry.¹¹ Thus some Latin American scholars applaud the return to democracy in the region because they believe that "... policy in democratic societies is likely to produce more equal distribution of wealth than in non-democratic societies."¹² Democratic regimes are also highly valued for their liberalism. In addition to elections, an important aspect of the new trend toward democratization in Latin America is the "reinstating of minimal civil political rights to individuals and groups."¹³ In one of the most recent and thorough studies of transitions to democracy, the authors conclude that the "... establishment of certain rules of regular, formalized political competition deserve

¹¹Ibid, pg. 1.

¹²Martin C. Needler, The Problem of Democracy in Latin America (Lexington: Lexington Books, 1987,) pg. 161.

¹³George A. Lopez and Michael Stohl, Liberalization and Redemocratization in Latin America (New York: Greenwood Press, 1987,) pg. 3.

priority attention by scholars and practitioners."¹⁴ Thus democracy, although political, is valued for what it can do for its citizens, both materially and normatively. And it should thereby be an important area of study for social scientists.

Explaining the Absence of Democracy

The appeal of democratic rule prompted many scholars to search for the preconditions or determinants of democracy. Explanations, especially in the 1960s and 1970s, emphasized political culture or socioeconomic development and structure. Empirical democratic theorists figuratively 'went to town' in hopes of finding the sources of democracy.

The best known cultural study is Almond and Verba's now classic The Civic Culture.¹⁵ The authors concluded that "[u]nless the political culture is able to support a democratic system, the chances of success of that system are slim."¹⁶ The types of cultures that were deemed to be most conducive to democracy were those that were steeped in Protestantism¹⁷ or Judeo-Christianity.¹⁸

¹⁴Guillermo O'Donnell, and Philippe Schmitter, Transitions From Authoritarian Rule: Tentative Conclusions About Uncertain Democracies (Baltimore: The John Hopkins University Press, 1986,) pg. 3.

¹⁵Gabriel A. Almond, and Sidney Verba, The Civic Culture: Political Attitudes and Democracy in Five Nations (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963.)

¹⁶Ibid, pg. 498.

¹⁷Kenneth Bollen, "Political Democracy and the Timing of Development," American Sociological Review 44 (1979) pp. 572-587.

¹⁸Seymour Lipset, "Some Social Requisites of Democracy," American Political Science Review 53 (March 1959), pp. 69-105.

Many studies attempted to link the emergence of democracy with the socioeconomic development of a nation. These studies would later be termed "developmentalist" in a disparaging manner. In one of the earliest efforts, Lipset claimed that democracy was directly related to a nation's level of wealth, industrialization, urbanization and education.¹⁹ Other studies of similar focus sought to find a relationship between the emergence of democracy and such factors as the level of education and communications development.²⁰ The basic hypothesis was that democracy (or political development) was the result of national modernization and economic development.

Other scholars looked to economic classes for the key to the puzzle. The most notable study linking class structure to the emergence of democracy is Moore's classic Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy.²¹ For Moore, three conditions in the class structure of a society are necessary for the emergence of democracy: (1) an independent but not all-powerful landed aristocracy; (2) the commercialization of agriculture; and (3) "the prevention of an aristocratic-bourgeois coalition against the peasants and workers."²²

¹⁹Ibid

²⁰See the various works in Charles F. Cnudde, and Deane E. Neubauer, eds., Empirical Democratic Theory (Chicago: Markham Publishing Co., 1969.)

²¹Barrington Moore, Jr., Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy: Lord and Peasant in the Making of the Modern World (Boston: Beacon Press, 1966.)

²²Ibid, pp. 430-431.

Yet other explanations pointed to external structural factors, suggesting that developing nations could be influenced by more powerful nations. For Dahl, democracy had a better chance of emerging if foreign domination was "weak or temporary."²³ But Huntington proposed that powerful democratic states such as Great Britain and the United States could have a positive cultural influence upon non-democratic states.²⁴

These studies did not generate optimism for those who hoped that democracy would flourish in Latin America. It seemed to many that the conditions that were deemed most important for the development of democratic institutions were precisely those that were absent in the region. In fact, up to the 1950s, many scholars lamented the "pathology of democracy" in Latin America.²⁵ Yet the 1950s and early 1960s were relatively optimistic years. Democratic governments appeared to be taking hold in the region. Much of the comparative politics literature reflected the idea that development - economic and political - would produce democratic regimes. But this latest redemocratization proved to be nothing more than a new oscillation in an already familiar historical cycle. In the 1960s, a new, stronger wave of military government hit the Latin nations. By the mid 1970's, only Colombia, Costa Rica,

²³Dahl, pp. 189-201.

²⁴Samuel P. Huntington, "Will More Countries Become Democratic?," Political Science Quarterly 99 (Summer 1984) pg. 89.

²⁵Arthur P. Whitaker "Pathology of Democracy in Latin America: A Symposium," American Political Science Review 44 (March 1950,) pp. 100-149.

and Venezuela could boast political democracies. The pathology of democracy once again dominated the debates.

Scholars argued (as they had before) that political and economic conditions in the region were antithetical to democracy. The new wave of authoritarian government prompted emphasis on the centralism, corporatism, personalism, Catholicism and Ibero tradition of the Latin American nations.²⁶ Thus, the cultural heritage and social structures of Latin America were antithetical to the development of democracy.

The new authoritarianism in Latin America also prompted many scholars to ridicule those who had promoted "developmentalist" theories. The idea that democracy was the result of socioeconomic development was harshly attacked and discarded by many.²⁷ In fact, the industrialization of the 1950's and 1960's now appeared to have generated the new move toward authoritarianism, rather than the proposed move toward

²⁶For example, see Howard J. Wiarda, "Toward a Framework for the Study of Political Change in the Iberic-Latin Tradition: The Corporative Model," World Politics 25 (January 1973) pp. 206-235; James M. Malloy, ed., Authoritarianism and Corporatism in Latin American (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1977); and Claudio Veliz, The Centralist Tradition of Latin America (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1980)

²⁷For an especially scathing critique, see Susanne J. Bodenheimer, "The Ideology of Developmentalism: American Political Science's Paradigm Surrogate For Latin American Studies," Berkeley Journal of Sociology 16 (1970): pp. 95-137.

democracy. Instead of producing democracy, industrialization induced political decay.²⁸

The new models stressed the economic dependency and delayed development of the Latin American nations. Most notable is O'Donnell's model of bureaucratic-authoritarianism.²⁹ O'Donnell observed that the most economically developed states in Latin America - Argentina and Brazil - did not maintain their democratic governments in the 1960's, but rather instituted repressive military governments. Basically, he argued that in these countries modernization generated populism, prompting military leaders and technocrats to ally themselves with foreign capital in order to develop the nation and to repress social mobilization. Although O'Donnell's model came under criticism,³⁰ its impact on the study of democratic politics in Latin America was substantial. The scholarly attention was focused, as it had many times before, on the breakdown of democracy in Latin America, rather than on its emergence.³¹

²⁸Samuel P. Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968.)

²⁹Guillermo O'Donnell, Modernization and Bureaucratic-Authoritarianism: Studies in South American Politics (Berkeley: Institute of International Studies, University of California, 1973.)

³⁰See David Collier, ed., The New Authoritarianism in Latin America (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1979.)

³¹See Juan Linz and Alfred Stepan, The Breakdown of Democratic Regimes: Latin America (Baltimore: The John Hopkins University Press, 1978.)

The new wave of military regimes also renewed interest in the study of Latin American militaries.³² The military takeovers of the 1960s and 1970s were significantly different from those of the past. The new regimes were not simply caretaker governments. This time the generals established institutional military governments that remained in power not only to maintain order, but also to develop the nation. The focus for these scholars was neither economic structure nor political culture. Their emphasis was on the institutionalization of social organizations.

Lowenthal proposed:

If military institutionalization outpaces the evolution of parties and other civilian institutions, long-term, directive, and institutional rule by the armed forces is likely.³³

Even before scholars could feel comfortable with their new explanations, history confused the issue once again. The end of the 1970's brought the beginning of yet a new wave of democratization and liberalization. In 1978, competitive democracy emerged in the Dominican Republic; in 1979, civilian rule was again established in Ecuador; and in 1980, the generals retired from

³²For example, see Martin Needler, "Military Motivations in the Seizure of Power," Latin American Research Review 10, no. 3 (1975) pp. 63-80; Abraham F. Lowenthal, Armies and Politics in Latin America (New York: Holmes & Meier Publishers, Inc., 1976;) and Amos Perlmutter, ed., The Military and Politics in Modern Times (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1977.)

³³Abraham F. Lowenthal, "Armies and Politics in Latin America," in Abraham F. Lowenthal, and J. Samuel Fitch, eds., Armies and Politics in Latin America: Revised Edition (New York: Holmes & Meier, 1986,) pg. 21-22.

power in Peru. In the 1980's so many democratic governments returned to the region that by 1989 only Chile, Cuba, Nicaragua, and Panama could be considered non-democratic. Along with this new political wave came a plethora of new literature on democracy in Latin America.

Pacted Democracy

The recent scholarship represents a severe break with the developmentalist arguments of the late 1950s and 1960s. It also diverges significantly from the economic-structural explanations of the 1970s. While the earlier literature pointed to socioeconomic development, socioeconomic structure, and political culture as the keys to political or democratic development, the new emphasis eschews social determinism and argues that the emergence of competitive democracy depends upon "... leadership behavior, on the leaders' ... willingness to compromise ... and on elite decisions made at critical historical junctions."³⁴ Thus, if we want to explain regime transition and the emergence of democracy in the developing world, we may attain more fruitful results by concentrating our attention on the actions of national elites.³⁵

³⁴Ergun Ozbudun, "Institutionalizing Competitive Elections in Developing Societies," in Myron Weiner and Ergun Ozbudun, eds., Competitive Elections in Developing Countries (Durham: Duke University Press, 1987,) pg. 418.

³⁵For an earlier appeal to look to the decisions of elites during democratic transitions, see Dankwart A. Rustow, "Transitions to Democracy: Toward a Dynamic

Attention is being focused on the behavior of elites and leaders because scholars are discovering that regime transitions are characterized by a great deal of "uncertainty" and "indeterminacy."³⁶ O'Donnell and Schmitter have recently concluded that

[d]uring transitions ... it is almost impossible to specify ex ante which classes, sectors, institutions, and other groups will take what role, opt for which issues, or support what alternative.³⁷

And, Malloy asserts that the "voluntary dimension" of regime transitions "... precludes neat deterministic theories based on general laws."³⁸

The inability to predict regime changes employing structural and cultural theories has generated increased interest in the voluntary actions and autonomy of choices of political and other elites. Thus, in an extensive study of democracies in Colombia and Venezuela, Herman has observed that "... the key to establishment of ... [liberal democracy] depends on the elites' choices."³⁹ Additionally, after studying current regime transitions, Lopez and Stohl discovered that those transitions depend upon a sort of "political engineering:"

Model," Comparative Politics 2 (April 1970) pp. 337-

363.

³⁶O'Donnell and Schmitter, "Tentative Conclusions ...," pp. 3-5.

³⁷Ibid, pg. 4.

³⁸James M. Malloy, "The Politics of Transition in Latin America," in Malloy and Seligson, pg. 237.

³⁹Donald L. Herman, "Democratic and Authoritarian Traditions," in Donald L. Herman, ed., Democracy in Latin America: Colombia and Venezuela (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1988,) pg. 4-5.

A ... factor influencing the transition phase is how the regime and its coalition of transition supporters architect particular processes that effectively transfer power and portend a changed character of political life.⁴⁰

Scholars are redirecting their attention toward the volunteeristic actions and choices of national elites because political pacts or accords have in the past resulted in the establishment of democratic politics. After studying the three most enduring, stable democracies in Latin America, Peeler concluded: "The establishment of liberal democratic regimes in all three cases [Colombia, Costa Rica, and Venezuela] was made possible by explicit pacts of accommodation between rival elites."⁴¹

Additionally, recent democratic transitions also demonstrate that elite accommodation at critical junctures is of paramount importance to democratic transitions. Thus, Malloy concludes that "... most democratic formulas spring from negotiations among key elite groups that provide for the ongoing access of all key players."⁴² Similarly, O'Donnell and Schmitter argue:

Pacts are therefore not always likely or possible, but we are convinced that where they are a feature of the transition, they are desirable - that is, they enhance the probability that the process will lead to a viable political democracy.⁴³

⁴⁰George A. Lopez, and Michael Stohl, Liberalization and Redemocratization in Latin America (New York: Greenwood Press, 1987,) pg. 9 (*italics mine.*)

⁴¹Peeler, pg. 137.

⁴²Malloy, "The Politics of Transition ...," pg. 253.

⁴³O'Donnell and Schmitter, "Tentative Conclusions ...," pg. 39.

And Weiner has concluded that competitive political systems emerge when "... there is an agreement [among elites] that adversarial politics takes place within certain procedures."⁴⁴

Thus, political pacts or agreements, constructed by the choices of elites, appear to be an important element in past, and current transitions to democracy. The importance of the political actions of elites has prompted one scholar to make this observation:

These political elements help explain why some developing countries, so diverse in their socioeconomic development, class structures, rate of growth, degrees of social and economic equality, cultural diversity or homogeneity, and religious and cultural values, have been able to sustain democratic processes and institutions.⁴⁵

In fact, as academics reacted to the oscillations between democracy and authoritarianism, democracy existed in three Latin American nations (Colombia, Costa Rica and Venezuela) all exhibiting cultural and structural conditions deemed to be antithetical to the emergence of democracy. They were Latin nations steeped in the Ibero tradition, were economically dependent and underdeveloped countries, and were devoid of a strong, independent bourgeois class. These theoretically anomalous cases have once again aroused the curiosity of scholars who are attempting to discover the conditions necessary for democratic transitions.

⁴⁴Myron Weiner, "Empirical Democratic Theory," in Weiner and Ozbudun, pg. 32.

⁴⁵Ibid

The competitive, political democracies in Colombia, Costa Rica, and Venezuela illustrate the importance of elite behavior and political accords for the establishment of stable democratic regimes in Latin America. Democracy emerged in Costa Rica in 1949. The transition to liberal democracy was made possible by a signed agreement between the leaders of two prominent political parties.⁴⁶ Jose Figueres, leader of the Social Democratic Party, and Otilio Ulate, leader of the National Union, agreed to share power, and call elections for a constituent assembly that would write a new constitution. Ever since that accord, elections have served as the principal avenue to political power in Costa Rica.

In Colombia stable political democracy emerged after the signing of an agreement between the two dominant political parties in the country.⁴⁷ The National Front agreement, signed by the Liberals and Conservatives, committed the two parties to alternate control of the presidency from 1958 to 1974. Although it excluded all other political parties, a limited competitive democracy was implemented by this watershed agreement.

As with the democracies in Costa Rica and Colombia, a political agreement permitted the 1959

⁴⁶See Peeler.

⁴⁷See Alexander W. Wilde, "Conversations Among Gentlemen: Oligarchical Democracy in Colombia," in Linz and Stepan, pp. 28-81; Jonathan Hartlyn, "Military Governments and the Transition to Civilian Rule: The Colombian Experience of 1957-1958," Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs 26 (1984) pp. 245-281; and Peeler, pp. 45-59.

democratic transition in Venezuela.⁴⁸ The Pact of Punto Fijo, signed by the leaders of the three dominant political parties, committed political elites to establish a coalition government after the 1959 elections. As a result of the pact, democratic governments have been in power in Venezuela since 1959.

The examples of Costa Rica, Colombia, and Venezuela indicate that elite agreements and accommodations have been an important element in the emergence of political democracy. Political pacts in those countries greatly assisted in the transition from conflictual politics to stable, democratic politics. However, despite the recent attention paid by scholars to elite choices and political agreements, little theoretical guidance exists for those who want to explore this avenue further. The next chapter elaborates the concept of elite settlement in order to develop a theoretical roadmap for the study of regime transitions to democracy.

⁴⁸See Daniel H. Levine, "Venezuela Since 1958: The Consolidation of Democratic Politics," in Linz and Stepan, pp.82-109; Peeler, pp. 76-89; and, Terry Lynn Karl, "Petroleum and political Pacts: The Transitions to Democracy in Venezuela," in O'Donnell, Schmitter and Whitehead, pp. 196-219.

Chapter Two

Elite Settlements and Stable Democracy

This theoretical chapter elaborates the concept of elite settlement. It is not enough for the scholar to assert that pacts, accords, or agreements between political elites are an important or "desirable" element in democratic transitions. If research is to demonstrate the importance of elite settlements, its characteristics must be specified so that researchers can determine *when, how and why* settlements have taken place. But before delving into the settlement concept, we will clarify the general paradigmatic stance of this study, and define some essential concepts.

Elite Unity and Democratic Stability

To many, discussion of elites and democracy embodies a political paradox. After all, democracy is perceived as rule by the people - the antithesis of elite rule. The concept "elite" is normally associated with other forms of government, such as monarchism, fascism, or communism. Thus, no one wants to think of democracy in this manner, since "... the term 'elite' has taken on a distinctly negative meaning."¹ But the emergence of representative democracy has in no way diminished the importance of elites in politics. As one scholar soberly points out,

... regardless of the extension of *opportunities* for political participation to larger portions of the population, the actual exercise of political power has remained, in most societies, the

¹William A. Welsch, Leaders and Elites (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1979,) pg. 13.

prerogative of a small part of the citizenry. In short, the rise of democracy has not signaled the decline of elites.²

If all political regimes are essentially elite dominated, then it is easier to accept the notion that they do not arise spontaneously as a result of impersonal socioeconomic structures or cultures, but are created by the actions and choices of individuals who possess a preponderance of social power. These individuals are elites.

There are many definitions, but in general elites are those individuals who possess economic, military, political, or ideological power, and are thus able to have influence in a political system. When someone proposes that an elite is a person who holds "... a position of dominance in a societal hierarchy,"³ or one who can influence "... the authoritative allocation of values,"⁴ it is relatively easy for the researcher to point to at least some of the individuals in any particular society who exhibit these criteria. Individuals who have ideological, economic, military, or political power can without a great deal of difficulty be identified in the larger population.⁵

Even though elites are present in all social hierarchies, there is variability in the structure of

²Ibid, pg. 1.

³Ibid, pp. 15-16.

⁴Robert D. Putnam, The Comparative Study of Political Elites (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1976,) pg. 6.

⁵For a good analysis of these sources of social power, see Michael Mann, The Sources of Social Power: Volume 1, A History of Power From the Beginning to A.D. 1760 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986.)

elites. The most basic distinction is between a unified and a disunified elite structure. The behavior of disunified elites is "... characterized by ruthless, often violent, interelite conflicts."⁶ Thus, elite disunity is closely associated with regime instability. Unstable regimes are those "... in which coups, uprisings, revolutions, and other forcible seizures of government power occur frequently or are widely expected."⁷ Irregular seizures of power then are simply manifestations of the underlying condition of elite disunity. Unstable regimes therefore reflect a condition where elites do not share agreement over the socioeconomic order, or the political rules of the game.

In contrast to elite disunity is the condition of elite unity. A unified elite structure is one where elites accept the socioeconomic structure and political system. But there are two types of unified elite structures: an ideologically unified elite and a consensually unified elite. The Soviet Union is the typical model of an ideologically unified elite. Ideologically unified elites "... publicly profess the same ideology and publicly support the same major policies."⁸ Under a consensually unified elite structure (although there is general agreement over the socioeconomic system and political regime) elites will "... regularly take opposing ideological and policy

⁶Michael G. Burton, and John Higley, "Elite Settlements," American Sociological Review 52 (June 1987), pg. 296.

⁷Ibid, pg. 297.

⁸Ibid, pg. 296.

stances in public."⁹ Nevertheless, consensually unified elites do not take (or insist upon) policy or ideological positions that may jeopardize the status or survival of other elites.

Just as regime instability is inextricably tied to elite disunity, regime stability is the product of elite unity. When elites agree upon specific socio-political structures and processes, they will not dispute the manner in which political power or governmental office is determined, whether it be through a single party, through a power-sharing arrangement (like in Colombia after the National Front), or through competitive elections. Thus, in a stable regime irregular seizures of power do not occur and are not widely expected to occur.¹⁰

At this point it is important to discuss the concept of elite disunity and political instability. While many scholars will agree with the assumption that elite disunity leads to political instability, agreement is much more difficult about the origins of disunity. This study concentrates on the transition from elite disunity to elite consensual unity, and the resultant transition from regime instability to regime stability. Nevertheless, an explanation of elite-regime transition must grapple with the origins of disunity.

⁹Ibid

¹⁰Ibid, pg. 295.

Some scholars take a Hobbesian approach, arguing that disunity is "... the normal situation."¹¹ The implication of this perspective is that once elite unity is achieved, then regime stability will follow. A second perspective asserts that disunity results from the efforts of elites to create the modern nation-state. In other words, elite conflict or disunity often reflect "crises" of national identity and political legitimacy.¹² Although elite unity is absent prior to state-building, this second interpretation does not necessarily argue that stability will persist indefinitely after elites have become nationally and politically integrated. Finally, many scholars have asserted that socioeconomic changes create new elites who often come into conflict with established elites. Marxist class analysis is the most prominent example of this perspective. But many other analysts have made similar assertions. For example, Mosca argued:

If a new source of wealth develops in a society, if the practical importance of knowledge grows, if an old religion declines or a new one is born, if a new current of ideas spreads, then, simultaneously, far-reaching dislocations occur in the ruling class.¹³

In order to understand social and political change social scientists will have to discover the origins of instability and elite disunity. This study, however,

¹¹G. Lowell Field, and John Higley, Elites and Non-Elites: The Possibilities and Their Side Effects (Andover: Warner Modular Publications, 1973), pg. 13.

¹²See, for example, Leonard Binder, et al, Crises and Sequences in Political Development (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1971.)

¹³In Putnam, pg. 169.

is limited to gaining a better understanding of how and why elites sometimes undergo transformations from disunity to consensual unity. A better understanding of these critical elite transformations and regime transitions will assist social scientists in understanding broader issues of political and social change.

Although unstable political regimes are pervasive (especially in the developing nations), many studies of elites have ignored the condition of elite disunity. In many ways, this is why elite analysis has been criticized for its bias toward stability and inability to account for "revolutionary change."¹⁴ Elites in many nations of the world do not share a consensus about rules of political conduct. As one scholar points out: "... as the record of instability, coups, and political decay in much of the Third World suggests, elite integration is exceedingly difficult to achieve."¹⁵ An elite analysis that concentrates on stable regimes, where there is a great deal of consensus among elites, and ignores changes in elite structure and behavior will certainly miss the opportunity to employ elite theory to help explain political change.

It is precisely in the unstable, developing nations of Latin America where an elite analysis that ignores elite disunity and conflict will be uninformative. The cycles of democracy and

¹⁴James A. Bill, and Robert L. Hardgrave, Comparative Politics: The Quest for Theory (Washington D.C.: University Press of America, Inc., 1981), pg. 173.

¹⁵Putnam, pg. 124.

authoritarianism demonstrate the instability of the region's political regimes. As one Latin American specialist has pointed out:

The intervention of the military in politics, the technique of the coup de d'etat, the use of violence and terror as political instruments, insecurity of tenure for constitutionally established governments, are all phenomena that appear over and over again in the political history of the region.¹⁶

The term elite, then, must also apply to those powerful individuals who contest the existing social structure or governmental regime. Those elites who have the power to instigate military golpes, to carry out anti-regime violence, and to attempt to undermine the authority of the existing government are often referred to as "counter-elites,"¹⁷ or "revolutionary elites."¹⁸ When studying nations that have not developed stable political systems, an elite analysis must take into consideration those elites who do not agree with the rules of the existing regime, because in these nations the elites are neither "internally homogeneous, unified, and self-conscious," nor "self-perpetuating."¹⁹ Thus, especially when studying unstable political systems, the concept "elite" must be expanded to include all those who are "... capable, if they wish, of making substantial political trouble for

¹⁶Charles W. Anderson, "Toward a Theory of Latin American Politics," in Politics and Social Change in Latin America: The Distinct Tradition, second revised edition, edited by Howard J. Wiarda (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 1982), pg. 309.

¹⁷Field and Higley, pg. 8.

¹⁸See Putnam, pp. 191-201.

¹⁹Ibid, pg. 4.

high officials ..."²⁰, such as labor leaders, populist leaders, etc. To understand elite interactions in Latin America, all "power contenders" must be taken into consideration.²¹

If regime stability results from a transformation of the elite structure from disunity to unity, the imperative question becomes: when and how do elites or power contenders (as we define them here) become unified or homogeneous? Since ideological unified elites have not to date established democratic regimes, we are only concerned here with the conditions or processes that lead to consensual elite unity.

Consensually unified elites can originate in several ways. The most common manner has been through the "habituation of major elite factions to open but peaceful competition while their society is still a colony or territorial dependency."²² British colonies, such as Canada, the United States and India, have been the most successful inheritors of this path to consensual unity and subsequently to democracy. Another form of habituation is the consensual unity achieved in Japan and Germany through the U.S occupation after the second World War.²³ Owing to decolonization and the rarity of post-war occupations, however, the likelihood of this route to stability and

²⁰Field and Higley, pg. 8.

²¹Anderson, op cit, developed the concept of power contenders for the study of politics in Latin America.

²²Burton and Higley, pg. 297.

²³See Myron Weiner, "Empirical Democratic Theory," in Competitive Elections in Developing Countries, edited by Myron Weiner and Ergun Ozbudun (Durham: Duke University Press, 1987), pg. 31.

democracy is today virtually nonexistent. For the developing nations then consensual elite unity will most likely be achieved through the accommodation of national elites at some historical juncture.

Elite Settlements

Higley and Burton have argued that there are two additional paths to consensual unity available to developing nations: elite settlements or the gradual convergence of elite factions.²⁴ They define elite settlements as

relatively rare events in which warring national elite factions suddenly and deliberately reorganize their relations by negotiating compromises on their most basic disagreements."²⁵

The principal feature is that all major factions are involved in the agreement. When the paramount leaders of those factions agree upon the rules of the political game, then elites will become consensually unified.

Elite convergence, on the other hand, is a two-step process that also leads to consensual unity. In the first step, only "some of the warring factions enter into sustained, peaceful collaboration in electoral politics."²⁶ The factions that reach an agreement in step one are able to achieve a winning coalition and thus dominate electoral politics. In the

²⁴John Higley and Michael G. Burton, "The Elite Variable in Democratic Transitions and Breakdowns," American Sociological Review 54 (February 1989) pp. 21. In this article, Higley and Burton refer to elite settlements and two-step transitions to consensual elite unity; however, they now refer to the second path as elite convergence.

²⁵Burton and Higley, pg. 295.

²⁶Higley and Burton, pg. 21.

second step, the factions excluded from the initial understanding "abandon their distinct ideological and policy stances"²⁷ and decide to join the political (electoral) game. This second path to consensual unity, is piecemeal because the first step results only in an imperfectly unified elite.²⁸ Only if the initially excluded factions eventually agree to participate, will consensual unity and thus regime stability emerge.

While Burton and Higley argue that these are two distinct routes to consensual unity, there are important similarities in the two processes. Both the elite settlement and elite convergence routes to elite consensual unity rely primarily upon the accommodation of elites at an important historical juncture. As the case studies in this thesis show, several important characteristics and preconditions of elite settlements are present in the first step of an elite convergence. Also, the first step of an elite convergence has consequences similar to that of elite settlements: generally, elite behavior changes from that of conflict to cooperation. Burton and Higley argue that elite settlements have two major consequences:

they create patterns of open but peaceful competition, ... among all major elite factions
... and they transform unstable political regimes
... into stable regimes, in which forcible power

²⁷Ibid, pg. 21.

²⁸For a discussion of imperfectly unified elites, see G. Lowell Field and John Higley, "Imperfectly Unified Elites: The Cases of Italy and France," in Comparative Studies in Sociology: An Annual Compilation of Research, Volume 1, 1978, edited by Richard F. Tomasson (Greenwich: JAI Press Inc., 1978), pp. 295-317.

seizures no longer occur and are not widely expected.²⁹

The first step of an elite convergence also significantly alters elite behavior. It establishes a pattern of cooperation among some (not all) elite factions, it institutes electoral politics, and it transforms disunified elites into imperfectly unified elites. Although regime stability is not guaranteed under an imperfectly unified elite structure, it can be achieved if the excluded factions eventually accept the political system established by the factions involved in the political accommodation.

Thus, elite accommodation leading to consensual elite unity and regime stability is an integral ingredient of both the elite settlement and elite convergence paths to elite consensual unity. For this reason, we argue that the most probable paths to consensual unity available to developing nations require that elites settle their basic disagreements through a comprehensive elite settlement (Burton and Higley's elite settlement) or through a partial elite settlement (elite convergence). Through such agreements elites may become committed to a political regime through which they can resolve their differences in the future.

An elite settlement, then, has some dimension; it is not an all or nothing phenomenon. If all major political groups participate in the negotiations, then a settlement can be described as comprehensive. A comprehensive settlement provides for full contestation

²⁹Burton and Higley, pg. 295.

since all important groups will be able to participate in the political process. If one or more major factions are excluded from the negotiations, then it is a partial settlement. A partial settlement is likely to be precarious because the elites who were excluded may decide to undermine the new political regime.

Partial settlements, however, can lead to stable democratic regimes if elites benefit from cooperation and toleration. Eventually even those groups that were excluded from the settlement may become incorporated into the political game and full contestation and participation can be introduced to the political regime. Therefore, a partial settlement may eventually lead to consensual elite unity and stable democracy.

The distinction between partial and comprehensive settlements is difficult to make. Although the settlements in Costa Rica, Colombia and Venezuela excluded the communists from participating in the new regime, there was overwhelming electoral support for the parties involved in the respective elite settlements. For example, in the 1958 Venezuelan presidential election the parties that were signators to the Pact of Punto Fijo - AD, COPEI and the URD - won 95.6% of the popular vote.³⁰ The partial-comprehensive dimension of elite settlements, then, is at least in part indicated by the electoral viability of the major political factions. For example, a settlement can be

³⁰See Daniel H. Levine, "Venezuela Since 1958: The Consolidation of Democratic Politics," in The Breakdown of Democratic Regimes: Latin America, edited by Juan Linz and Alfred Stepan (Baltimore: The John Hopkins University Press, 1978), pg. 96.

considered comprehensive if there is very little popular support for the factions that have been excluded from the settlement. On the other hand, if a faction that has significant electoral support is excluded from the accord, then we can say that the settlement is partial. A partial settlement that excludes a popular faction will most likely yield an imperfectly unified elite. However, a partial settlement that allows that faction to participate in the new political regime could eventually yield a consensually unified elite through the process of convergence.

We should emphasize that consensual elite unity achieved through elite settlement does not necessarily result in democracy - full political contestation and participation. Once cooperation among elites and political stability are established, democratic politics can emerge. But an elite settlement is not a sufficient condition for the emergence of democracy according to this perspective. In particular, democracy does not necessarily emerge immediately after an elite settlement, and an elite settlement can "sometimes long antedate democratic transitions."³¹ A prime example would be the United States which achieved consensual unity through colonial habituation yet full democratic participation did not occur until much later when women and blacks were granted suffrage. This is quite similar to Dahl's argument that elites can agree

³¹Burton and Higley, pg. 302.

to accept contestation, yet restrict participation.³² Additionally, an elite accord can restrict contestation but eventually lead to a political regime that is fully competitive and participatory. For example, the elite agreement that led to the democratic transition in Costa Rica excluded (in fact outlawed) the communist party, but it nevertheless resulted in a democracy that now guarantees full contestation and participation. Likewise, the Pact of Punto Fijo, which brought democracy to Venezuela, initially excluded the communist party from participating in the electoral process.

The conceptual framework elaborated above greatly simplifies the seemingly complex political history of Latin America. We have seen that stable, democratic regimes, like those in Colombia, Costa Rica, and Venezuela, were neither the result of a democratic or "civic culture", nor the result of socioeconomic development, but rather were to a large extent created by national elites, through the process of political agreements. The political instability that was prevalent in these three countries prior to these accords virtually ended once the elites agreed upon the "rules of the game." The regime stability present in Colombia, Costa Rica, and Venezuela has been absent in other Latin American nations, precisely because in many other countries "... there is imperfect consensus on the nature of the political regime ...".³³ This is

³²Robert A. Dahl, Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1971,) pp. 1-10.

³³Anderson, pg. 310.

not to say that elite settlements eliminate all conflict. All stable democratic regimes regularly experience political and social turmoil. Demonstrations, riots, and other forms of civil discord have periodically occurred not only in the Latin American democracies but also in other stable democracies such as France and the United States. What can be argued, however, is that once elites in Colombia, Costa Rican and Venezuela decided upon a "code of conduct" that established a political regime with rules to resolve conflicts non-violently³⁴ irregular siezures of power no longer occurred.

Thus, the political instability that has plagued Latin America for most of its independent history can be in part attributed to a disunified elite structure. Regimes in most Latin countries have not persisted over long periods of time - save for a handful of personal dictatorships³⁵ - because the national elites have not agreed upon which political regime (or rules of the game) to accept. When elites agree to end their conflict and establish a democratic political system, then it is much more likely that the agreed upon regime may last. Testimony to this assertion is the fact that

³⁴Kenneth Prewitt and Alan Stone, The Ruling Elites: Elite Theory, Power, and American Democracy (New York: Harper & Row, 1973,) pg. 151.

³⁵Dictatorships, such as Somoza's in Nicaragua and Trujillo's in the Dominican Republic, do not theoretically represent elite consensus. They can be perceived as temporary conditions during which one individual or family is able to monopolize the means of coercion and thus minimize the activity of counter-elites. During the reign of both dictators, several attempts were made by opposing elites to undermine the governmental power.

the regimes in Colombia, Costa Rica and Venezuela all survived the wave of "bureaucratic-authoritarianism" that swept Latin America in the 1960s and 1970s. While Mexico also survived the instability of these decades, this study will not attempt to determine whether an elite settlement occurred there or whether Mexican elites might best be classified as ideologically unified.

In sum, the political conflict and instability historically prevalent in the Latin American region has principally resulted from elite disunity. Consensual elite unity and regime stability has in three specific cases derived from political accords between national elites, suggesting that elite unity is the by-product of those agreements. Once unity is attained, the door opens for elites to institutionalize and defend the political regime they have agreed upon, producing regime stability. The analysis in the following chapters concentrates on agreements that have resulted in democratic political regimes during the 1980s in the Dominican Republic and Peru. But if elite settlements are necessary events in the transition from regime instability to stability, then we must specify the elite settlement concept more fully.

Characteristics and Preconditions of Settlements

As indicated in chapter one, some research has recently reduced the question of regime transition to the individual (elite) level of analysis. The emergence of democracy becomes the result of human choice, rather than a cultural or structural phenomenon. This perspective is elitist since it deems

the choices of leaders as most important. Scholars have, of course, previously pointed to the importance of the elite variable in the establishment of stable, democratic regimes. Dahl argued that the emergence of polyarchy is much more likely to occur in societies where political activists believe that democracy is legitimate, have trust in others, and are willing to cooperate.³⁶ Similarly, Rustow argued that a critical phase of democratic development involves the "deliberate decision on the part of political leaders to accept ... democratic procedure."³⁷ And, Huntington pointed out that "[a]lmost always, democracy has come as much from the top down as from the bottom up ..."³⁸

But while the importance of elite decisions and agreements for the emergence and consolidation of competitive democracies appear to be important, relatively few scholars have attempted to develop an elite settlement theory of democracy. Rustow, Hartlyn, Levine, and O'Donnell and Schmitter discuss the importance of pacts, but only begin to identify the conditions that compel elites to reach agreements, or the specific characteristics to look for to determine if and when elites have reached a settlement. Burton and Higley, however, have proposed some preconditions and characteristics of elite settlements that result in

³⁶Dahl, pp. 124-207.

³⁷Dankwart A. Rustow, "Transitions to Democracy: Toward a Dynamic Model," Comparative Politics 2 (April 1970) pp. 355.

³⁸Samuel P. Huntington, "Will More Countries Become Democratic?" Political Science Quarterly 99, no. 2 (Summer 1984) pp. 210.

stable, representative regimes.³⁹ This study explores their conception of elite settlement to see whether it is useful for explaining the recent democratic transitions in the Dominican Republic and Peru.

To employ the elite settlement perspective, we must first determine if and when stable democracy is established. Once that is accomplished, we must look back for the existence of an elite settlement. However, to derive explanatory power from our perspective, we must show not only that an elite settlement took place, but also show why elites opted for a settlement rather than continuing conflictual politics. Thus, the theoretical framework must assist us in finding a settlement, as well as in pointing to the conditions and processes that lead to a settlement.

After studying elite settlements in Great Britain, Sweden, Colombia, and Venezuela, Burton and Higley found that certain characteristics were present in all four settlements.⁴⁰ The settlement process tends to be relatively rapid. Usually settlements take no more than a year to consummate. Also, settlements involve many, "face-to-face, partially secret, negotiations among the paramount leaders of the major elite factions." These negotiations are carried out by "experienced political leaders." Well known elites are much more likely than newcomers to have the full support of their followers and the respect of their political opponents. Another common characteristic is that elite settlements create "formal, written

³⁹Burton and Higley, pg. 295-307.

⁴⁰Ibid, pp. 298-301.

agreements," such as "constitutional" documents. However, even though legally binding documents result from elite settlements, elites exhibit a great deal of "forbearance" and "conciliatory behavior." During a crisis/settlement period, elites are more likely to allow minor transgressions from the law than to demand rigid interpretation. When looking for the existence of a settlement, we should find these characteristics in the behavior of elites and the settlement process prior to the establishment of stable, democratic politics.

In addition to finding the existence of a settlement among elites, it is important to discover the conditions that lead or cause elites to reach a political settlement. If the elite settlement concept is to have any explanatory power, it should help explain why elites suddenly choose to settle their differences when in the past they have been in conflict. While a settlement represents individual, elite choices about the "rules of the game", those choices are affected by a specific historical context.

Perhaps the most important condition leading to an elite settlement is the existence of a national crisis. Simply stated, elites must feel that it is imperative to settle their differences in order to deal with a national threat or crisis. Sometimes the threat is external. State-building in Western Europe was greatly facilitated by the threat of foreign aggression. In the foreword of The Formation of National States in Western Europe, Lucian Pye lamented:

Possibly most striking and disturbing is the finding of the authors of this volume that wars and threats of war played such a critical part in building the strong states of Europe.⁴¹

The development literature of the 1960s highlighted the importance of an "identity crisis" for the establishment of the nation-state.⁴² Rustow also refers to an identity phase when he writes: "... the vast majority of citizens in a democracy-to-be must not have any doubt or mental reservations as to which political community they belong to".⁴³ Thus, Rustow argues that democracy is developed only after "prolonged and inconclusive political struggle."⁴⁴ Burton and Higley argue that costly but inconclusive conflict and crises, such as civil war, create conditions where elites are more likely to reach consensus.⁴⁵ Additionally, "decades of intense but inconclusive struggles for factional ascendancy" serve to compel elites to reach an agreement.⁴⁶ In summation, elites will cease internal conflict and work toward national integration only when compelled to do so by a serious crisis or crises that demand cooperation. Elites must feel that if they do not settle upon the rules of the game they will suffer extreme consequences. As Putnam argues, "Where elites fear social convulsion ... a pattern of elite

⁴¹Lucian Pye, "Foreword," in The Formation of National States in Western Europe, edited by Charles Tilly (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1975), pg. x.

⁴²See Binder.

⁴³Rustow, pg. 350.

⁴⁴Ibid, pg. 352.

⁴⁵Burton and Higley, pp. 298-299

⁴⁶Ibid, pg. 298.

coalescence may emerge."⁴⁷ We propose, then, that prior to an elite settlement a national crisis must be present, and must be perceived by the national elites as a critical situation that they must resolve through mutual cooperation.

The second condition that encourages elite settlement is the gradual moderation of national elites. Elites are unlikely to reach a settlement with opponents who hold a very different outlook on social life or who demand drastically different solutions to social problems, especially if the different outlooks are philosophically irreconcilable. Anderson has emphasized that in Latin America new power contenders are not admitted into the political arena unless they "... provide assurances that they will not jeopardize the ability of any existing power contender to similarly participate in political activity."⁴⁸ For example, in Venezuela AD's three-year rule (the trienio 1946-1948) alienated several powerful groups, such as the Church and the armed forces. While in exile during the military regime, AD political leaders learned that they would benefit more from cooperation than from intransigence. Consequently, after AD took power in 1958 its relations with Church leaders, economic elites, political elites and the military was characterized by accommodation and compromise rather than by conflict and antagonism as had been the case during the trienio.⁴⁹ This moderation on the part of AD leaders was essential for the successful culmination

⁴⁷Putnam, pg. 119.

⁴⁸Anderson, pg. 315.

⁴⁹Levine, pp. 89-98.

of the Pact of Punto Fijo in 1958. We propose, then, that unless a rough political consensus exists among national elites, a national crisis may be insufficient to facilitate an elite settlement.

This proposition should not be confused with the second step of elite convergence. The period of elite convergence comes after the initial settlement between some factions in a partial settlement. Here we argue that moderation occurs prior to a comprehensive settlement or the first step in elite convergence (a partial settlement). Burton and Higley view an elite settlement as a sudden accord among all major factions which resolves major factional disputes and establishes consensual elite unity. However, previous elite settlements, like the one in Venezuela, exhibit prior moderation of political and other elites. And, as we shall see, political elites became more moderate in both the Dominican Republic and Peru prior to their recent democratic transitions.

Finally, structural conditions also affect the likelihood of elite settlements. Burton and Higley argue that elite settlements that have produced democracies occurred in countries that were at a "relatively low-level of socioeconomic development."⁵⁰ The important feature of underdevelopment, according to the perspective, is that elites have a high degree of autonomy in agricultural, lowly-industrialized states. Elites in complex, organized societies are less able to make substantive compromises with rival elite factions, since their organized and oftentimes ideological

⁵⁰Burton and Higley, pp. 300-301.

constituencies place many demands and constraints upon them.

Perhaps more important than the level of social mobilization however is the degree to which political leaders are able to control mobilization. For example, social mobilization in Colombia and Venezuela surged just prior to the elite settlements in those countries.⁵¹ But political leaders were able to control the mass organizations, and to demobilize them after the settlements were accepted by the key elite factions. If elites cannot demobilize their constituents, then they will not be able to implement a settlement.⁵² Thus, we propose that elite settlements are more likely to be successful when there is low social mobilization or when that mobilization is securely under the control of political elites.

⁵¹See, Alexander W. Wilde, "Conversations Among Gentlemen: Oligarchical Democracy in Colombia," in Juan Linz and Alfred Stepan, The Breakdown of Democratic Regimes: Latin America (Baltimore: The John Hopkins University Press, 1978), pp. 39, 41; Jonathan Hartlyn, "Military Governments and the Transition to Civilian Rule: The Colombian Experience of 1957-1958," Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs 26 (1984), reprinted in Abraham F. Lowenthal and J. Samuel Fitch, eds., Armies and Politics in Latin America: Revised Edition (New York: Holmes & Meier, 1986,) pp. 420-421; and, Terry Lynn Karl, "Petroleum and political Pacts: The Transitions to Democracy in Venezuela," in Guillermo O'Donnell, Philippe C. Schmitter, and Lawrence Whitehead, editors, Transitions From Authoritarian Rule: Latin America (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1986,) pp. 205, 209.

⁵²See Gavan Duffy and Nathalie J. Frensley, "Community Conflict Processes: Mobilization and Demobilization in Northern Ireland," in International Crisis and Domestic Politics edited by James W. Lamare (forthcoming).

In summation, the elite settlement approach predicts that elite unity, often achieved through an elite settlement, precedes stable democratic regimes. Additionally, elite unity is greatly assisted by the existence of a national crisis, gradual moderation among national elites, and the existence of controlled mobilization. When these conditions are present, then elites may reach a settlement that may establish democratic politics. A settlement is characterized by a relatively quick process in which previously warring elites resolve their differences through many secret meetings. These negotiations normally produce written agreements or constitutional documents. Finally, during the critical negotiations, elites exhibit unprecedented forbearance and conciliation toward each other, creating an environment of mutual trust and cooperation.

The Case Studies and Methodology

The current democratic cycle in Latin America began in 1978 when an opposition party was allowed to win power for the first time in the Dominican Republic. In that same year a free, competitive election chose a constituent assembly to write a new constitution for Peru. Since these two events, elections have determined the political leadership in both countries and irregular seizures of power, although often predicted, have not interrupted the two constitutional regimes. Certainly, the holding of elections does not guarantee that an elite settlement has taken place. But when political parties that have historically been excluded from power are allowed to hold political

power, then it is likely that some sort of rapprochement has occurred. Either a comprehensive or partial elite settlement may have taken place. And in both the Dominican Republic and Peru, opposition parties came to power in the recent democratic transitions.

In the following chapters, we will apply the elite settlement concept to determine whether the new democratic regimes in these two countries represent just another oscillation, or whether they represent the consensual unity of national elites. The research is historical and personal. Personal interviews⁵³ enhance historical chronology by getting at the attitudes and actions of elites during the democratic transitions. Our goals are to determine whether competitive democracy is present in our case studies, whether an elite settlement occurred prior to the democratic transition, and whether the characteristics and preconditions of settlements were present prior to and during a settlement. While primary and secondary historical sources can assist in this endeavor, personal interviews of individuals who were involved in the transition process are indispensable.

Chapters three and six provide a broad historical background of Dominican and Peruvian politics, respectively, indicating when competitive democracy emerged in both countries. Chapters four and seven take a closer look at the democratic transitions in each country, emphasizing the actions of political and

⁵³ Further elaboration on the personal interviews that I conducted is at the appendix.

other elites during the transitions. These historical chapters not only provide evidence for later theoretical analysis, but also give readers who are unfamiliar with the Dominican Republic and Peru the necessary historical background to adequately understand the application of the theoretical framework. Chapters five and eight apply the elite settlement concept to the historical context and elite choices in both countries. The object is to determine whether the characteristics and preconditions of elite settlements were present during the transitions to democracy. Finally, chapter nine compares and contrasts the two democratic transitions from the elite settlement perspective. It also discusses some of the implications and consequences of elite settlements.

Chapter Three

A History of Democracy in the Dominican Republic

On August 16, 1978, Antonio Guzman was inaugurated as president of the Dominican Republic. Although such an event might be matter-of-fact in many countries, for the Dominican Republic it was the first time that power was transferred peacefully from one president to another. Elections had been held in the past, but never had they resulted in a complete cycle of the transfer of power. Since that watershed election, the ballot box has determined the political leadership of the nation, and political violence has been greatly attenuated. Prior to the 1978 election, political office had been determined more by force than by electoral procedures.

Rafael Trujillo ruled the Dominican Republic from 1930 until his assassination in May 1961. Most scholars and journalists agree that the Trujillo dictatorship was one of the most brutally repressive in modern history. Certainly, during that thirty year period, opposition was not tolerated and often eliminated. Trujillo was able to dominate the nation because of his control of the armed forces. "...[T]he Dominican Army was the vehicle for Trujillo's rise to power, and the armed forces then became Trujillo's main instrument of control."¹ Trujillo's legacy was thus a politically active military that, as one analyst puts

¹Abraham F. Lowenthal, "The Dominican Republic: The Politics of Chaos," in Reform and Revolution: Readings in Latin American Politics, Arpad Von Lazar, and Robert R. Kaufman, editors, (Boston: Allyn and Bacon, 1969), pg. 40.

it, "has been an integral part of the country's political process."²

After the dictator's assassination, Joaquin Balaguer, Trujillo's nominal head of state, remained in power until a *golpe* forced him into exile in January, 1962, and a Council of State assumed control of the nation. While he was in power, Balaguer restored many civil liberties and nationalized the Trujillo family's vast land-holdings, actions that would enhance his image in the years to follow.³ During Balaguer's administration the United States continually pressed for elections. The urgency was generated by President Kennedy's Alliance for Progress, which sought to prevent the emergence of revolutionary governments by supporting the establishment of democratic governments in Latin America. The Council of State that ruled after Balaguer's ouster conceded to Washington's urging and held the first free and honest elections in over 30 years in December, 1962.

Juan Bosch was elected president and was inaugurated on February 27, 1963. Bosch was the leader of the *Partido Revolucionario Dominicano* (PRD or Dominican Revolutionary Party), a social democratic party that he had established while in exile in Cuba in 1939. He defeated Viriato Fiallo, representing the *Union Civica Nacional* (UCN or National Civic Union), a party primarily of the business community. Bosch won a commanding 64% of the vote as well as more than two

²*Ibid*, pg. 40.

³G. Pope Atkins, Arms and Politics in the Dominican Republic, (Boulder: Westview Press, Inc., 1981), pg. 12.

thirds of the seats in both houses of congress.⁴ Both parties, however, called for the end of *trujillismo*; anything that had to do with the late dictator had become anathema.

The newfound democracy proved to be short-lived, lasting only seven months. Bosch was ousted by a military *golpe* in September, 1963, and sent into exile in Puerto Rico. His progressive constitution was discarded and congress was dissolved. A three-man junta, referred to as the Triumvirate, took control, and was ultimately dominated by Reid Cabral, a man who had almost no base of support.⁵ The Triumvirate came under continual attack, but the United States was supportive, since elections had been promised for 1965.⁶ Nevertheless, austerity measures during a period of economic troubles eventually brought down the Triumvirate⁷, and the resulting power struggle led to civil war.

On April 24, 1965, the Triumvirate was overthrown by a military *golpe*. In addition to Cabral's lack of support, the *golpe* was partially sparked by a popular uprising instigated by Jose Peña Gomez, a young PRD activist. Peña Gomez took control of Radio Santo Domingo, the government radio station, and urged the masses to take to the streets in order to restore Bosch

⁴Jan Knippers Black, The Dominican Republic: Politics and Development in an Unsovereign State, (Boston: Allen & Unwin, Inc., 1986), pg. 31.

⁵Jerome Slater, Intervention and Negotiation: The United States and the Dominican Republic, (New York: Harper and Row, 1970), pg. 17.

⁶Abraham F. Lowenthal, The Dominican Intervention, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1971), pg. 16.

⁷Slater, pg. 17.

and his constitution to power. PRD radicals had acquired weapons and were passing them out to anyone who would support their "constitutionalist" cause. Although there were only 1000 to 1500 rebels on April 24, by the next morning there were several thousand.⁸ This social turmoil was enough to convince the military to oust the Triumvirate and to take steps to put down the insurrection.

The civil war's two factions were the "constitutionalists" and the "loyalists". The constitutionalists relied upon younger military officers, colonels who were currently in service, and generals who had been ousted or retired in previous power struggles and who hoped to be reinstated into the armed forces.⁹ Their military commander was Colonel Francisco Caamaño Deño, their highest ranking active duty officer. Politically, the PRD was the backbone of the movement, although the "constitutionalist" also had the support of the *Partido Revolucionario Social Cristiano* (PRSC or Social Christian Revolutionary Party) because of a pact the two parties signed in January, 1965, committing both signators to the restoration of Bosch's government.¹⁰ Additionally, two thousand leading professionals and intellectuals had endorsed a public proclamation calling for the restoration of the Bosch government.¹¹ The

⁸Audrey Bracey, Resolution of the Dominican Crisis, 1965: A Study in Mediation, (Wash. DC: Institute for the Study of Diplomacy, School of Foreign Service, Georgetown University, 1980), pg. XIV.

⁹Lowenthal, "The Dominican Republic . . .," pg. 42.

¹⁰Slater, pg. 19.

¹¹*Ibid.*

"loyalists", on the other hand, relied upon generals who supported the ouster of the Bosch government. They called their faction "loyalist", because those involved were loyal to the military institution and had not defected to the rebel camp. Their military strength came from their control of the air force, commanded by General Juan De Los Santos, and control of the tank units, commanded by General Elias Wessin y Wessin. Politically, the "loyalists" quickly established a Government of National Reconstruction or GNR, headed by General Antonio Imbert Barrera. Additionally, they enjoyed the support of the U.S. Government.

On April 28, 1965, President Johnson dispatched U.S. Marines to the Dominican Republic to "protect U.S. citizens." Eventually, about 22,000 U.S. troops occupied a zone in Santo Domingo, in effect halting all armed conflict. Most analysts, however, agree that Johnson's primary concern was preventing another Cuban revolution. On May 2, 1965, he stated: "What began as a popular democratic revolution ... [is now] in the hands of communist conspirators."¹² Prior to the U.S. intervention it appeared that the "constitutionalists" were near victory; since the U.S. government was afraid of communist influence in the "constitutionalist" ranks, it was not about to allow them victory. The occupation became an international venture when, on May 6, the Organization of American States voted to establish an Inter-American Peace Force (IAPF) in the Dominican Republic. Of course, the United States

¹²Black, pg. 38.

introduced the resolution and lobbied intensely for its passage.

The IAPF produced a stalemate in the conflict, and it soon became obvious that a negotiated solution was the only way out of the impasse. After a failed attempt by the Johnson Administration at negotiating a settlement, the OAS established the Ad Hoc Committee to attempt to resolve the conflict. The Committee eventually found a solution by facilitating a negotiated settlement between the two factions. The settlement established a provisional government acceptable to both factions that would rule until a new government could be elected.

The 1966 Elections

The main contenders in the election held on June 1, 1966, were Juan Bosch, the leader of the PRD, who returned from exile in September 1965, and Joaquin Balaguer. Balaguer had founded the *Partido Reformista* (PR or Reformist Party), in March 1962 while in exile. Balaguer received a substantial victory with 57% of the vote; Bosch received only 39%. Parties of the far right received 3.5%, while parties of the far left received less than 1%. Balaguer also won a substantial majority in both houses.¹³

There is considerable controversy over the validity of these elections. Some observers argue that the elections were "fair and free from any kind of intimidation."¹⁴ This claim is based on the fact that

¹³*Ibid*, pg. 40.

¹⁴This argument is made by Ian Bell, The Dominican Republic, (Boulder: Westview Press, 1981), pg. 98; Slater, pg. 172.; and Atkins, pg. 17.

many groups monitored the elections - the United Nations, the OAS, U.S. and Latin American journalists, labor union missions, and representatives of private groups¹⁵ - and did not criticize them in any significant way. Other observers, nevertheless, claim that the elections were in no way fair, but, on the contrary, were characterized by "repression."¹⁶ One journalist has alleged that during the campaign one general told several reporters: "If he [Bosch] takes thirty steps out of his house, we'll blow his head off."¹⁷ In fact, on March 6, one of Bosch's bodyguards was shot to death only fifty feet from Bosch's home.¹⁸ During the campaign, Bosch left his house on only two occasions - once to attend mass and once to vote. Some claim that his lackluster campaign was the result of the political violence, while others claim that Bosch was overreacting. Nevertheless, after conceding defeat, Bosch stated that the amount of fraud that was present during the election had not been sufficient to alter the results.¹⁹ In summation, while the election could be considered procedurally honest, there is sufficient indication that the political climate was dangerous and intimidating for Bosch and his PRD.

¹⁵Slater, pg. 164.

¹⁶This argument is put forth by Howard J. Wiarda, and Michael J. Kryzanek, The Dominican Republic: A Caribbean Crucible, (Boulder: Westview Press, 1982), pg. 47; Black, pp. 39-41; and Georgia Anne Ceyer, ISLA, Vol. 16, no. 5, May 1978, pg. 265.

¹⁷ISLA, vol. 16, no. 5, May 1978, pg. 265.

¹⁸Facts on File: World News Digest With Index, vol. XXVI, no. 1334, May 19-25, 1966, pg. 189.

¹⁹Facts on File, Vol. XXVI, no. 1342, July 14-20, 1966, pg. 263.

Unfortunately, the 1966 election did not pave the way for the establishment of stable democracy in the Dominican Republic. Most of the evidence indicates that President Balaguer employed the military for his political advantage by repressing the political opposition, especially PRD radicals and former "constitutionalists." From 1966 to 1971 the PRD was attacked constantly by the Army and the National Police.²⁰ Haffe Serulle, former president of the Dominican Union for the Defense of Human Rights, stated in an interview that "many leftists who fought in the civil war were systematically killed by death squads in the years after the war."²¹ In fact, some have estimated that two thousand political murders occurred from 1966 to 1971.²² One noted expert on Dominican politics described the Balaguer government as "willing to use fraud and intimidation in order to remain in power."²³

Whatever the tactics employed, they were successful in helping Balaguer win the Presidency in the 1970 and the 1974 elections. The PRD boycotted both elections charging the government with violation of civil liberties and "colossal fraud."²⁴ Although Balaguer's regime was not being challenged in the

²⁰Atkins, pg. 23.

²¹ISLA, Vol. 32, no. 5, May-June 1978, pg. 197.

²²Black, pg. 48.

²³Michael J. Kryzanek, "The 1978 Election in the Dominican Republic: Opposition Politics, Intervention and the Carter Administration," Caribbean Studies, Vol. 19, nos. 1&2, April-July 1979, pp. 57.

²⁴George E. Delury, editor, World Encyclopedia of Political systems and Parties, vol. 1, (New York: Facts on File Publications, 1983), pg. 270.

ballot boxes, it came under armed attack on two occasions. In 1971, General Wessin y Wessin admitted he had plotted to overthrow the government; and in 1973, Col. Caamaño was killed after landing a guerrilla force in the Dominican Republic. Interestingly enough, a former "constitutionalist," and a former "loyalist" had both plotted against Balaguer, an indication of extensive elite disunity.

The 1978 elections, however, were different: the PRD participated. Bosch was not the candidate, since in 1973 he had split from the party and founded the *Partido de la Liberacion Dominicana* (PLD or Dominican Liberation Party). The PRD candidate was Antonio Guzman, a wealthy landowner who had been a key figure in the 1965 negotiations as a possible leader of the provisional government. Balaguer and military leaders on several occasions assured the public that the elections would be respected. In fact, in March, Balaguer and Guzman signed a "non-aggression pact," in an effort to reduce violence and ensure that the results would be respected.²⁵

Despite such assurances, the election was marred by violence, military involvement and irregularities. In April, the newsweekly *Ahora!* cited twelve different cases where the opposition was subjected to political violence by the ruling party and the military.²⁶ Guzman, himself, was not allowed to campaign and was even jailed in some rural areas by the local military

²⁵Facts on File, Vol. 38, no. 1951, March 31, 1978, pg. 230.

²⁶"La Violencia Electoral," Ahora!, no. 754, April 24, 1978, pp. 12-14.

authorities.²⁷ More importantly, on 17 May, the day after the election, the National Police occupied the headquarters of the *Junta Central Electoral*, JCE (Central Electoral Board), and stopped the vote count. On the next day, Balaguer went on national television and announced that the vote count would resume, and that the results would be honored. The vote count, however, proceeded at a snail's pace, raising suspicions. Indeed, the JCE was forced to hire foreign election specialists to verify the electoral results, since most Dominicans who were qualified would not take on the responsibility because of fear.²⁸ On May 26, the JCE finally announced that Guzman had won the election, but that it was investigating charges of fraud brought against the PRD by the PR. When the official results were eventually made public on July 7, Guzman was still the victor, but his party had lost four senate seats, thus giving Balaguer's party a majority in the senate. Initially, the PRD had won control of both houses, but the JCE overturned the results of four senate races, giving the PR a 16 to 11 edge in the senate.²⁹ Not only did this ruling provide the PR with the opportunity to block PRD legislation, it also gave the PR considerable control over the judicial branch, since the senate selects Supreme Court justices. The PRD protested the JCE's decision and brought their case to the Supreme Court, but the court

²⁷Interview with Hugo Tolentino Dipp, PRD vice-president, Santo Domingo, Dominican Republic, 25 January 1989.

²⁸"Contrataran a Tecnicos Electorales Extranjeros," Diario De Las Americas, no. 291. June 15, 1978, pg. 3.

²⁹Kryzanek, pg. 62.

ruled that it did not have jurisdiction over electoral matters and the decision stood.

The 1978 Transfer of Power

In spite of all such irregularities, the 1978 elections delivered power to an opposition party for the first time in Dominican history, and paved the way for the establishment of stable democracy. Upon taking office, Guzman put through congress a general amnesty bill and quickly took steps to depoliticize the armed forces. During his administration he was able to create a less violent political atmosphere by helping to lessen "ancient animosities."³⁰ He also announced that he would not run for the presidency for a second term in an effort to end *continuismo*.³¹

Unfortunately, Antonio Guzman did not complete his term in office; he committed suicide on July 3, 1982. There is no indication, however, that his death could have been a political murder. Guzman was in the presidential palace with his brother-in-law and bodyguards when he entered the bathroom and shot himself with his pistol.³² It is widely believed that he took his life during a period of intense depression, generated by his realization that many high officials in his administration were involved in corruption.³³

³⁰Wiarda and Kryzanek, pg. 97.

³¹*Continuismo*, substantively translated as continuation of power by an individual, was an attack against *Trujillismo* - the Trujillo rule - and the 12 year rule of Balaguer. Guzman on many occasions attacked *continuismo*, and equated it with *caudillismo*, or strong-man rule.

³²*ISLA*, Vol. 25, no. 1, July 1982, pg. 147.

³³*Ibid*

Guzman had always attacked government corruption and vowed to end it. In fact, prior to his inauguration, in 1978, he stated that his "greatest dream" was to establish a government that was a "model of honesty."³⁴ Balaguer has recently claimed that Guzman's suicide was influenced by the fact that Guzman's arch-rival within the PRD, Jorge Blanco, had intentions of carrying out reprisals and persecutions against him, if he (Blanco) became the next Dominican president.³⁵

The elections of 1982 gave the PRD another presidential victory, and control of both houses of Congress. As Guzman had feared, Jorge Blanco won the PRD nomination and presidency of the nation. The election also gave Juan Bosch nearly 10% of the vote, providing his PLD with nine seats in the chamber of deputies.³⁶ While there were no major complaints about the 1982 electoral proceedings, there were approximately 12 deaths and several hundred people injured as a result of political violence.³⁷ However, an important development had occurred in Dominican politics - former hatred had been significantly modified. For example, prior to the election the Army

³⁴"Dijo Guzman que suena con realizar un gobierno que sea modelo de honestidad," Diario de las Americas, June 30, 1978, pg. 8.

³⁵Joaquin Balaguer, Memorias de un Cortesano de la "Era de Trujillo" (Santo Domingo: Editora Corripio, C. por A., 1988), pg. 370. Blanco had led an "obstructionist opposition" in the Congress during Guzman's presidency, 1978-1982; see Jonathan Hartlyn, "A Democratic Shoot-Out in the D.R.: An Analysis of the 1986 Elections," Caribbean Review 15, no. 3 (Winter 1987) pg. 15.

³⁶Delury, pg. 271.

³⁷"Republica Dominicana," Caribbean Monthly Bulletin, Vol. 16, nos. 5-6, May/June 1982, pg. 36.

Chief of Staff, General Manuel Lachapelle, stated that the left represented "no danger" to the nation, and that their participation in the election "might possibly enhance democracy."³⁸ The military had also lost its fear of the PRD, and especially of Antonio Guzman. In fact, by 1982 most military leaders wanted Guzman to be reelected. One PRD vice-president has confided that Guzman "drank and rode horses," and because of his land-owning background had a "feudal demeanor;" military leaders liked and admired such behavior.³⁹ Finally, and of paramount importance, the most feared PRD leader - Peña Gomez - was elected mayor of Santo Domingo, the nation's capitol. The man who had helped instigate the 1965 civil war, and whom many had labelled a communist, even as late as 1978, was now a government elite!

The elections of 1986 produced the second peaceful transfer of power to an opposition candidate, thus further enhancing the democratic process. Joaquin Balaguer, whose PR party had merged with the PRSC⁴⁰, defeated Jacobo Majluta, the PRD candidate and vice-president under Guzman. Perhaps the most important aspect of this election with respect to democracy is that there was some indication that the PRD was attempting to establish itself as the dominant

³⁸Latin America Weekly Report, Jan 29, 1982 (WR-82-05), pg. 11.

³⁹Interview with Tolentino.

⁴⁰The union occurred in 1985. The PR also became a member of the Christian Democratic International, and is now officially known as the *Partido Reformista Social Cristiano*.

government party, much like the PRI in Mexico.⁴¹ Not only did the PR victory spoil this intent, but Bosch's strong showing (over 18% of the vote and 16 seats in the Chamber of Deputies) forced the PRD to negotiate with the PR. In fact, Balaguer held secret talks with the PRD after his inauguration in order to "secure its support in parliament."⁴²

The elections, however, were not devoid of problems. Six people died as a result of political violence during the 1986 campaign.⁴³ During the vote count Majluta claimed that the JCE favored Balaguer. Two of the three board members, including the JCE president, resigned in protest, resulting in the discontinuation of the vote count. The controversy was resolved when Majluta and Balaguer met and agreed upon a government of "national unity."⁴⁴

An important aspect of the 1986 elections was that Juan Bosch, who in 1978 had labelled the PRD's involvement in electoral politics as "treason,"⁴⁵ became much more sympathetic toward electoral politics. Curiously, during the 1986 campaign, Bosch stated that Dominican capitalism had to be strengthened before socialism could succeed, and he "... considerably moderated his stance on many issues ..."⁴⁶ Clearly,

⁴¹Delury, pg. 271.

⁴²"Dominican Republic," Latin America Weekly Report, August 28, 1986 (WR-86-33), pg. 11.

⁴³ISLA, Vol. 32, no. 5, May/June 1986, pg. 191.

⁴⁴Latin America Weekly Report, June 6, 1986 (WR-86-22), pg. 10; for an good overview and analysis of the 1986 elections, see Hartlyn.

⁴⁵Interview with Tolentino.

⁴⁶ISLA, vol. 32, no. 5, May-Jun 1978, pg. 199., and Hartlyn, pg. 14.

Bosch, encouraged by his increasing electoral support - 10% in 1982, and 18% in 1986 - had decided that moderation was the key to electoral viability.

All present indications point to a continuation of democratic politics in the Dominican Republic. The 1990 elections will most likely be open to all political parties, free from extensive manipulation, and respected by the political elites, political parties, and the mass population. The greatest fear seems to be the possibility that Bosch could win in 1990, and that the military and economic elites would not allow him to take office. However, a high-ranking general involved in the GNR and labelled a rightist by the Johnson Administration expressed candidly that the threat of communism in the Dominican Republic is no longer realistic.⁴⁷ And, in a recent press conference, Balaguer declared that if Juan Bosch won the 1990 elections "... he would personally celebrate it as a triumph of Dominican democracy."⁴⁸

It appears, then, that there is sufficient evidence to conclude that democracy exists in the Dominican Republic, and that it rests on a considerable foundation of political stability. Deaths from

⁴⁷ Anonymous interview with retired general involved in the GNR, Santo Domingo, Dominican Republic, 19 January 1989.

⁴⁸ Listin Diario, January 8, 1989, pg. 1. All of the individuals interviewed by the author shared the opinion that if Bosch were to win in 1990 he should definitely be allowed to take office. There were three basic reasons offered: because democracy should be preserved; because Bosch would not, and probably could not, make drastic reforms or changes; and because a civil war could break out if he were denied power.

political violence have declined considerably throughout the years under examination.⁴⁹ Additionally, estimates of the extent of political rights in the Dominican Republic indicate marked improvement from 1977 to 1986.⁵⁰

Not only are irregular and forcible transfers of power a thing of the past, but, most importantly, there have been significant changes in the behavior and attitudes of political elites. Indeed, we can say with a great deal of certainty that previously "... warring national elite factions suddenly and deliberately reorganized their relations ...," so that now there is "... open but peaceful competition ..."⁵¹ In the following pages, we will argue that this important change in elite behavior was indeed the result of a sudden and deliberate elite settlement. First, we will examine in considerable detail the 1978 election crisis that resulted in the first peaceful transfer of power in Dominican history. Since that crisis represents the democratic watershed for the Dominican Republic, that

⁴⁹For specific estimates see, Charles L. Taylor, and David A. Jodice, World Handbook of Political and Social Indicators, volume 2, 3d edition, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1983), pg. 48.

⁵⁰On a scale from one to seven, one being the greatest amount of political rights, the Dominican Republic received a 4 in 1977, a 2 from 1978 to 1981, and a 1 in 1982 and 1983. See James W. Wilkie and Adam Perkal, editors, Statistical Abstract of Latin America, Volume 24, (Los Angeles: UCLA Latin American Center Publications, 1985), pg. 169.

⁵¹Michael G. Burton and John Higley, "Elite Settlements," American Sociological Review 52 (June 1987) pg. 295.

is where we should find evidence for the existence of an elite settlement.

Chapter Four

The 1978 Dominican Electoral Crisis

Immediately prior to the 1978 elections the political climate in the Dominican Republic was relatively more tolerant of political opposition than in the 1970 and 1974 elections. Perhaps a major reason for the relaxed climate was the selection of Antonio Guzman as the PRD's presidential candidate. Guzman was a wealthy rancher who was "acceptable to the Dominican oligarchy and the U.S. Embassy."¹ However, even the Dominican Communist Party was allowed to participate for the first time in Dominican history. As early as January, General Neit Nivar Seijas, Chief of the National Police, announced that all parties would be treated equally and that the National Police had no preferences.² Balaguer also welcomed a group of OAS observers, composed of three former Latin American presidents. Even more surprising, in March, Balaguer met with Guzman, Salvador Blanco, President of the PRD, and Jacobo Majluta, the PRD's vice-presidential candidate; all four signed a "non-aggression" pact. The pact committed both parties to "insure that the election was orderly; respect the results of the voting; support the efforts of the next government ...; and guarantee the safety of the losing candidates and their supporters."³ Perhaps more important is what was

¹Howard J. Wiarda, and Michael J. Kryzanek, The Dominican Republic: A Caribbean Crucible, (Boulder: Westview Press, 1982), pg. 11.

²Ahora!, No. 741, January 23, 1978, pg. 11.

³"Dominican Republic," Facts on File, Volume 38, no. 1951, March 31, 1978, pg. 230.

implied by this agreement - that such democratic guarantees had not been provided in the past. In fact, in 1978 political violence and intimidation were still very much a part of the political landscape. In an April editorial, *Ahora!* mentioned that in spite of the "non-aggression" pact, Dominican politics was still carried on with "rocks, shots and knives."⁴ And, as already pointed out, the military in some areas of the country seriously curtailed Guzman's campaigning. Nevertheless, the PRD felt confident enough with the political climate to participate in the first elections since 1966.

On the day after the elections, all the preelection promises degenerated into rhetoric when the National Police took over the JCE headquarters and halted the vote count. Yet any attempt to preclude a PRD victory was going to be difficult since 25% of the votes had been counted and the PRD was ahead by a margin of 3 to 2 when the military stopped the count.⁵ The results of the voting had been broadcast on radio and television. In addition, a large majority of the precincts had tallied the votes soon after the polls were closed, and had provided certified copies of the results to officials from each political party.⁶ Thus, engineering a Balaguer victory would have been an obvious and gross manipulation of the elections.

⁴"Editorial: Y El Pacto?," *Ahora!*, No. 753, April 17, 1978, pg. 3.

⁵"La Pesadilla Electoral," *Ahora!*, No. 758, May 22, 1978, pg. 6.

⁶*ISLA*, vol. 12, no. 5, May 1978, pg. 250.

The reaction to the military intervention was quick, critical and came from almost all corners. However, the PRD refrained from inciting violent reactions to the military intervention. Only the PRD's vice-presidential candidate, Jacobo Majluta, employed virulent language when he stated that if the PRD was denied victory the result would be "a general strike ... with a series of measures that will overthrow the government".⁷ On the other hand, both Salvador Blanco and Jose Peña Gomez were "low key in their comments about the irregularities and the military role" in the elections.⁸ Guzman's strategy, for the most part, was to appeal to international leaders, especially to President Carter, to place pressure upon Balaguer and the military, rather than to "... call the people into the streets ..."⁹ Peña Gomez urged PRD members, all other political parties, national institutions and important personalities to become involved in a "... peaceful movement in support of the PRD victory," and emphasized that the most important thing was the "maintenance of peace and harmony among all dominicans." ¹⁰

The United States and other foreign nations and organizations quickly responded to the PRD's plea. On May 17, U.S. Ambassador Robert Yost attempted to see Balaguer on two separate occasions, but Balaguer

⁷*Ibid*, pg. 243.

⁸*Ibid*, pg. 264.

⁹Michael J. Kryzanek, "The 1978 Election in the Dominican Republic: Opposition Politics, Intervention and the Carter Administration," Caribbean Studies, Vol. 19, nos. 1&2, April-July 1979, pg. 59.

¹⁰Listin Diario, May 18, 1978, pg. 1.

refused to see him; the U.S. Defense Attache tried to see General Beauchamp, also with no success.¹¹ On May 18, 1978, U.S. Secretary of State Cyrus Vance sent an urgent message to Balaguer (after he was unable to reach him by phone¹²) emphasizing the "serious consequences for bilateral relations" if the vote count was not resumed immediately.¹³ Soon thereafter, President Carter in a speech stated that U.S. economic and military assistance to the Dominican Republic were contingent upon the "integrity" of the elections.¹⁴ In addition to the U.S. pressure, the president of Venezuela organized a joint protest with Colombia, Panama and Costa Rica. The Socialist International, which the PRD had joined in 1976, sent strong protests from many Western European nations. And, needless to say, the OAS registered a complaint as well.

In addition to the international pressure, the electoral intervention was severely criticized by domestic groups and economic elites. On May 18, an "influential group" of economic leaders published a communique in major newspapers stating that a military golpe would "give rise to violence and disturbance among the citizenry."¹⁵ On 19 May, a full page advertisement entitled "National Advice From

¹¹G. Pope Atkins, Arms and Politics in the Dominican Republic, (Boulder: Westview Press, Inc., 1981), pg. 105.

¹²Joaquin Balaguer, Memorias de un Cortesano de la "Era de Trujillo" (Santo Domingo: Editora Corripio, C. por A., 1988), pg. 310.

¹³Caribbean Monthly Bulletin, Vol. 12, no. 4, April-May 1978, pg. 3.

¹⁴Kryzanek, pg. 58.

¹⁵ISLA, Vol. 12, no. 5, May 1978, pg. 252.

Businessmen" and signed by most of Santo Domingo's business groups was published in the *Listin Diario*.

The advertisement stated:

...we are confident that the norms of good sense will prevail in the conscience of everyone, and that the will of the dominican people, legally expressed through the voting urns, will be respected.¹⁶

On May 20, members of professional organizations in Santiago (the nation's second largest city) also took out a one-page advertisement addressed to President Balaguer, the President of the JCE, and to the national and international public opinion. The advertisement expressed the "most energetic protest" against the military intervention in the vote count.¹⁷ And, on the same day, the professional, cultural, labor, religious, and commercial organizations of Puerto Plata published a communique that called on Balaguer to "respect" the results of the election.¹⁸ A Dominican executive in a U.S.-owned company in Santo Domingo was quoted as saying: "These guys who signed the communiques, you put them all together and you have 75% of the money in this country."¹⁹

Protests were registered from virtually all levels and sectors of Dominican society, "including the Church, the private sector, professional groups, trade unions, masonic lodges, universities, the press, and

¹⁶Listin Diario, May 19, 1978, pg. 3.

¹⁷Ibid, May 20, 1978, pg. 13.

¹⁸The communique published in El Nacional de Ahora!, May 20, 1978, pg. 24, was signed by key leaders of Puerto Plata.

¹⁹Ibid.

political parties."²⁰ Even the PR's candidate for mayor of Santo Domingo resigned in protest.²¹ And in a case of historic irony, Rhadames Trujillo, the dead dictator's son, stated that Balaguer should turn power over to the PRD, since "there is no doubt that Guzman is the winner."²²

Resumption of the Vote Count

Balaguer quickly responded to the pressure and managed to ease the tensions by convincing the National Police to allow the electoral process to proceed. Balaguer spent a great deal of time on the 17th and 18th of May meeting with military leaders. One key individual was informed by several generals on 17 May that they would not turn power over to the PRD.²³ Fortunately for the democratic process, the military was divided. Neit Nivar Seijas, Chief of the National Police was by most accounts the driving force behind the interruption of the vote. Other military leaders, however, were against *continuismo* and wanted the democratic process to proceed unhampered.²⁴ In fact, on 19 May, those who were opposed to a *golpe* (predominantly middle-grade officers) formed a group in an effort to support the democratic process. These

²⁰Latin America Political Report, Vol. 12, no. 20, May 26, 1978, pg. 158.

²¹*Ibid.*

²²El Nacional De Ahora! May 19, 1978, pg. 21.

²³Interview with Marino Vinicio Castillo, PR attorney in 1978, Santo Domingo, Dominican republic, 11 January 1989. Castillo argues that Balaguer was not in favor of preventing the PRD from assuming power, but was conscious of the fact that it would be difficult to persuade the generals to back off.

²⁴Atkins, pg. 107-111.

officers believed that the military needed to become de-politicized, and believed that a *golpe* could result in another civil war.²⁵

Eventually, Balaguer was able, with the assistance of Galo Plaza Lasso, former president of Ecuador and member of the OAS observer team, to convince the military to allow the continuation of the vote count.²⁶ Pressures from foreign nations (especially the United States), from domestic groups and leaders, and most importantly from disaffected military officers all convinced the adventurist generals that a *golpe* would only produce social chaos and international reproach.

Late in the evening, on May 18, Balaguer went on national television and told the nation that the vote count would quickly resume, and condemned the external intervention in Dominican affairs. He stated that what was important was not the fate of an individual or a political party, but rather the "survival of our incipient democracy." He called for an end to the public communiques because they "contribute to the increase of public tensions."²⁷ The PRD viewed the speech essentially as an admission of defeat. Their interpretation was correct, since the JCE announced the following day that the opposition was ahead by over 131,000 votes.²⁸ It appeared that the crisis had been resolved.

In the following weeks, however, tensions ebbed and flowed as both parties, and certainly the military,

²⁵Ibid, pp. 108-110.

²⁶ISLA, Vol. 12, no. 5, May 1978, pg. 246.

²⁷Listin Diario, May 19, 1978, pg. 2.

²⁸Ibid, pg. 248.

jockeyed for position. Tensions were heightened when on May 22, the newspaper, *El Caribe*, published a New York Times interview with Peña Gomez in which he was quoted as saying that the new government would be "socialist," and implied that the new government might establish diplomatic ties with Cuba.²⁹ Since the military leaders objected primarily to Peña Gomez's involvement in politics, Guzman was forced to quickly defuse the situation, especially in light of the fact that the PR was again charging that Guzman was an "extreme leftist."³⁰ Guzman thus emphasized that he would not establish relations with Cuba or the Soviet Union, that his government would not be socialist, but democratic, and would respect freedom of the press, private property, human rights, and individual rights, that he would strengthen ties with the United States, and that Peña Gomez not only would not be involved in the next government, but would be out of the country for at least one year after the new government's inauguration.³¹ Guzman stated for the press: "I reaffirm that we will respect free enterprise, private property, and human rights," and that "my government under no circumstance will be of a socialist form."³²

²⁹Caribbean Monthly Bulletin, Vol. 12, no. 4, April-May 1978, pg. 2.

³⁰ISLA, Vol. 12, no. 5, May 1978, pg. 257.

³¹Ibid; also Caribbean Monthly Bulletin, Vol. 12, no. 4, April-May 1978, pg. 2. Peña Gomez, sensing that his presence could become an obstacle to a democratic transition, had previously volunteered to leave the country for a significant period of time. Once the crisis was resolved, however, he decided not to leave the country after all.

³²Listin Diario, May 24, 1978, pp. 1 and 14.

Perhaps to further convince the skeptics, two weeks later, Guzman stated that Communists would be excluded from his government.³³ During this time, Guzman also toned down his anti-corruption stance. Throughout his campaign, he had attacked government corruption, especially corruption perpetrated by the armed forces. However, late in May, he stated that he would not prosecute past crimes - those committed prior to his inauguration - and that he would respect the "institutionality" of the armed forces.³⁴

But the PRD's political stance was not the most contentious and disturbing issue; rather, the electoral count was. Even though the vote count had resumed, it was proceeding at a suspiciously slow pace, convincing many that the PR and the military were still looking for a way to preclude a PRD victory. The problem was that many of the precincts were not sending their official results to the JCE in Santo Domingo. And, the JCE was unable to contact or find many provincial officials. It is widely believed, and there is some documentation, that these officials were hesitant to send in the results because of threats by the military.³⁵ Lending credibility to this position is the fact that official tallies from remote precincts that were pro-Balaguer arrived in Santo Domingo "within a day of the balloting," yet areas where Guzman was popular that were only two hours from the capital had not sent in official results one week after the day of

³³"Dijo Guzman que Excluiria a Comunistas," Diario De Las Americas, No. 284, June 7, 1978, pg. 3.

³⁴ISLA, Vol. 16, no. 5, May 1978, pg. 266 and 272.

³⁵ISLA, Vol. 12, no. 5, May 1978, pg. 251.

the election.³⁶ A further complication developed when the President of the JCE, Manuel Castillo, disappeared soon after the vote count was stopped by the military, and the interim President, Hugo Vargas Subervi was still in charge.

The PRD's worst fears materialized on June 16, when the PR petitioned the JCE either to hold complementary elections or to annul the May 16 election. The PR launched a public relations campaign of its own by purchasing space in the newspapers in order to convince the public that fraud on the part of the PRD had taken place. The PR's lawyer, Vinicio Castillo, argued that many PR supporters were omitted from the 1978 voting lists, and thus the PR had lost a great deal of support because its voters were not allowed to vote.³⁷ There was considerable, negative reaction to the PR's attempts at preventing Guzman from taking office, however. Even though Balaguer had called for an end to the communiques, many groups and individuals continued to buy space in the newspapers to publicly demand that the popular mandate be respected. In late June, more than fifty labor, professional, cultural, religious and political organizations promised to fight to defend the popular will by establishing the *Comite Para la Defensa de la Voluntad*

³⁶*Ibid*, pg. 264.

³⁷Interview with Castillo. Castillo does not know whether the problem of the voting lists was intentional or technical. Nevertheless, he is still convinced that the PR suffered a great deal because of the irregularity.

Popular (Committee for the Defense of the Popular Will)).³⁸

About three weeks after the election, therefore, matters had reached a critical moment. The PR and the armed forces appeared to be engineering an electoral golpe, while international and domestic groups were demanding that the election be respected. The stage was set for either an escalation of the crisis that could lead to another civil war or for a political settlement.

Crisis Resolution

In the end, the crisis was resolved and Guzman was allowed to take office. However, owing to the JCE decision, the PRD lost four senate seats, providing the PR with a majority in that chamber, and thus control of the judiciary. There is convincing evidence that this co-victory was the result of a compromise or settlement between Guzman, Balaguer and the armed forces.

Prior to the JCE ruling, Guzman met with Balaguer on three occasions, with military leaders on two occasions, and once with the U.S. Ambassador. On May 30, Guzman and Balaguer met, in Guzman's words, to obtain a better "understanding" and to discuss the "transition of power."³⁹ The meeting lasted twenty minutes and was conducted in private with only the president and president-elect in attendance. After the meeting, Guzman characterized the discussion as

³⁸"La Historia de Una Angustia de 55 Dias," Ahora!, No. 766, July 17, 1978, pg. 9.

³⁹"Recibe Balaguer a Guzman," Diario De Las Americas, No. 279, June 1, 1978, pg. 9.

"extremely cordial" and stated: "We have seated the base for a series of meetings and dialogues which we will celebrate in the future."⁴⁰ One week later, on July 7, Guzman met with the Secretary of the Armed Forces, General Juan Beauchamp Javier, and other military leaders for a period of fifty minutes. Guzman, who had requested the meeting, stated that the purpose of the encounter was to maintain good relations with that "important sector" - the military. He characterized the meeting as "very cordial,"⁴¹ and claimed that the interchange "was very beneficial and fruitful."⁴² Guzman met with Balaguer for the second time for just over forty minutes on June 8. After their meeting, Guzman said: "I know that on 16 August I will take possession. The new government will take possession."⁴³ He also revealed that Balaguer had authorized him to visit with the Chief of the National Police. Three days later, on June 11, Guzman did just that - he met with General Neit Nivar Seijas, the man who had initiated the electoral intervention, for twenty-five minutes. Prior to the meeting, Balaguer had announced that he was giving the National Police a pay raise. After the meeting, Guzman stated that he had told Nivar Seijas that Balaguer had beat him to the punch, since he would have done the same once he was

⁴⁰Listin Diario, May 31, 1978, pg. 1 and 15.

⁴¹"Se Reune Guzman Con El Alto Mando Militar," Diario De Las Americas, No. 286, June 9, 1978, pg. 7.

⁴²El Nacional de Ahora! June 7, 1978, pp. 1.

⁴³Listin Diario, June 9, 1978, pg. 1, and "Asegura Guzman Que No Tiene Dudas De Que Asumira El Poder El Dia 16 de Agosto," Diario De Las Americas, No. 288, June 11, 1978, pg. 11.

inaugurated.⁴⁴ Guzman and Balaguer met for the last time on June 17. This time, unlike the previous meetings, the Balaguer regime released official photographs of the encounter that lasted one hour and twenty minutes. After the meeting, Balaguer stated that he was confident that the electoral crisis would be resolved; Guzman added that the JCE would announce the official results of the election within eight to ten days.⁴⁵ Guzman also mysteriously told the press that he could not reveal details of the meeting to them or to anyone; he was quoted as saying: "There are things that I can not reveal to anyone."⁴⁶ Finally, Guzman met with U.S. Ambassador Robert Yost on June 20 for a brief fifteen minutes.⁴⁷

On 23 June, Guzman visited the PRD Headquarters and urged party militants to remain calm. He also told them that once the JCE announced its decision, "all will be normalized in the country."⁴⁸ Guzman's action strongly suggests not only that he was confident that he would be the next Dominican president but also that he was aware of the upcoming JCE decision.

Clearly, the meetings described above are insufficient by and of themselves to conclude that a definitive settlement or compromise was worked out by Guzman, Balaguer and the military, especially since

⁴⁴"Se Entrevista Guzman Con El Jefe de la Policia," Diario De Las Americas, No. 290, June 14, 1978, pg. 3, and El Nacional De Ahora! June 12, 1978, pg. 1.

⁴⁵"Confia Balaguer en que se Solucione Crisis Electoral," Diario De Las Americas, June 20, 1978, pg. 3.

⁴⁶Listin Diario, June 19, 1978, pg. 1.

⁴⁷El Nacional de Ahora! June 21, 1978, pg. 1 and 2.

⁴⁸Ibid, June 23, 1978, pg. 2.

details of the meetings are not available. However, as we shall see, reactions to the arbitrary JCE decision by the PRD, the PR and the armed forces, and the revelations of key individuals provide additional support for the assertion that some sort of agreement was reached.

It seems that Dominicans understand the importance of the JCE decision quite well, since they refer to it as the "historic decision" - *el fallo historico*.⁴⁹ The JCE's July 7 ruling to overturn four senatorial contests, while historically important, was also totally arbitrary. The PR had claimed that in many precincts PR supporters were kept off the computerized electoral roster because of a conspiracy between the PRD and some JCE officials. The PRD, on the other hand, argued that the rosters were not up to date because of the enormous voter turnout, and that large numbers of PRD supporters had also been excluded from voting. The JCE, however, sided with the PR. The average abstention rate in the election had been 27%, but in four districts the abstention rate had been higher. So the JCE estimated the number of voters that had been unable to vote in those four districts and gave the PR a percentage of that estimate (the percentage they had received in the election). This new total put the PR ahead of the PRD in all four cases. What was most objectionable, however, was that no other party received a percentage of the estimated abstention.

⁴⁹Arzeno Rodriguez, Luis, Politicicos Y Partidos Politicos Dominicanos (Santo Domingo: Publicaciones America, 1982) pg. 303.

If the JCE's decision was unusual, the reactions to the decision were even more so. The PR's attorney, Mario Vinicio Castillo, called the ruling "absurd", "anti-judicial", and "unconstitutional".⁵⁰ On July 13, both Balaguer and Guzman went on national television to discuss the JCE's ruling. Balaguer stated that "even though it [the decision] is monstrous in its judicial aspect, it is convenient for the country because it brings to an end a dangerous crisis ..."⁵¹ He also said that even though some PRD members were criticizing the decision they should realize that the PR and the PRD had signed the "non-aggression" pact that committed him to cooperate with the new government and the "necessary" reforms it would initiate, including agrarian reform. Finally, he added that the JCE's decision was actually "convenient", because President Guzman would need an "independent political force" to counterbalance the radical forces within the PRD (an interesting comment from a man who had repressed the political opposition for 12 years.)⁵²

Guzman and PRD leaders, while certainly critical of the decision, exhibited a great deal of restraint and moderation. In order to avert the possibility of chaos, Peña Gomez in a radio speech aired on the night of the JCE ruling called for "patience and calm" and urged party militants not to obey any orders that did not originate directly from the PRD Executive

⁵⁰Caribbean Monthly Bulletin, Vol. 12, no. 4, July 1978, pg. 2. Castillo still stands by these characterizations.

⁵¹Listin Diario, July 14, 1978, pg. 1.

⁵²Caribbean Monthly Bulletin, Vol. 12, no. 7, July 1978, pp. 3-4. (excerpts from Balaguer's speech.)

Committee.⁵³ In his July 13 address, Guzman asked all Dominicans, especially PRD supporters, for "cordiality, tranquility and harmony." He also stated that the ruling should not detract from the "joy and satisfaction" of the PRD victory, and that the decision was "worthy of being pardoned."⁵⁴ In a radio speech on July 17, Peña Gomez stated that the *fallo* was unconstitutional, but that the PRD National Executive Committee had decided to accept it as "valid," so that it would not succeed in provoking the PRD to "irresponsibly launch its masses into the streets."⁵⁵

Finally, the military and national police supported the decision wholeheartedly. On July 12, the armed forces and the National Police promulgated a declaration signed by all officers of the rank of captain and above supporting the JCE's decision. The declaration, published in the *Listin Diario*, stated that the Army, Navy, Air Force, and National Police "offered their unconditional support to the ruling decreed by the JCE," and added that the decision "could guarantee the continuation of peace ... maintain the constitutional regime and make possible the peaceful transition of power."⁵⁶

Negotiated Settlement

⁵³Listin Diario, July 8, 1978, pg. 1 and 2, and "La Historia De Una Angustia de 55 Dias," Ahora!, No. 766, July 17, 1978, pg. 9.

⁵⁴Ibid, pp. 2-3 (excerpts from Guzman's speech), and Latin America Political Report, Vol. 12, no. 27, July 14, 1978, 224.

⁵⁵Interview with Sara Peralta De Rathe, historian, Santo Domingo, Dominican Republic, January 1989.

⁵⁶Listin Diario, July 12, 1978, pg. 2.

This overwhelming acceptance and support of the JCE's totally arbitrary decision certainly lends credibility to the assertion that a political compromise was reached. If not, how could we explain the unanimous support of an arbitrary decision by factions that only one month earlier were on the verge of serious conflict, perhaps even civil war?

Additional evidence comes from several analysts who closely watched the electoral crisis evolve. They concluded that the JCE's ruling was in fact the result of an agreement between the PRD, the PR and the armed forces. One study argued that:

Under an arrangement worked out when Guzman's election hung in the balance [the weeks prior to the JCE decision], the PRD agreed to an allocation of seats in the Dominican Congress that gave Balaguer's Reformista Party control of the senate.... As a result of this arrangement, and perhaps for the first time in Dominican history, a strong and viable opposition emerged ...⁵⁷

Additionally, Latin America: Political Report stated in the July 28, 1978 issue: "The arrangement looks somewhat similar to that established in Colombia, where the Conservative and Liberal parties share power and its fruits, overtly or covertly."⁵⁸ Those who have

⁵⁷Wiarda and Kryzanek, pg. 95. Unfortunately, the authors do not substantiate their conclusion with any evidence. However, both authors have published extensively on the Dominican Republic and Kryzanek was present during the crisis.

⁵⁸Latin America: Political Report, Vol. 12, no. 29, July 28, 1978, pg. 229. Unfortunately, as with the previous conclusion, no facts are given to substantiate the conclusion. And, it is now obvious that, if indeed there was an agreement, it was not a long-term, power-sharing one like the one in Colombia.

studied the crisis thus sense that some form of arrangement was worked out between the key elites involved. The series of secret meetings, the mild reactions to the JCE's arbitrary decision, and the appeal for cooperation after the decision, all lend support to this conclusion.

Finally, political leaders who were involved in, or closely followed the crisis, almost without exception believe that a settlement did in fact occur. Some have provided details related to the settlement negotiations. There is strong evidence that sometime in June, when the PR was attempting to have the JCE reevaluate the election, a secret meeting occurred between a close friend of Balaguer, Guzman's daughter (Sonia Guzman), the U.S. Political Attache, and an emissary sent by President Perez of Venezuela.⁵⁹ The purpose of the meeting was to reach a solution to the political impasse. Two sources claim that President Perez of Venezuela introduced the idea of a "transaction" that would give presidential power to the PRD, while at the same time give the PR control of the senate.⁶⁰ One observer close to Balaguer and intimately involved in the crisis claims that Sonia Guzman agreed to the "transaction" on behalf of her father, because Antonio Guzman preferred to have a senate led by Joaquin Balaguer than by his party rival

⁵⁹Interviews with Castillo, Leonel Fernandez, PLD Press Secretary, and Hugo Tolentino Dipp, PRD vice-president, Santo Domingo, Dominican Republic, January 1989.

⁶⁰Interviews with Castillo, and Julio Brea Franco, political consultant and elections expert, Santo Domingo, Dominican Republic, January 1989.

Jorge Blanco.⁶¹ This assertion is understandable in light of Balaguer's recent revelation concerning the bitter animosity between Guzman and Blanco.⁶² One observer, politically removed from both the PR and the PRD, believes that this "transaction," even though "it could not be called democracy," was necessary for the sake of national stability.⁶³

Most PRD leaders, however, refrain from calling the JCE ruling a political "transaction" or settlement. Peña Gomez points out that Guzman always denied that he struck a deal with Balaguer. He also argues that the fallo was Balaguer's decision, and that Guzman decided simply not to press the issue.⁶⁴ The current PRD Secretary General, Hatuey De Camps, characterizes the fallo as the "greatest act of corruption in Dominican History."⁶⁵ Finally, the Secretary General of the PRD-La Estructura, Winston Arnaud, calls the fallo "a robbery."⁶⁶ While these men perceive the JCE decision as an imposition by Balaguer, they recognize that Antonio Guzman *did* in fact accept the "transaction" in

⁶¹Interview with Castillo. I was unable to confirm Castillo's assertion through personal interviews. However, no one dismissed his claim, and some stated that it was certainly possible given the relationship between Guzman and Blanco.

⁶²Balaguer, pp. 370-372.

⁶³Interview with Fernandez.

⁶⁴Interview with Jose Francisco Peña Gomez, PRD President, Santo Domingo, Dominican Republic, January 1989.

⁶⁵Interview with Hatuey De Camps, PRD Secretary General, Santo Domingo, Dominican Republic, January 1989.

⁶⁶Interview with Winston Arnaud, PRD-La Estructura Secretary General, Santo Domingo, Dominican Republic, January 1989.

order to avert social turmoil. Peña Gomez admits that Guzman decided not to contest in earnest the JCE ruling, and that he gave orders to respect Balaguer once he was inaugurated as president. De Camps points out that the PRD was forced to deal with Balaguer and the military, since it either accepted the *fallo* or civil war would ensue. And Arnaud admits that Guzman told the PRD leadership that they should offer an "olive branch."

It is understandable that PRD leaders would be hesitant to accept the idea, or admit that the electoral crisis of 1978 was resolved through a deal or "transaction." After all, if true, such a solution would be considered by many to be anti-democratic. It is likely that those who reject the idea or suggestion of a settlement are themselves convinced that the *fallo* was not the result of a "transaction," but rather the result of political and military pressure brought upon Guzman by Balaguer and the anti-democratic generals. No one could argue that Guzman was not under pressure to accept the *fallo*. However, it is also true that Balaguer and certain key generals were likewise under extreme domestic and international pressure to hand power over to the PRD. Therefore, it can just as easily be argued by PR proponents that even though Balaguer believed that fraud had taken place in the election⁶⁷, Guzman pressured him into the transfer of

⁶⁷Interviews with Castillo and Carlos Rafael Goico Morales, Dominican President (1970-1978), Santo Domingo, Dominican Republic, January 1989. According to Vinicio Castillo and Carlos Goico Morales, Balaguer is still convinced that he lost the election through some sort of fraud on the part of the PRD.

power through the use of pressure from the United States, the Socialist International, and numerous influential domestic groups. It is understandable, then, that some PRD leaders perceive the *fallo* as an imposition rather than a "transaction" because the negotiations between Balaguer and Guzman took place under a great deal of pressure and because Guzman always denied that he had struck a deal. Nevertheless, the evidence strongly points to the existence of an explicit political compromise.

Other key observers, including a current PRD leader, are convinced that an explicit "transaction" took place prior to the JCE ruling. Dr. Hugo Tolentino, an historian and PRD vice-president, believes, without a doubt, that Guzman agreed to the JCE decision prior to its announcement.⁶⁸ During discussions with other political elites and observers, the general consensus is that the transfer of power in 1978 could not have been possible without the "transaction" that gave the PR control of the senate. For important political, military and economic elites, that control was imperative for the completion of a successful settlement, since it ensured that the PRD would neither carry out "risky social reforms,"⁶⁹ nor attempt to judicially persecute the PR or the military.⁷⁰ Without those explicit guarantees the transfer of power might not have taken place peacefully.

⁶⁸Interview with Tolentino.

⁶⁹Interview with Goico Morales.

⁷⁰Interview with Brea.

Guzman's inauguration on August 16, 1978 marked the beginning of substantial military reforms called for by the Act of Reconciliation of 1965. The day of the inauguration Guzman made five significant military reassignments that removed key supporters of the Balaguer regime from important military commands. Guzman also eased out those generals who were believed to have been involved in past "repression and murder."⁷¹ Most importantly, he removed General Nivar Seijas as commander of the First Brigade⁷², the most powerful military unit in the nation, and sent him to the United States as the Dominican representative to the Inter-American Defense Board. General Beauchamp was sent to Argentina as the Dominican Ambassador, and soon thereafter retired. Guzman was eventually able to "depoliticize" the armed forces, in that military leaders "became less blatantly political and the president gained control of military affairs."⁷³ Many analysts had predicted that Guzman would not be able to change the military.⁷⁴ In fact, prior to his inauguration, some analysts gave Guzman no more than six months in office before he would be ousted by the military. Nevertheless, he was able to retire or remove from important military posts virtually all generals loyal to Balaguer, and replace them with

⁷¹Interview with Rafael Gamundi Cordero, PRD Director of Organization, Santo Domingo, Dominican Republic, January 1989.

⁷²Balaguer had given Nivar Seijas this position just prior to the inauguration.

⁷³For a good description of Guzman's depoliticization of the armed forces, see Atkins, pp. 132-148. Quotes are from pg. xiii.

⁷⁴*Ibid*, pg. 133.

generals who wanted to de-politicize the military.⁷⁵ While Guzman was able to eliminate Balaguerista generals, he did not substitute them with generals who favored the PRD. On the contrary, the new military hierarchy that he installed consisted of generals who had fought against the Constitutionals in the 1965 civil war.⁷⁶

Several factors enabled Guzman to accomplish the previously insurmountable task of de-politicizing the military. First, at the time of Guzman's inauguration there was a strong "climate of acceptance" of the new regime by most sectors in the Dominican Republic.⁷⁷ Second, Guzman's restructuring of the military was "within the parameters that had previously been negotiated ..." among the military, Balaguer, and Guzman.⁷⁸ Finally, the United States had given Guzman a green light to de-politicize the military.⁷⁹ Thus, the supportive national mood along with the agreement of key players to accept the depoliticization of the military, allowed the new PRD president to accomplish what no one had been able to do in the past - the subordination of the military to civil authority.

It is evident that elites in the Dominican Republic allowed full political contestation and participation after 1978. Since that year a stable democratic regime appears to have taken root. This

⁷⁵Ibid, pg. 123.

⁷⁶Latin America Political Report, Vol. 12, No. 33 (25 Aug 1978), pg. 258.

⁷⁷Interview with Tolentino.

⁷⁸Melvin Mañon, Cambio De Mandos (Santo Domingo: Isabel la Catolica, 1985), pg. 24.

⁷⁹Interview with Hatuey De Camps.

chapter suggests that an agreement took place among the leadership of the PRD, the PR and the armed forces. In the following chapter we will demonstrate that the characteristics and preconditions of elite settlements were present during the 1978 transition period.

Chapter Five

Elite Settlement and Dominican Democracy

Now that we have examined a period in Dominican history that is of paramount importance to understanding the development of stable democracy, we must see if the elite settlement concept can explain effectively the emergence and maintenance of democracy in the Dominican Republic. To do this, we will return to the common features of elite settlements. Our purpose is to determine whether the 1978 crisis resolution clearly exhibits the four characteristics and three preconditions of elite settlements: relative quickness, meetings between paramount leaders, written documents, and forbearance and conciliation.

Characteristics of Elite Settlements

The 1978 crisis was certainly resolved relatively quickly. The crisis began on 17 May, when the military stopped the vote count, and was effectively resolved by the time the JCE issued its decision on 7 July - less than two months.

Many "face-to-face, partially secret negotiations among the paramount leaders of the major elite factions"¹ also characterized the crisis resolution. During the 1978 crisis, Guzman met with Balaguer three times (recall that they also met prior to the crisis to sign the "non-aggression" pact), with military leaders twice, and with the U.S. Ambassador once. For his

¹Michael G. Burton and John Higley, "Elite Settlements," American Sociological Review 52 (June 1987) pg. 299.

part, Balaguer met regularly with military leaders during the crisis², no doubt both to understand exactly what was transpiring and to convince the military to resume the vote count. Additionally, military officers who were against a military golpe met on several occasions to rally support for their cause and to organize their efforts.³ These meetings must have in turn generated many meetings within the PRD, the PR, and the military. For example, when the JCE announced its decision on July 7, the PRD's National Executive Committee conducted an intensive series of meetings that lasted two days.⁴ Thus, it is most likely that scores of meetings took place during the crisis period. All of these meetings were, for the most part, secret. In fact, details of the discussions between Balaguer and Guzman are still unknown to the public. And many individuals who were intimately involved in the process are still hesitant to describe what really took place in the June 1978 negotiations.

The meetings that took place involved the major elite factions. In 1978, the PRD, the PR, and the military were the three major social organizations in the Dominican Republic: the military, because they had a monopoly over the means of coercion, and the two political parties, because together they controlled 94%

²G. Pope Atkins, Arms and Politics in the Dominican Republic, (Boulder: Westview Press, Inc., 1981), pg. 109.

³*Ibid*, pp. 109-111.

⁴El Nacional De Ahora! July 9, 1978, pp. 1-2.

of the electorate.⁵ Additionally, it is evident that the United States, a traditionally influential player in Dominican politics, was also involved in the negotiations.

The paramount political leaders were involved in the resolution of the crisis. Balaguer had been president under Trujillo, eight months after the death of Trujillo, and had been elected president in 1966, 1970 and 1974. Guzman had been a critical player during the 1965 crisis, having been the prominent choice in the negotiations for a PRD dominated government without Bosch. He also served as Minister of Agriculture in Bosch's 1962 government, and was Bosch's vice-presidential candidate in the 1966 election. But most importantly, he became the leader of the PRD, the best organized political party in the Dominican Republic. Although the military was fragmented in 1978, the key generals - Nivar Seijas, Beauchamps, and Perez y Perez - were all intimately involved in the crisis negotiations.

The only written document produced during the 1978 crisis was the "non-aggression" pact between Balaguer and Guzman. However, the business elites signed a communique in support of the electoral process and military elites signed a document supporting the JCE's decision. Additionally, broad socioeconomic issues, for the most part, were not at issue in the crisis. During the 1978 election the PRD never varied significantly from the PR's political platform. And

⁵Jan Knippers Black, The Dominican Republic: Politics and Development in an Unsovereign State, (Boston: Allen & Unwin, Inc., 1986), pg. 81.

when Peña Gomez implied that the PRD government might take a turn to the left, he was quickly corrected and Guzman spelled out a PRD platform that did not vary in any significant way from the PR platform. Therefore, even though a "constitutional" document was not produced during the 1978 "transaction", this may be because a constitution that was acceptable to both sides was already in place, and, perhaps more importantly, because the two major parties did not significantly differ on broad policy issues. In 1978, only two things had to be resolved in order for a stable democratic regime to emerge: the acceptance of the opposition and the depoliticization of the military. Both were resolved in the June 1978 negotiations.

Forbearance and conciliatory behavior among elites was also clearly present during the crisis. The best example occurs in the PRD's mild reaction to the JCE ruling. The party lost control of the senate because of an arbitrary decision, yet it accepted the decision and even took steps to ensure that its constituency did not react violently to the decision. As we have seen, both Guzman and Peña Gomez exhibited a great deal of restraint and moderation when the *fallo* was made public. There was forbearance on the part of the PR and the military as well. First and most important, Guzman was allowed to take office. While this is common practice in democratic systems, an electoral transfer of power in the Dominican Republic was unknown in 1978, and many observers did not believe that Guzman would last long. Also, Guzman removed military

officers who supported Balaguer; such an action by a civilian leader prior to 1978 would have resulted in military intervention, as some observers in 1978 predicted. The PR and the military accepted Guzman's bold actions, and thus he was able to reform the military. Additionally, the evidence suggests that this reform was partially the result of the settlement negotiations of 1978.

Thus, conciliation and forbearance were evident on the part of the three major factions. PRD leaders, although convinced that they had won political power legitimately, nevertheless accepted the loss of a majority in the senate, and a concomitant loss of judicial power. The PR, although convinced that the PRD had perpetrated some sort of electoral fraud, nevertheless allowed the PRD to take control of the presidency. And several key military leaders, although convinced that a PRD government would be dangerous for the country and contrary to their own self interests, nevertheless accepted a PRD victory and the subsequent civilian control of the military institution. In sum, elites within the three major groups accepted an outcome that they perceived to be contrary to some of their personal interests.

In order to understand why powerful elites would opt for a decision that in their eyes reduced their power and influence, we must turn to the three historical and structural preconditions that facilitate the emergence of an elite settlement: national crisis, the moderation of political elites, and controlled mobilization.

National Crisis

The Dominican case exhibits the historical conditions that are most conducive for the emergence of an elite settlement. The civil war had indeed been a costly and inconclusive conflict. The International Red Cross estimated that 3,000 lives were lost as a result of the war.⁶ The intervention by the United States and the OAS Peace Force prevented either of the two factions from winning. Thus the conflict continued after the 1966 elections with government repression against the PRD and the two attempts to overthrow the Balaguer regime.

From the time of Trujillo's murder to Johnson's intervention, the Dominican Republic was embroiled in political/regime crises. First, Trujillo's assassination was itself the resolution of a crisis. The Dominican Republic had been virtually ostracized by the international community, owing to Trujillo's violently repressive regime. As a result, some elites decided that the dictator's rule had outlived its usefulness. Bosch emerged from the power vacuum produced by the death of the dictator. However, as is now apparent, many elites were not pleased with Bosch, and thus directly or indirectly participated in his ouster. The Triumvirate that replaced Bosch also became prey to dissatisfied factions. Two violently antagonistic factions finally emerged, generating the conflict that led to civil war. Thus, when foreign occupation abruptly halted the war, elites in the

⁶David Atlee Phillips, The Night Watch (New York: Atheneum, 1977), pg. 150.

Dominican Republic were perhaps tired of the killing, tired of the constant changes in regime, and, finally, tired of having their autonomy challenged by outside forces, namely the United State. These are precisely the conditions which encourage a settlement among disunified elites. However, perhaps because the United States sided with the "loyalists" (the military and pro-Balaguer factions), the power struggle in 1965 left Balaguer in a position to dominate his political opponents, namely the "constitutionalists" and the PRD. Under these conditions, no elite settlement took place in 1966.

The 1978 electoral crisis was really a crisis over *continuismo*.⁷ Balaguer had ruled for 12 years and had encouraged or allowed political repression. By 1978, many elites had tired of his continuation in power. When the elections showed that the majority of Dominicans wanted change, most sectors of society indicated that they would not tolerate electoral fraud. Even sectors of the military went against those military leaders who wanted to deny Guzman his victory. In fact, there was so much opposition to the electoral intervention that a majority of military officers feared that a veto coup to prevent Guzman from taking office would result in another civil war.⁸ Fear of a new civil war was certainly a strong incentive for previously warring elites to reach a political compromise. PR and PRD leaders as well as military leaders believed that if the crisis was not resolved

⁷Interview with Goico Morales.

⁸Atkins, pg. 108.

through some sort of compromise, a new civil war could ensue.⁹ Even Juan Bosch, a marginal actor in the 1978 crisis, argued that unless an accord was reached by all the "... people and principal political forces affected by the crisis ..." , the "... crisis could enter into a state of decomposition."¹⁰

Although the Dominican Republic had experienced military conflict against Haiti¹¹ and Spain in the distant past, few observers would say that in 1978 the country had an external enemy that required it to be under constant preparation for war. However, the United States occupied the Dominican Republic from 1916 until 1923. Balaguer recollects that as a young boy he witnessed the arrival of American Marines in his small town, an event that influenced him eventually to become a member of the *Partido Nacionalista* (Nationalist Party), which initiated a civic movement opposing the U.S. intervention.¹² The 1965 intervention was the second time that the country had been occupied by the United States. And, some observers are convinced that the 1966 elections were an imposition by the United States.¹³ While the Dominican Republic and the United States do not have a history of armed conflict, there is a history, well known to Dominicans, of U.S.

⁹Interviews with Fernandez, Gamundi, Arnaud, Goico Morales, and Tolentino.

¹⁰Listin Diario, May 18, 1978, pg. 1.

¹¹Haiti occupied the Dominican Republic from 1822 to 1844, and there is still strong hatred towards Haitians that closely borders on racism.

¹²Joaquin Balaguer, Memorias de un Cortesano de la "Era de Trujillo" (Santo Domingo: Editora Corripio, C. por A., 1988), pg. 19.

¹³Interviews with Fernandez, Castillo, and Arnaud.

involvement in its internal affairs. Elites in 1978 must have realized that if they did not reach a settlement, the United States might attempt to impose a solution, especially if conflict were to break out. And, in fact, as we have seen, the Carter administration lost no time in telling Balaguer what it wanted him to do.

In short, there is good evidence to suggest that a significant national crisis was present in the Dominican Republic in 1978. First, elites were concerned that if they did not reach a settlement, a new domestic conflict could materialize. This was not just speculation; civil war had occurred only thirteen years before and had cost the nation 3000 lives. Second, *continuismo*, represented by the Balaguer regime, was perceived as an evil that had to be controlled. Most Dominicans associated *continuismo* with *Trujillismo*, and thus believed that such a regime should not remain in power.¹⁴ Third, Dominican elites feared that unless they solved their political problems, Tio Sam (Uncle Sam) would become "very concerned."¹⁵

The national crisis described above on its own might not have been sufficiently strong to provide a proper foundation for a settlement. After all, the civil war was the product of intense hostilities, and the subsequent repression of the Constitutionlists was still quite fresh in the minds of many opposition elites. Additionally, Balaguer's regime in 1978 was

¹⁴Interview with Goico Morales.

¹⁵Interview with Goico Morales.

not beset by an economic crisis of the magnitude that has plagued other contemporary Latin American regimes. Finally, it is doubtful that most Dominican elites perceived the United States as a hostile enemy militarily. While the crisis situation served to provide elites a rationale for cooperating with each other, other conditions were also necessary in order for the environment to be ripe for a political settlement - namely, the *gradual moderation of political elites*.

Moderation of Elites

An historical fact of paramount importance is that the most powerful political opposition in the Dominican Republic - the PRD - gradually moved away from the radicalism prevalent at its founding in 1939. Bosch had founded a revolutionary party, greatly influenced by other Latin American revolutionary parties, like the *Partido Revolucionario Institucional* (Institutional Revolutionary Party) of Mexico, the *Partido Revolucionario Cubano* (Cuban Revolutionary Party), and the *Alianza Popular Revolucionaria Americana* (American Popular Revolutionary Alliance) of Peru. These parties tended to be anti-oligarchic, egalitarian, and highly nationalistic, which often translated into anti-U.S. imperialism. The PRD's revolutionary doctrine was directed against the Trujillo regime, and in 1949 and 1959 the party directed and supported unsuccessful military attacks against the dictator.¹⁶

¹⁶Luis Arzeno Rodriguez, Políticos Y Partidos Politicos Dominicanos (Santo Domingo: Publicaciones America, S.A., 1982), pg. 305.

However, by the time Bosch was elected president in 1962, the PRD - probably because of the elimination of Trujillo and his highly repressive regime - had become a much more moderate political organization. Nevertheless, Juan Bosch was overthrown primarily because he was still perceived to be a danger by most of the powerful sectors in Dominican society. With hindsight, we can say that Bosch was not really a revolutionary in 1962, but rather a democratic reformer. He was a writer, an intellectual who had developed strong ties with democratic reformers such as Romulo Betancourt of Venezuela, Luis Muñoz-Marin of Puerto Rico, and Jose Figueres of Costa Rica.¹⁷ However, Bosch adopted "agitational" and "populist" political tactics that overstated his political stances.¹⁸

In any event, Bosch's constitution, promulgated in April 1963, alienated most of the powerful sectors of the nation. Bosch himself classified the constitution as "revolutionary" and as emphasizing "social justice and economic democracy."¹⁹ Those in opposition to the new constitution feared, or at least played upon fears, that the new law of the land would eliminate private

¹⁷Jerome Slater, Intervention and Negotiation: The United States and the Dominican Republic, (New York: Harper and Row, 1970), pg. 10.

¹⁸Charles H. Weston, "The Failure of the Democratic Left in the Dominican Republic: A Case Study of the Overthrow of the Juan Bosch Government," Discussion Paper No. 65, The University of Wisconsin - Milwaukee, Center for Latin America, June 1, 1979, pg. 16, and 77.

¹⁹John Bartlow Martin, Overtaken By Events: The Dominican Crisis from the Fall of Trujillo to the Civil War (New York: Doubleday, 1966), pg. 325.

property, would separate the church from the state, would give too much power to workers, and would endanger the autonomy of the armed forces.²⁰ As a result, Bosch "... antagonized the four most powerful sectors of the establishment" - business elites, major landowners, the church, and the very powerful and politically involved military.²¹

Soon those four powerful sectors began to label the Bosch government as communist and in so doing to raise the suspicions of the U.S. Government. To make matters worse, the U.S. Ambassador, John Martin, had a very poor opinion of Bosch. Even though the Ambassador had concluded that the communist influence in Bosch's regime was "surprisingly small"²², he described Bosch as "emotionally unstable" and "erratic."²³ Thus, two years after Bosch's overthrow, when the "constitutionalists" appeared to be on the verge of victory in April of 1965, the United States intervened to prevent a possible communist revolution. In light of this intense and powerful opposition, it is not surprising that Bosch's regime lasted only seven months. In 1962, most Dominican elites, as well as U.S. elites, were not ready for a democratic reformer, especially one who was prone to what to them was

²⁰Ian Bell, The Dominican Republic, (Boulder: Westview Press, 1981), pg. 84, and Weston, pg. 16. Most other accounts of Bosch's downfall emphasize the fact that he and his constitution alienated the most powerful groups in the country.

²¹Bell, pg. 84.

²²Martin, pg. 129.

²³*Ibid*, pg. 11.

dangerous rhetoric. At that time, they could never reach a settlement with such a man.

The overthrow of Bosch re-radicalized the PRD to the extent that it supported and carried out an armed uprising. The civil war led to bitter hatred between strong elements of the armed forces and the PRD leadership. This intense animosity prevented the emergence of any sort of political settlement between the PRD, the PR and the Armed Forces in 1966. On the contrary, the war compelled the new regime, primarily with the encouragement of the armed forces, to repress the former "Constitutionalists" and the political opposition in general. The repression carried out by the Balaguer regime turned the PRD into a "conspiratorial" political organization, especially from 1966 to 1970. In 1970, Juan Bosch returned to the Dominican Republic and began to turn the party into an organized political institution.²⁴

The PRD reached a point of internal crisis in 1973 when a personal and ideological rift pitted the patriarch Bosch against the younger activist and secretary general of the party, Peña Gomez. Caamaño's invasion in 1973 sharply divided the two leaders. While it is still uncertain whether Bosch fully supported the revolutionary endeavor²⁵, Peña Gomez was

²⁴Interview with De Camps.

²⁵Goico Morales, vice-president at the time, is convinced that Bosch was hiding at the French embassy during the invasion. However, this is not conclusive evidence that he was involved in the venture, since he may have just been playing it safe in case the government began another series of repressions against opposition leaders.

dead set against it.²⁶ Bosch and Peña Gomez also disagreed on basic political strategy. While Bosch labelled electoral parties as "traitors," Peña Gomez was quite willing to adopt the electoral route to political power.²⁷

The conflict between the two men was also personal in nature. Bosch, being very much the *caudillo*, prevented all young leaders from overshadowing him. Peña Gomez was becoming too popular and independent for Bosch's taste, and thus the latter attempted to isolate the younger and charismatic leader.²⁸ To do this, Bosch founded a new party in November 1973 - the PLD, hoping that most of the PRD militants would follow in his footsteps.

Unfortunately for Bosch, Peña Gomez inherited the PRD and kept most of its following. What Bosch unwittingly ended up doing was to take with him the most radical militants of the PRD.²⁹ Now that the old *caudillo* and his devoted and radical followers were gone, "... the PRD reaffirmed its moderate position under the leadership of Jose Francisco Peña Gomez."³⁰

Immediately, Peña Gomez and the PRD were faced with an important decision: whether to participate in the 1974 elections. The PRD, along with five other opposition parties, had signed the *Acuerdo de Santiago*

²⁶Interview with DeCamps.

²⁷Interview with Tolentino.

²⁸Interview with Peralta.

²⁹Interview with Brea.

³⁰Rosario Espinal, "An Interpretation of the Democratic Transition in the Dominican Republic," in The Central American Impasse, edited by Giuseppe Di Palma, and Lawrence Whitehead (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1986,) pp. 72-90.

(Santiago Accord) as a means of unifying the opposition against the Balaguer regime in the 1974 elections.³¹ However, only days before the election the PRD pulled out of the agreement, its leaders fearing that the opposition, as in 1966, would be brutally repressed by Balaguer's military, and that as a consequence violence would break out.³² Their fears were well grounded since the military was very active in the 1974 campaign, openly placing red banners - the PR color - on the rifles of soldiers. Once the PRD pulled out of the election, the accord disintegrated, and only one party challenged Balaguer in the elections.³³

Peña Gomez and other PRD leaders had decided that instead of participating in a lost cause in 1974, they would prepare the PRD to participate in the 1978 elections - a long-term goal that paid off handsomely. Essentially, Peña Gomez and other key PRD leaders decided to make the PRD an "acceptable" political institution, not just to Balaguer, the PR, and military elites, but to Dominican businessmen, professionals, clergymen, and the international community as well.³⁴

³¹The signators were the PRD, the *Unión Cívica Nacional* (National Civic Union), the *Partido Quisqueyano Democrata* (Democratic Quisqueyano Party), *Movimiento Popular Dominicano* (Dominican Popular Movement), the *Partido Revolucionario Social Cristiano* (Social Christian Revolutionary Party), and the *Partido Democrata Popular* (Popular Democratic Party).

³²Interview with De Camps.

³³The Popular Democratic Party participated in the elections. Its leader, then and now, is retired admiral Luis Lajara Burgos.

³⁴Interview with Brea.

The first step was to organize the party's domestic support. PRD leaders realized that the party was nothing more than a union of a few political intellectuals with a fair number of political activists. Although a large number of Dominicans supported or sympathized with the PRD and its goals, no link existed between the party leadership and the people. The leaders realized that in order to become a viable political party they had to organize support aggressively and effectively.³⁵ Thus, in 1974 PRD leaders and activists began a nation-wide effort to organize urban and rural syndicates, university students, and PRD youth clubs.³⁶

The second step was for the party to acquire international support. As early as 1972, some PRD leaders had begun to establish ties with U.S. political elites. The PRD in that year prepared a document for Senator Edward Kennedy that described the political repression that had been, and was being, carried out by the Balaguer regime.³⁷ After 1974, Peña Gomez began to travel extensively to the United States and Europe in an effort to legitimate his opposition party in the eyes of international political leaders. He attended the 1976 Democratic Party Convention that nominated Jimmy Carter, and developed strong personal ties with Senators Church, Fullbright and Kennedy.³⁸ The PRD

³⁵Interviews with Tolentino, and Arnaud.

³⁶Interviews with Arnaud and Gamundi.

³⁷Interview with Arnaud. Arnaud himself was responsible for putting together the human rights document for Senator Kennedy.

³⁸Interviews with Fernandez and Gamundi. Peña Gomez, according to Fernandez, became very good friends with

developed such good ties with liberal U.S. congressmen that it won the ear of the Carter Administration. Prior to the 1978 election, Peña Gomez and Majluta met on several occasions with U.S. State Department representatives to discuss the upcoming election. The two leaders argued that if the PRD won the elections it would need U.S. influence and support to serve as a buttress against the power of the Dominican military.³⁹

The PRD, however, did not rely solely on establishing good relations with important U.S. political leaders. It also developed close ties with other nations of the industrialized west, and with Latin American neighbors. The PRD incorporated itself into the Socialist International (S.I.) in 1976. This move not only provided the party with important political ties, but also provided it with economic and organizational support. The S.I. furnished Peña Gomez and his party with influential friends such as Willy Brandt of Germany, Felipe Gonzales of Spain, and Francois Mitterand of France. PRD ties with leaders of socialist parties from Latin America were also developed and enhanced. Peña Gomez cultivated especially strong personal ties with President Perez of Venezuela, who became an important actor in the 1978 "transaction" that ended the electoral crisis.⁴⁰

Through these pragmatic steps, the PRD became a strong political organization with mass domestic

Sen. Kennedy; a friendship that was to become of crucial importance in 1978.

³⁹Interview with Castillo. According to Castillo, the meetings took place on Mosquito Island.

⁴⁰Interview with Fernandez.

support and important international ties. The result was that by 1978 the PRD was "no longer guided by radical leaders and policies."⁴¹ Naturally, these practical transformations attracted some criticism from the parties of the left. Two days prior to the historic 1978 elections, Juan Bosch attacked his old party by calling the PRD a "rightist organization."⁴² After Guzman was officially announced as the winner of the election, the leader of the *Partido Comunista Dominicano* (Dominican Communist Party), Narciso Isa Conde, stated that Guzman's government would be very similar to Balaguer's government.⁴³ These criticisms are convincing because the PRD had won the support, or at a minimum the acceptance, of the economic elites. One week prior to the election, Peña Gomez pointed out that PRD relations with the business community were "better" than in 1963. He affirmed that while there were still some businessmen who believed that the PRD was an extremist party, many of them "realized that their interests and their son's interests were guaranteed with the PRD."⁴⁴ Thus, by 1978

... the PRD had a following that was by no means confined to manual labourers and the unemployed. Its spread was both vertical and horizontal: from the masses upward into the middle-classes and,

⁴¹Atkins, pg. 95.

⁴²El Nacional de Ahora! May 14, 1978, pg. 15.

⁴³El Nacional de Ahora! May 24, 1978, pg. 18.

⁴⁴Sara Peralta De Rathe, editor, Jose Francisco Pena Gomez: Coleccion Pensamiento Politico, Tomo 7, III - Por La Conquista De La Democracia, Volumen 3. Santo Domingo: Forthcoming. From a Peña Gomez speech, delivered on 9 May 1978.

more important still, from the towns outward into the countryside.⁴⁵

Now that PRD leaders had transformed the party from a revolutionary to a mainstream political organization, only one pragmatic political decision was necessary - choosing a viable candidate. Peña Gomez, although the chief engineer of the PRD's political transformation, knew that he would not be accepted as president by the PR, many economic elites, and especially the military. His involvement in the civil war, and his youthful radicalism of the past were both against him. However, another critical consideration was that Peña Gomez was a black man in a nation made up predominantly of mulattos who had a deep-seated hatred for Haitians (or anyone who looked Haitian.)⁴⁶ Peña Gomez, an astute politician, stepped aside in order for the party to select a viable presidential candidate.⁴⁷ The result was a power struggle between the top three contenders - Guzman, Majluta, and Blanco. The party convention selected Guzman, who had good ties to the business community.

The party was now poised for a successful political campaign: it had strong organization, an acceptable platform, and an acceptable candidate.

⁴⁵Bell, pg. 223. See also, Black, pg. 83, and ISLA, Vol. 32, no. 5 (May-Jun 1978) pg. 199, for additional insight into the PRD's moderation.

⁴⁶Although many Dominicans convey that Peña's problem is that he looks Haitian because of his deep-black color, the problem is undoubtedly racist in nature. Nevertheless, Peña has served as the mayor of Santo Domingo, a very important step in terms of equality of opportunity.

⁴⁷Interview with Brea.

Without this transformation it is doubtful that the PR and the military would have negotiated a political settlement with the PRD. Nevertheless, the settlement and its attendant negotiations were imperative in the transition since, despite the substantial moderation that occurred from 1974-1978 within the PRD, the military and elements of the PR still did not want the PRD to take power in 1978.

The PRD, however, was not the only group to undergo gradual political moderation. While the PR might be classified as a conservative and even reactionary political party, Balaguer was certainly no Trujillo, and even PRD leaders seldom compared him to the ruthless dictator. On the contrary, the forces of the right in the Dominican Republic also underwent a gradual shift toward the center that began with the death of the hated dictator. Upon Trujillo's death, the *de facto* regime led by Balaguer, exhibited important tendencies toward moderation. Balaguer immediately reinstated civil rights, confiscated all of Trujillo's vast land-holdings, and instituted a land-reform program. Unfortunately, the chaos and uncertainty that emerged after Trujillo's death prevented the establishment of a stable and legitimate government, owing largely to elite disunity. Most elites at that time disagreed both on what direction the nation should take, as well as what type of government should lead the nation.

The civil war, unfortunately, heightened the political tensions, producing a regime that actively repressed its opposition. Yet even Balaguer's 1966

regime has escaped being compared to Trujillo's regime. PRD leaders, who were persecuted from 1966 to 1972, have labelled that regime as a "semi-dictadura" (semi-dictatorship.)⁴⁸ Balaguer's three governments, although repressive, allowed the opposition some degree of freedom, especially after 1974. Without such leeway the PRD would not have been able to carry out its program of organization and moderation from 1974-1978. Under Trujillo's reign, an opposition party would never have been able to do what the PRD did beginning in 1974 - develop into an effective political organization. By 1978, Balaguer even allowed the Dominican Communist party to participate in the national elections.

In addition to the gradual political liberalization, Balaguer instituted a land-reform program in 1972. This new reform initiative could well have been a PRD program. In fact, Bosch declared that in 1963 he was deposed from power for much less than what Balaguer carried out in 1972.⁴⁹ Balaguer's new land-reform alienated a good portion of his economic support, especially the landed elites.⁵⁰ Fortunately for these alienated economic elites, in 1974 (and surely in 1978) they had a moderate political party to turn to - the PRD.

⁴⁸Interview with Tolentino; also Listin Diario, January 5, 1989, pp. 1 and 21, where Peña Gomez labels Balaguer's three governments (1966-1978) as "semi-dictaduras."

⁴⁹Interview with Castillo.

⁵⁰Espinal, pg. 81. and Interview with Fiallo, who points out that Balaguer also lost the support of many exporters and importers as a result of land reform.

By 1978, other social organizations had moderated as well. Economic elites, professionals, intellectuals, and church leaders all urged the government to respect the elections. In 1962, most elites from these sectors, except perhaps for many intellectuals, had been violently opposed to PRD rule under Bosch. One week prior to the 1978 election, Peña Gomez stated that democracy might now be possible in the Dominican Republic for two reasons. First, he argued that business elites had more "progressive, democratic ideas." Second, he believed that church elites had become much more concerned with the condition of the lower classes.⁵¹ The PRD leader was simply taking into consideration the fact that a variety of traditionally conservative social forces in the country had become more moderate through the years.

Controlled Mobilizaion

The final condition that enabled political elites to reach a settlement in 1978 was the existence of low and controllable mass mobilization. The Dominican Republic is predominantly an agricultural society. In 1960, 67% of the labor force was in agriculture, while only 12% was in industry. Not much had changed by 1977: 58% was in agriculture, and 16% in industry.⁵² Additionally, only a small portion of that labor force

⁵¹Peralta (Peña Gomez speech delivered on 8 May 1978).

⁵²Charles L. Taylor, and David A. Jodice, World Handbook of Political and Social Indicators, volume 1, 3d edition, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1983), pg. 209.

(12% in 1977) was organized.⁵³ During the Trujillo reign the only organizations that existed were his Dominican Party and the armed forces; all other social groupings were repressed. Even though mass mobilization increased after his death, organized labor and political parties were repressed for twelve years under Balaguer.⁵⁴ For example, in the period from 1962 to 1965 an average of nearly fifty unions were being certified annually by the Labor Ministry. During the period 1966-1977, that number dropped to just over twenty-five certifications per year. In essence, trade unions were dismantled during Balaguer's three terms in office.⁵⁵ And lastly, labor organizations in the Dominican Republic have been characterized by significant polarization, making it difficult to establish themselves as a viable political force.⁵⁶ Such structural conditions parallel the conditions present in countries that have experienced successful elite settlements, such as Colombia and Costa Rica. Most importantly, they provide elites with the autonomy necessary for making significant compromises.

The mass mobilization that occurred in 1978 was controlled essentially by the PRD. Balaguer and the conservative military elites feared that a civil war could break out in 1978, because they knew that the PRD could mobilize a significant portion of the population

⁵³George T. Kurian, The Book of World Rankings (New York: Facts on File, 1979), pg. 217.

⁵⁴Black, pg. 97.

⁵⁵Espinal, pg. 84.

⁵⁶Thomas E. Weil, et al, Area Handbook for the Dominican Republic (Wash. DC: US Government Printing Office, 1973), pg. 150.

through the use of its party militants. During the 1978 crisis the PRD considered doing just that. The PRD's National Executive Committee had intense negotiations right after the JCE announced its decision. The Committee called upon party militants to remain calm. However, it did decide to hold a "Patriotic Civic Day's Work in Seclusion" (*jornada civica de recogimiento patriotico*) to protest the JCE decision that took four senate seats away from the PRD. The PRD called upon all Dominicans to stay at home to "reflect and pray" on July 11, 1978. The PRD emphasized, however, that the day of seclusion was not a national strike, and that there were "no subversive intentions" on the part of the PRD.⁵⁷ But the day before the day of seclusion was to take place, Peña Gomez announced that the PRD's Political Commission had decided to cancel the event, because the civic movement could be used to "... unleash acts of violence ..."⁵⁸ The situation was so serious at the time that the PRD leadership decided to cancel the day of seclusion to ensure that no social unrest could possibly undermine the political settlement that had already taken place. PRD ability to control their militants provided them with the leeway to negotiate a political settlement, and subsequently to prevent their followers from rejecting or undermining that settlement. And Guzman's ability to reach a settlement with Balaguer and the military in the first place was greatly enhanced by the fact that, just prior to the 1978 elections, the PRD's

⁵⁷Listin Diario, July 10, 1978, pp. 1 and 17.

⁵⁸Listin Diario, July 11, 1978, pp. 1 and 4.

National Executive Committee had granted him "full powers to make the compromises that he deemed convenient."⁵⁹

In summary, it appears that the elite settlement concept is quite useful in explaining the emergence of stable democracy in the Dominican Republic. Convincing evidence indicates that a settlement did in fact take place immediately prior to the emergence of democratic politics in the Dominican Republic. The Dominican settlement exhibits the same characteristics present in previous settlements that resulted in stable democracies, such as Venezuela, and Colombia. Additionally, the three historical and structural preconditions necessary for the facilitation of an elite settlement were also present in the Dominican Republic. In light of the evidence, we can conclude that the elite settlement concept helps us in understanding and explaining the emergence of stable, democratic politics in the Dominican Republic.

Elite settlements have some important consequences that must be taken into consideration by social scientists. Yet, before we discuss these implications, let us examine how well the concept helps explain democratization in a country where a good deal of political violence exists, but where elections have been respected for over ten years - Peru.

⁵⁹Peralta (Peña Gomez speech delivered on 12 May 1978).

Chapter Six

A History of Democratic Politics in Peru

Peru's history is replete with political instability, military golpes, and the absence of stable democracy. Fifty-two of the nation's seventy-eight presidents prior to 1980 were military men.¹ In contemporary history, military officers ruled Peru during several prolonged periods: 1930-1939, 1948-1956, 1962-1963, and 1968-1980. One expert summarizes the nation's politically troubled history in this manner:

... Peru's experiences with civilian rule since independence have have been short-term, interrupted, and until recent times, dominated by elite groups who governed largely for their own benefit.²

Elites in control of the state apparatus have typically prevented the political opposition from contesting their power and from governing the nation. The most prominent example of this historical trend is the case of the best organized party in Peru - the *Alianza Popular Revolucionaria Americana* (APRA, American Revolutionary Popular Alliance.)

APRA, the first mass-based party in Peru, was founded by a young revolutionary, Victor Raul Haya de la Torre, while in exile in Mexico in 1924. Haya had borrowed intellectually from Jose Carlos Mariategui, a

¹Richard F. Nyrop, editor, Peru: A Country Study (Wash. D.C.: The American University, 1981), pg. 182.

²Henry Dietz, "Electoral Politics in Peru, 1978-1986," Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs 28, no. 4 (Winter 1986-87) pg. 144.

Peruvian socialist and journalist.³ APRA's political platform was radical and revolutionary for Peru in the 1920s. Haya called for socioeconomic change through the elimination of imperialism (namely U.S. imperialism), capitalism, and the traditional landed oligarchy. To accomplish these changes, Haya insisted upon the nationalization of land and industry.⁴ Naturally, such policies generated fear and distrust on the part of the traditional elites, especially the land-owners who would lose their possessions if APRA were allowed to govern.

Haya introduced his party to fellow Peruvians in 1930 in preparation for the elections of 1931. While a Constitutional Assembly was writing a new Carta Magna, Haya and other APRA leaders were jailed and exiled by the military president, Colonel Luis Sanchez Cerro. APRA had won twenty-three seats in the Assembly. But the colonel and his supporters wanted to ensure that Haya and his revolutionary party played no part in the creation of the new law of the land. Sanchez Cerro eventually won the election, defeating Haya. The electoral conflict, however, helped initiate a bitter and prolonged hatred between APRA and the military.

The following year, APRA militants in Trujillo (Haya's birthplace) commandeered an uprising against

³Mariategui is one of Peru's leading intellectual figures, and greatly admired by a large number of Peruvians. One of his most popular and best known works is Siete Ensayos de Interpretacion de la Realidad Peruana (Lima: Biblioteca Amauta, 1965.)

⁴Nyrop, pg. 29; and Thomas E. Skidmore and Peter H. Smith, Modern Latin America (New York: Oxford University Press, 1984), pg. 209.

the military government that took the lives of sixty military officers and government officials.⁵ The military reacted brutally against the insurrection and killed perhaps as many as 6,000 real or suspected apristas.⁶ This event greatly intensified the hatred between APRA and the Peruvian armed forces. As a result of APRA's revolutionary rhetoric and practice, the party was prevented from participating in elections in 1936, 1939, 1945, 1950, and 1956, primarily at the behest of the armed forces.⁷

In 1948, APRA was banned as a political party by President Bustamante, an elected civilian, because the party had inspired a naval mutiny. Unfortunately for Haya and his party, in addition to losing legality, a military golpe in that same year brought General Manuel Odria to power. The Odria regime (1948-1956) was "... harshly authoritarian ...;" approximately 8,000 people were arrested within its first eight months.⁸ Of course APRA suffered most from Odria's wrath. In 1949, Haya sought and received political asylum in the Colombian embassy, remaining there until 1954, when Odria agreed to let him flee to Mexico. Odria held elections in 1950, but did not allow APRA or the

⁵See Nyrop, pg. 29; and Henry F. Dobyns and Paul L. Doughty, Peru: A Cultural History (New York: Oxford University Press, 1976), pg. 232.

⁶Skidmore and Smith, pg. 212. The estimates run anywhere from one to six thousand.

⁷APRA, however, was able to get candidates elected to congress on several occasions. Other revolutionary parties, such as the Peruvian Communist Party, were also prevented from participating in elections.

⁸David P. Werlich, Peru: A Short History (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1978), pg. 248.

*Partido Comunista Peruano*⁹ (PCP, Peruvian Communist Party) to participate, and one month before the voting disqualified his only opponent in the election.

Despite Odria's harsh authoritarianism, he amassed a good deal of popularity, owing to his imitation of Juan Peron's populist regime in Argentina.¹⁰ His populist attempts, however, began to generate problems with traditional economic elites.¹¹ Influential elites and groups, fearing populism, began calling for democratic elections, and when it looked like Odria would not cooperate two *golpe* attempts against him were carried out by disenchanted military officers who supported the demands for elections.¹² Eventually, Odria succumbed to the pressure and agreed to hold elections in 1956.

The 1956 elections would become an uncomfortable landmark in the history of the APRA party. One of the leading candidates was former President Manuel Prado, a conservative who was allied to the traditional landed elites. Sensing imminent victory for Prado, Haya forged a deal with the former president. When Prado won the election he legalized APRA, and in turn "... the party supported Prado on most critical issues and

⁹The PCP, like APRA, was greatly influenced by Mariategui. Mariategui organized the *Partido Socialista del Peru* (Socialist Party of Peru,) which later became the PCP.

¹⁰Skidmore and Smith, pg. 214.

¹¹Julio Cotler, "A Structural-Historical Approach to the Breakdown of Democratic Institutions: Peru," in Linz and Stepan, The Breakdown of Democratic Regimes: Latin America (Baltimore: The John Hopkins University Press, 1978), pg. 137.

¹²Werlich, pg. 255.

used its influence to reduce labor unrest."¹³ This unlikely partnership was labelled the *convivencia* (cohabitation - of course, in a derogatory sense.) Its result was that APRA began to lose its "... credibility as the representative of the Peruvian left,"¹⁴ and it allowed the rise of new parties that would challenge APRA's monopoly as a populist and anti-oligarchic party, such as the *Partido Democratico Cristiano* (PDC, or Christian Democratic Party), and *Accion Popular* (AP, or Popular Accion.)¹⁵ The *convivencia* also put more distance between the traditional elites and the military. One expert has written:

The military-oligarchy partnership was destroyed once and for all when influential elements of the oligarchy joined an informal alliance, popularly known as the *convivencia*, with their formerly despised and often suppressed political opponent APRA.¹⁶

APRA Becomes Legal.

As a result of the *convivencia*, Haya was able to run for the presidency for the first time since 1931 in the 1962 elections. The electoral contest pitted Haya, Odria, and Fernando Belaunde Terry, the founder of *Accion Popular* (AP.) No single candidate received the required one third of the vote, meaning that the presidency would be decided in congress. However, when Haya began to negotiate with his arch-enemy, former

¹³*Ibid*, pg. 258.

¹⁴Nyrop, pg. 34.

¹⁵Cotler, "A Structural-Historical ...", pg. 189.

¹⁶Arnold Payne, "Peru: Latin America's Silent Revolution," Inter-American Economic Affairs 20 (winter 1966) pg. 75.

President Odria, the military did not wait to see the outcome; it ousted President Prado just days before his term expired, and annulled the election results. The military decided it would rather depose a conservative president than allow the possibility that their hated enemy - Haya - and his party - APRA - could take political power. If some of the traditional elites could mend fences with APRA the military could not. This *golpe* represented "... the first time ever that the Peruvian military had deposed a conservative-backed government."¹⁷ The generals who directed the *golpe* argued that they intervened because fraud had taken place, and because of the "fratricidal conflict" among groups and classes.¹⁸

The military's reign was short-lived, scheduling elections for the following year. It was also a relatively benign military government, being labelled a *dictablanda*, or soft dictatorship. The appellation reflected the fact that the regime did not eliminate individual rights, was relatively pro-labor, and took some steps toward land reform.¹⁹ The policies of the regime reflected changing attitudes in the leadership of the armed forces. In the 1950s, the military had enhanced its professionalism and institutionalization with the help of the *Centro de Altos Estudios Militares* (CAEM, Center for Superior Military Studies), that had been created in 1950. The intellectual studies of

¹⁷*Ibid*, pg. 76.

¹⁸Jane S. Jaquette, "The Politics of Development in Peru," Unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation, Cornell University, 1971, pg. 134-135. Belaunde had initiated the fraud charges.

¹⁹Werlich, pp. 276-278.

high-ranking officers at this center had led the military to conclude during the 1950s that "... it was necessary to ameliorate the conditions of life of the lower sectors in order to prevent the spread of the conflict that was threatening order in Peru."²⁰ The military's interest in national issues became so strong that they created the National Planning Institute in 1962, for the purpose of planning the nation's "... social and economic development."²¹ By 1963, military elites had become politically progressive in their evaluation of the socioeconomic situation in Peru. A CAEM study in that year concluded:

The sad and desperate reality is that, in Peru, real power is not executive, legislative, judicial or electoral power, but that which is held by landowners, exporters, bankers, and North American companies.²²

In 1963, the same three candidates competed for the presidency - Belaunde, Haya and Odria. Belaunde, having forged an alliance with the PDC, led by Hector Cornejo Chavez, was able to win a decisive plurality of 39%.²³ Once elected, Belaunde attempted to include Haya and Odria in his government, but both men rejected his conciliatory move.²⁴ Soon thereafter, Belaunde's troubles began.

²⁰Cotler, "A Structural-Historical ...", pg. 194.

²¹Werlich, pg. 278.

²²CAEM, El Estado y la Política General (Chorrillos: CAEM, 1963), pg. 92, quoted in Cotler, "A Structural-Historical...", pg. 193.

²³Jaquette, pg. 144. Haya received just over 34%, and Odria 25.5%.

²⁴Werlich, pg. 280.

Belaunde immediately attempted to initiate social reforms that many economic and political groups, as well as the military, were calling for. One of his first acts was to nationalize a consortium of banks that collected national taxes.²⁵ Belaunde's attempt at land reform, however, was thwarted by a coalition - sardonically labelled the *superconvivencia* - between Odria's party, UNO, and Haya's APRA in the legislature. Ironically, APRA labelled Belaunde's land reform "reactionary, and communist inspired."²⁶ As a result of the APRA-UNO alliance against Belaunde's program, "by mid-1968 ... only 20,000 farmers had been affected ..." by the land reform bill that ultimately was passed by the legislature.²⁷ Part of the problem, however, was that Belaunde exempted many of the large land-owners because their workers were organized by the APRA party.²⁸ Thus, owing to inter-party rivalry and jealousy, the two most important populist parties were unwilling to develop legislation on an issue of mutual interest, and APRA once again reached an agreement with a former enemy.²⁹

Belaunde's problems were greatly intensified by a series of crises that eventually led to the downfall of his government in 1968. In 1965, two guerrilla groups

²⁵Jaquette, pg. 148.

²⁶Werlich, pg. 284.

²⁷Ibid, pg. 285.

²⁸Howard Handelman and Thomas Sanders, eds, Military Government and the Movement Toward Democracy in South America (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1981), pp. 87-88.

²⁹Richard Lee Clinton, "APRA: An Appraisal," Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs 12 (April 1970) pg. 288.

had initiated armed conflict against the elected regime. Belaunde hesitated initially to use the armed forces to combat the revolutionaries, but eventually gave in to the generals' demands for swift and strong action. The two groups were the *Movimiento de Izquierda Revolucionario* (MIR, or Leftist Revolutionary Movement), and the *Ejercito de Liberacion Nacional* (ELN, or National Liberation Army.) MIR was created by Apristas who had become disillusioned with the party and its *convivencias* with rightist forces.³⁰ ELN was a marxist-leninist group that aspired to duplicate the revolutionary struggle that had occurred in Cuba. The Peruvian armed forces eliminated both movements rather quickly, killing the leader of the MIR in battle, and arresting the leader of the ELN.³¹

The defeat of the insurgents did not ease Belaunde's problems. His ambitious government programs dramatically increased government expenditures. Public spending rose from 14 to 30 billion soles during his tenure.³² Unfortunately for Belaunde, the APRA-UNO coalition blocked his efforts to increase revenues through taxation. Thus, he turned to external sources - principally the IMF - to finance his programs. Eventually, in late-1967, under the stress of deficit

³⁰During the *convivencia* with Prado, Luis de la Puente formed a group of disaffected APRA militants commonly known as APRA Rebelde (or rebel APRA). Then in 1962, the group named itself MIR. Hector Bejar was the leader of ELN. He had been a member of the PCP, but in the 1960s decided to follow the Castroist route of armed conflict, rather than the united front route that Moscow promoted.

³¹Nyrop, pg. 37.

³²Werlich, pg. 286.

spending, Belaunde was compelled to devalue the sol by 35%, even though months earlier he had declared that a devaluation would be a "treasonous" act.³³ The devaluation, needless to say, generated a great deal of opposition. In fact, many leaders in his party abandoned him, and Cornejo Chavez decided to end the PDC alliance with AP.³⁴

During 1968 the crises kept mounting. First, in February, a smuggling ring was discovered that implicated customs officials, and military officers in Belaunde's administration.³⁵ Then, in August of 1968, Belaunde's government reached an agreement - Act of Talara - with the International Petroleum Company (IPC) that galvanized the entire nation against his government. The IPC, a subsidiary of Standard Oil of New Jersey, owned two oil fields known as Pariñas and La Brea that had been a continuous and unpleasant symbol to most Peruvians of "Yankee economic imperialism."³⁶ In fact, IPC was the nation's largest private employer and its second largest taxpayer.³⁷ IPC and Peruvian governments had long-standing quarrels over the rights to the oil fields.³⁸

The agreement with the IPC, which returned the oil fields to Peru, should have been an accomplishment for the Belaunde Administration. However, a mysterious

³³Ibid, pg. 287.

³⁴Cotler, "A Structural-Historic ...", pp. 201.

³⁵Jaquette, pp. 184-189.

³⁶Werlich, pg. 291.

³⁷Ibid, pg. 292.

³⁸For an excellent, and detailed description of the IPC issue, see Richard Goodwin, "Letter From Peru," The New Yorker, May 17, 1969.

turn of events created a national fiasco. After the agreement had been completed, the chief negotiator, Carlos Loret de Mola, stated that a page of the agreement - which stipulated the price that IPC would pay Peru for crude oil - had been tampered with after he had signed the agreement, and thus he declared that the agreement was null and void.³⁹ Belaunde denied that the page existed, but the seemingly careless manner in which the agreement had been carried out generated intense criticism against the Belaunde regime. Accusations that the government was turning the nation over to foreigners (*entreguismo*) were rampant. Virtually all political groups came out publicly against the agreement. Belaunde's Minister of War told the nation that he had had nothing to do with the Act of Talara, the Congress with the help of AP annulled the agreement, and the secretary general of AP called for an investigation into the negotiations.⁴⁰ The nation was bitter and dejected. The newsweekly *Oiga* editorialized: "This is not a country ... it is only a territory of demoralized people."⁴¹

The intense opposition to Belaunde, interestingly enough, reflected a growing national consensus. Most "professionals, intellectuals, politicians, technocrats, labor leaders, and industrialists," as well as military officers, agreed that Peru needed to accomplish two important changes in order to develop as

³⁹Jaquette, pg. 216.

⁴⁰Henry Pease Garcia and Verme Insua, eds., Peru, 1968-1973: Cronologia Politica, Tomo 1 (Lima: DESCO, Centro de Estudios y Promocion del Desarrollo, 1974), pp. 3-13.

⁴¹Quoted in *Ibid*, pg. 12.

a nation: the traditional landed oligarchy had to go, and the economy had to be controlled by the Peruvian state.⁴² Belaunde's government was unable to accomplish these goals. One institution, however, believed it had the power, motivation, discipline, and intellectual preparation to accomplish the task - the Peruvian Army.

The Gobierno Revolucionario de las Fuerzas Armadas.

In the early morning hours of 3 October 1968, Fernando Belaunde Terry was escorted in his pajamas to a military aircraft that took him to Argentina. If the military had come to believe in 1961 that "fratricidal" conflict existed among Peruvian elites, by the latter half of 1968 they were convinced that such conflict would doom the nation. As one analyst explains, "... the officers of the armed forces began to argue that it was not feasible to rely on political parties and the parliamentary system to carry out ... reforms."⁴³ And like 1962, there was the fear among the generals that Haya de la Torre and APRA could win the elections in 1969, especially considering the almost unanimous repudiation of Belaunde's government.⁴⁴

The Gobierno Revolucionario de las Fuerzas Armadas

⁴²Cynthia McClintock, and Abraham F. Lowenthal, The Peruvian Experiment Reconsidered (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1983), pp. 419-421.

⁴³Cotler, "A Structural-Historical ...", pg. 199.

⁴⁴David Scott Palmer, Peru: The Authoritarian Tradition (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1980), pg. 99, and Interview with Fernando Belaunde Terry, Peruvian President 1963-1968 and 1980-1985, Lima, Peru, 8 February 1989.

(GRFA, or Revolutionary Government of the Armed Forces) soon began to acquire a substantial amount of public support. Initially most political parties, the press and many other social groups lamented the elimination of the constitutional government. However, when the GRFA abrogated the Act of Talara and nationalized the Pariñas and La Brea oil fields on 9 October, the nation as a whole rejoiced. The leader of the new government, General Juan Velasco, told the nation: "... the sovereignty of the Peruvian state from this moment is no longer a mere statement but an authentic reality."⁴⁵ Leftist parties stated that they recognized the new government's "reformist capabilities."⁴⁶ One observer has commented that the nationalization was greeted by the "almost universal applause of [the] press and political leaders ..."⁴⁷ In essence, sympathy and support reflected the fact that the new government was against *entreguismo* - the nation would no longer be sold out.⁴⁸

Since the GRFA was against the traditional landed oligarchy, against economic imperialism, and concerned with the welfare of the poverty-stricken masses, its policies were necessarily progressive, if not revolutionary. But these policies were primarily a means to an end. The end was social harmony and national development - order and strength - traditional military imperatives. Velasco and his supporters

⁴⁵Pease Garcia and Insua, pg. 28.

⁴⁶*Ibid*, pg. 40.

⁴⁷Goodwin, pg. 93.

⁴⁸Interview with Genaro Ledesma. Senator and former President of FOCEP, Lima, Peru, 10 February 1989.

believed that goals for national development, assisted by the discipline of the military, would create a new Peru that would be peaceful and prosperous. The Manifesto of the Revolutionary Junta, issued on the day of the *golpe*, argued that "powerful economic, national, and foreign forces in collusion with Peruvian nationals ..." were preventing the necessary structural changes required by the nation to eliminate the current "... unjust social and economic order ..." They admitted that the last straw had been the Act of Talara and its *entreguista* solution to the IPC problem. Therefore the armed forces would perform their constitutional mission of defending Peru's national resources, and accomplish national development by "... transforming the structure of the state."⁴⁹ Their dreams, however, would eventually turn into nightmares.

The GRFA did make some substantial changes in Peruvian society. It was able to eliminate virtually all of the power of traditional landed elites by expropriating almost all properties larger than fifty hectares and turning large estates into peasant cooperatives.⁵⁰ The GRFA was also able to greatly enhance the power of the Peruvian state. One economics expert has concluded that, from 1968 to 1974, "... [t]he public sector increased both in size and scope to include most banking, basic industries, and most

⁴⁹Pease Garcia and Insua, pp. 19-20.

⁵⁰Cynthia McClintock, "Perspectivas Para La Consolidacion Democratica En El Peru," in Democracia Y Violencia En El Peru, Diego Garcia Sayan, editor (Lima: Centro Peruano De Estudios Internacionales, 1988), pg. 60.

international and some domestic trade."⁵¹ The Velasco regime eventually nationalized sixteen U.S firms as a means of making good on his promise of ridding the nation of *entreguismo*.⁵²

Finally, the GRFA increased the link between the state and society in an effort to integrate the nation and muster support for the regime. The military government encouraged the organization of labor and the formation of cooperatives. While there were only 540 cooperatives in 1963, there were 2,881 by 1979.⁵³ In 1971, the GRFA established the *Sistema Nacional de Apoyo a la Movilizacion Social* (SINAMOS, or National System for Support of Social Mobilization) to enable the masses to participate in the political system, but also to redirect support away from the political parties and toward government programs.⁵⁴ In the following year, the military junta created two labor confederations: the *Confederacion Nacional Agraria* (CNA, or National Agrarian Confederation), and the *Central de Trabajadores de la Revolucion Peruana* (CTRP, or Peruvian Revolution Labor Central.)

The social changes carried out by the GRFA, however, created a number of unexpected results that quickly began to undermine the regime's power and authority. The exponential growth and participation of

⁵¹Alfred H. Saulniers, "ENCI: Peru's Bandied Monopolist," Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs 22, no. 4 (November 1980) pg. 441.

⁵²Handelman and Sanders, pg. 85.

⁵³Martin J. Scurrah and Guadalupe Esteves, "The Condition of Organized Labor," in Post-Revolutionary Peru: The Politics of Transformation, edited by Stephen M. Gorman (Boulder: Westview Press, 1982), pg. 117.

⁵⁴Nyrop, pg. 188.

the state in the national economy alienated many economic elites, resulting in a rapid diminution of both international and domestic capital.⁵⁵ For example, gross internal savings had represented 17.8% of the nation's GNP in 1968; that percentage was reduced to 9.4% by 1975.⁵⁶ The alienation of private capital along with significant declines in export earnings, owing to natural causes and a drastic decline in the price of copper, created an enormous economic crisis for the military regime. At the same time, the increased mobilization that the government had encouraged generated more demands than supports from the population. By 1975 the crisis had reached the streets of Lima, in February, there was rioting and sacking of the capital for three days. The social stability, national development, and social integration that the GRFA had been looking for and promising had not materialized; on the contrary, a crisis was gripping Peru once again.

The Second Phase: Transition to Civilian Rule.

If the Act of Talara had broken Belaunde's back, the internal divisions within the GRFA ultimately broke Velasco's back. In August 1975, General Francisco Morales Bermudez replaced General Velasco as President of Peru and chief of the military junta. By 1974, the GRFA had become divided into three factions: the *radicales* (radicals) were the colonels who had established the GRFA, the *mision* (the mission) where the staunch anti-communist officers, and the

⁵⁵Handelman and Sanders, pg. 92.

⁵⁶*Ibid*, pg. 86.

institucionales (institutionalists) were officers concerned primarily with the survival of the armed forces. The *institucionales* became dominant, and were convinced that

[t]he armed forces as an institution could not stay indefinitely in power because it would compromise its own existence as an institution, and because the doors had to be open to civilians, the national majorities, in search of their own destiny.⁵⁷

The consensus among military elites had changed drastically, and quickly. While in 1968 they had little faith in civilian regimes and parliaments, and were convinced that they could produce the development and integration that Peru so desperately needed, by 1975 they realized that they were unable to effectively unify or govern the nation. By the middle of 1976, the "reformist" officers - *radicales* - had been almost completely purged from the military.⁵⁸

Thus, the new military leadership, under the direction of Morales Bermudez, decided to mend fences with the elites they had alienated. To appease the economic elites and encourage the return of capital to the nation, new, more conservative economic strategies were attempted. To appease the political elites, a return to democratic government was devised. These two steps, the leaders believed, would help to restore order, and save the military institution from possible self-annihilation.

⁵⁷Francisco Morales Bermudez, Apuntes Sobre Autoritarismo Y Democracia (Lima: Iberoamericana de Editores S.A., 1989), pg. 279.

⁵⁸Stephen M. Gorman, "The Peruvian Revolution in Historical Perspective," in Gorman, pg. 29.

Unfortunately for the new regime, the economic measures that pacified economic elites had the effect of economically punishing the lower classes. Austerity measures, called for by the IMF, resulted in "... three days of rioting that required a full scale military operation to contain."⁵⁹ The austerity measures, which would continue throughout Morales Bermudez's tenure, generated a substantial rise in strike activity that would also last until 1980.⁶⁰ The government imposed a state of emergency in June 1976 that was to last for nearly one year. The mobilization that the GRFA had encouraged had come back to haunt it. Those political groups that represented the concerns of the lower classes, mostly the leftist parties and the military radicals, stepped in and took control of many of the labor and peasant organizations that the GRFA had helped to create.

Strike activity reached its zenith on 19 July 1977, with the first successful national strike since 1919, when workers had demanded an 8-hour work day.⁶¹ The strike, called by the PCP's *Confederacion General de Trabajadores del Peru* (CGTP, or Peruvian Worker's General Confederation,) was also supported by all leftist political, labor and peasant organizations, as well as APRA, AP, the PDC, and economic elites, all of whom wanted the military to relinquish political

⁵⁹Ibid, pg. 26.

⁶⁰Teresa Tovar Samanez, Movimiento Popular Y Paros Nacionales: Historia del Movimiento Popular, 1976-1980 (Lima: DESCO, Centro de Estudios y Promocion del Desarrollo, 1982,) pg. 19.

⁶¹Ibid, pg. 21.

power.⁶² The strike, unfortunately, was very costly, leaving nine persons dead⁶³, and prompting the government to dismiss over 4000 workers.⁶⁴

The increase in strike activity also created more conflict within the GRFA. Some officers, led by Interior Minister General Luis Cisneros, wanted strong repression against the strikers and especially their leaders. General Oscar Molina, on the other hand, promoted a "soft line." Morales Bermudez ultimately sided with Molina, who argued that repression could jeopardize the transfer of power to the civilians. Cisneros, who viewed elections as a "waste of time," was ultimately dismissed by General Morales Bermudez in May 1978.⁶⁵ Although the so-called "soft-line" predominated, strike activity continued to be heavily repressed and states of emergency and losses of civil rights were commonplace. The GRFA also decided to separate itself from the social organizations it had created to generate support for the regime. For example, in May 1978 it dissolved the CNA, because that organization had been involved in strike activity, had accused the GRFA of creating a "parasitic bureaucracy,"

⁶²Julio Cotler, "Military Interventions and the 'Transfer of Power to Civilians' in Peru," in Transitions From Authoritarian Rule: Latin America, Guillermo O'Donnell, Philippe C. Schmitter, and Lawrence Whitehead, eds. (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986), pg. 163.

⁶³Interview with Ledesma.

⁶⁴Grace M. Ferrara, editor, Latin America, 1978 (New York: Facts on File, Inc., 1979), pg. 156.

⁶⁵Latin America: Political Report, Volume 12, 10 May 1978, no. 10, pg. 74.

and had demanded that the government promulgate a general amnesty.⁶⁶

If the GRFA had not been totally convinced that it should turn power back to the civilians, the national strike of 1977, with its almost unanimous support from all sectors, certainly convinced the military elites that they had to step aside, or the social outcry could be devastating for their institution as well as for the country.

Morales Bermudez, however, had begun to make overtures toward the political elites, and had publicly expressed his decision to transfer power to civilians prior to the national strike of 1977. In a speech on 30 April 1976 in Trujillo, the bastion of APRA, Morales Bermudez, referring to the long-standing feud between the military and APRA, said: "... it is time to forget the struggles between brothers."⁶⁷ The statement was historic. Haya himself was very pleased with the general's conciliatory gesture.⁶⁸ Then, on 6 February 77, Morales unveiled Plan Tupac Amaru, which proposed to turn the government over to civilians after a constituent assembly had been elected and a new constitution drafted. The general stated: "... if we do not achieve an active consensus and a historical commitment between the armed forces and civilians, the viability of Peru as a democratic society will be in

⁶⁶Henry Pease Garcia and Alfredo Filomeno, eds., Peru, 1978: Cronologia Politica, Tomo VII, pg. 3070.

⁶⁷Werlich, pg. 366.

⁶⁸Luis Alberto Sanchez, Testimonio Personal, 6: Adios A Las Armas, 1976-1987 (Lima: Mosca Azul Editores, 1988), pg. 31.

doubt."⁶⁹ Morales Bermudez "called for a public discussion of the plan and asked for suggestions from representative institutions in society."⁷⁰

The GRFA then began discussions with a variety of political and social groups, including the major labor confederations, government officials and private institutions, in order to discuss the government's proposed plan, obtain suggestions, and determine a *cronograma politico*, or political time-schedule, to determine when elections would be held (no doubt also to determine whether the political consensus they were looking for was present).⁷¹ General Morales Bermudez met personally during April and May of 1977 with the leaders of the "major" political parties - AP, APRA, PDC, PCP, and PPC.⁷² He did not meet with representatives of newer, and usually more radical, political parties, such as the *Partido Comunista del Peru* (PC del P, or Communist Party of Peru,) the *Vanguardia Revolucionaria* (VR, or Revolutionary Vanguard,) or the MIR.⁷³ While some parties, such as

⁶⁹Handelman and Sanders, pg. 96.

⁷⁰Luis A. Abugattas, "Populism and After: The Peruvian Experience," in Authoritarians and Democrats: Regime Transition in Latin America, James M. Malloy, and Mitchell A. Seligson, editors (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1987), pg. 131.

⁷¹Interview with General Francisco Morales Bermudez. Leader of GRFA 1974-1980, Lima, Peru, 22 February 1989; Also, Sanchez, pp. 34-35.

⁷²Interviews with Morales Bermudez, and with Roberto Ramirez Del Villar, Senator and ex-constituent for the PPC, Lima, Peru, 20 February 1989. See also Sanchez, pp. 34-35, Cotler, "Military Interventions ...", pg. 161, and Abugattas, pg. 131.

⁷³PC del P was the pro-Chinese communist party. VR was a home-grown, Marxist-Leninist party, that did not

the PPC and AP, wanted immediate elections to return political power to civilians, Haya de la Torre strongly pushed for a constituent assembly prior to holding general elections.⁷⁴

On 4 October 1977, the GRFA formally approved Plan Tupac Amaru, which laid out a concrete *cronograma politico*. Generally, the purpose of the plan was to install, through popular elections, a constituent assembly in the second quarter of 1978, and to hold general elections in 1980, after the assembly had drafted a new constitution.⁷⁵ The paramount objective of the plan was to "institutionalize through a Constitution, the structural reforms, giving them the indispensable adjustments that experience advised."⁷⁶ Thus, while the GRFA had decided that it would turn power over to civilians, they would do it in a way that would guarantee that the structural changes made during the late 1960's and early 1970's would be respected by the new civilian government. General Morales Bermudez was adamant about this point. In a newspaper interview on 16 October 1977, he said:

If reforms are not ratified, then the *de facto* government, that is, this government, annuls the Assembly and the story is over; ... the military

originate from either the PCP, the PC del P, or APRA. And, MIR was the revolutionary movement that had originated from APRA Rebelde, and carried out a guerrilla struggle against the Belaunde regime in 1965.

⁷⁴Interview with Cesar Levano, Director of Information for Si; also The Lima Times, #272, 30 May 1980, pg. 3.

⁷⁵Morales Bermudez, pp. 275-276.

⁷⁶*Ibid*, pg. 275.

government, with me or with another person, will continue.⁷⁷

After approving the plan, the GRFA continued its discussions with the "major" political parties. Morales Bermudez was not personally involved in this second round of discussions, delegating the discussions to the *Junta Militar* (or, military junta,) consisting of the Prime Minister and the commanding generals of the armed forces. Included in these discussions was the *Partido Socialista Revolucionario* (PSR, or Revolutionary Socialist Party,) consisting of followers of General Velasco, and led by former-general Leonidas Rodriguez Figueroa.⁷⁸

A constituent assembly was eventually elected in June 1978 despite continuing social turmoil. Although the GRFA and the major parties were anxious to begin the political transition, many new groups to Peruvian society had been excluded from the initial process. These newer political groups, predominantly Marxist-Leninist, were more concerned with labor and peasant issues than with a peaceful political transfer of power. Strikes continued to plague the GRFA's regime. Nevertheless, after a brief postponement because of a national strike in May 1978, the elections for the constituent assembly were held on 18 June 1978. Twelve political organizations, representing the entire political spectrum, participated in the elections. One prominent exception was Belaunde's AP, which decided not to participate because its leaders believed that a

⁷⁷Interview in *El Comercio*, 16 October 1977, quoted in Abugattas, pg. 133.

⁷⁸Interview with Morales Bermudez.

new constitution was unnecessary, and that the GRFA should immediately hold general elections.⁷⁹

Chapter six closely examines the constituent assembly and the development of the new constitution, as well as the 1980 transition election. Here it will suffice to say that, from July 1978 to July 1979, the Assembly and its one hundred constituents, under considerable duress, produced a constitution that not only facilitated the holding of general elections in 1980, but that is still in effect today.

Electoral Politics

The 1980 elections, a case of historic irony, returned to power by popular demand Fernando Belaunde Terry, the man who had been repudiated by all sectors in 1968. AP received a commanding plurality - 45.4%, obviating a second round, since only 36% of the vote was necessary for a clear victory. APRA, to the disappointment of its leaders, came in second with only 27%, thereby losing its traditional one third of the vote. APRA's poor showing was certainly affected by the death of its patriarch, Haya de la Torre, who died on 2 August 1979, only weeks after signing the new Constitution. The PPC, which had done very well in the Assembly elections owing to AP's absence, received only 9.6%. And finally, the left's portion of the vote dropped from 33% in the Assembly elections to only 16.7%, partly because the various parties were unable to present a united front.⁸⁰

⁷⁹Interview with Belaunde.

⁸⁰For the election results, see Abugattas, pg. 137.

The elections were of utmost importance in the democratic history of Peru. They represented the first time in Peruvian history that total participation was allowed in an electoral contest for political power. Dominant elites, as noted earlier, had traditionally excluded even the moderate left from electorally contesting political power, but as a result of the 1980 elections, one expert points out that "[t]he Parliament included as part of the left Trotskyites, Marxist-Leninists, nationalists, socialists, [and] various communist parties and groupings of more complex definition."⁸¹ Additionally, it was the first election in Peruvian history where 18 year-olds and illiterates were allowed to participate. For the first time full contestation and participation had been introduced to Peruvian electoral politics.

Unfortunately for the incipient democratic regime, a new guerrilla force also began military operations against the Belaunde government. The group called itself the true Partido Comunista del Peru (PC del P). It had originated in 1970 from a faction of the pro-Chinese PC del P - Patria Roja (PC del P-Patria Roja, or Red Homeland.) The group, however, became commonly known as *Sendero Luminoso* (or Shining Path,) because one of the first written acknowledgments of the group called for the nation to go "down the shining path of Carlos Mariategui." Its leader, Abimael Guzman, a staunch Maoist, Marxist-Leninist, admirer of Mariategui and a professor at the University of San Cristobal de

⁸¹Henry Pease Garcia, Democracia Y Precariedad Bajo el Populismo Aprista (Lima: DESCO, Centro de Estudios y Promocion del Desarrollo, 1988), pg. 50.

Huamanga, in the province of Ayacucho, had begun to organize students and peasants in that poverty-stricken and indian inhabited province as early as 1970.⁸² Sendero's military operations began in May 1980 with an estimated following of less than 100, and by the end of that year it was blamed for 232 acts of terrorism, primarily in Ayacucho.⁸³ However, despite Sendero's Marxist philosophy, all leftist political parties in Peru denounced the new group as "terrorist."⁸⁴

In September 1980, after their disappointing performance in the general elections, various leftist parties decided that the best way to duplicate the excellent electoral performance that they had achieved in the constituency assembly elections was to coalesce under one banner. Thus, several leftist parties and fronts created *Izquierda Unida* (IU, or United Left,) in the early morning hours of 13 September 1980, after three days of intense negotiations.⁸⁵ The same left that had, not so long before, "rejected the electoral route,"⁸⁶ was going to do everything possible to increase its percentage of the vote. In fact, the IU

⁸²Ronald H. Berg, "Sendero Luminoso and the Peasants of Andahuaylas," Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs 28, no. 4 (Winter 86/87) pg. 172.

⁸³Sandra L. Woy-Hazleton, "The Return of Partisan Politics in Peru," in Gorman, pp. 67, 72.

⁸⁴Caretas, no. 614, 8 September 1980, pg. 32; Berg, pg. 165; and Interview with Ledesma.

⁸⁵Alvaro Rojas Samanez, Partidos Politicos en el Peru, fourth edition (Lima: Editorial F & A, 1985), pp. 233-234. The parties and fronts were: PSR, PCP, FOCEP, UNIR, and UDP.

⁸⁶Enrique Bernales B., Parlamento, Estado Y Sociedad (Lima: DESCO, Centro de Estudios y Pomocion del Desarrollo, 1981), pg. 48.

leadership placed a great deal of distance between themselves and Sendero by severely criticizing the group's violent tactics. IU also did not allow the Trotskyite parties - despite their strong efforts - to join the united front. IU's intransigence led the trotskyite *Partido Revolucionario de Trabajadores* (PRT, or Revolutionary Party of the Workers) to publish an open letter to the national directive committee of IU asking for "internal democracy" within the left, so that they could be included in the front.⁸⁷ Their demands, however, met deaf ears.

The government held municipal elections in November 1980. Over eighteen hundred provincial and district mayors, and over ten thousand council members were elected. While AP finished first again, its share of the total vote was reduced to 36%. The big surprise was the performance of the left. After banding together under the united front of IU and under the leadership of Alfonso Barrantes Lingan, the left placed second, increasing its share to 23.9%. APRA came in third place with only 22.7%, and PPC slightly improved its performance, receiving 10.9%.⁸⁸

Municipal elections were again held in 1983. Owing to deteriorating economic conditions, Belaunde's AP did poorly, obtaining only 12% of the vote in Lima's mayoral race. As a result of continued unity, IU again did very well, receiving 36.6% of the city's vote, and thus winning the mayoral race in Lima. IU's leader,

⁸⁷Alvaro Rojas Samanez, Partidos Politicos en el Peru, seventh (reprinted) edition (Lima: Editorial F & A, 1988,) pg. 267.

⁸⁸Dietz, pg. 150.

Alfonso Barrantes, a Marxist-Leninist, was now the mayor of the Peruvian capital. APRA also rebounded, capturing 27% of the vote in the capital. Finally, PPC maintained its relatively poor position in the national vote, but maintained its normal standing in the capital, getting about 20% of the vote.

Despite speculations that Belaunde would not complete his tenure, national elections were held on schedule in 1985. One Peruvian expert wrote in February of 1984:

Today Peru's fragile democracy, restored with great enthusiasm in 1980, is caught in a deadly cross fire between the Shining Path and the Palace of Pizarro, where Belaunde's tenure has become very insecure.⁸⁹

Any student of Peruvian history would probably have come to the same conclusion. After all, political instability was the one thing that remained constant in Peruvian politics, and it looked as though APRA, or perhaps even the left, might win the elections in 1985. Nevertheless, the elections went on as scheduled, and APRA, the party that had been in the opposition for so long, finally won political power.

The results of the presidential race made APRA and IU as the two most powerful political forces in Peru. Alan Garcia, APRA's young secretary general, received a commanding 53% of the vote. IU's Alfonso Barrantes came in second with 25%. Luis Bedoya Reyes, of the new *Convergencia Democratica* (CODE, or Democratic Convergence, formerly PPC) received 12%. And, AP,

⁸⁹David P. Werlich, "Peru: The Shadow of the Shining Path," Current History 83, 490 (February 1984) pg. 90.

suffering from the poor economic conditions, attained only 6% of the vote.⁹⁰

Along with the success of APRA in 1985 came the emergence of a new political group bent on militarily undermining the elected government. In November 1985, the *Movimiento Revolucionario Tupac Amaru* (MRTA, or Revolutionary Tupac Amaru Movement) attacked the U.S. Embassy in Lima. This new group, unlike Sendero, was careful to minimize the loss of human life by principally attacking symbols of imperialism and capitalism, such as the U.S. Embassy, government buildings and private industries.⁹¹ MRTA, however, like Sendero, has been unable to precipitate a military golpe, or to halt the electoral process.

In November 1986 municipal elections were held once again. AP, licking its wounds from the 1985 results, decided not to participate. AP's decision turned the election into a three way race. APRA took the Lima mayoralty away from IU, in a close and bitterly fought campaign, winning 37.7% of the vote. IU came in a close second with 35.3%. And CODE came in a respectable third with 27%.⁹²

Peru has defied many experts who in recent years have predicted political collapse. Even though Sendero *Luminoso* and MRTA have intensified their attacks and increased their bases of support, political, economic and military elites appear to be disposed to accept the electoral process as the best means of determining the national political leadership. In the past eleven

⁹⁰Dietz, pg. 154.

⁹¹Interview with Ledesma.

⁹²Dietz, pg. 157.

years six elections have been held, and the results have been respected by all political parties. Recently, one expert has concluded: "Virtually all social groups in Peru today, according to all indications, are in favor of a democratic political regime for the nation."⁹³ Peru has made the transition from a nation that did not allow any opposition or participation to a nation where all political parties - from conservative to Marxist-Leninist - are represented in the national legislature, and where illiterates can participate in the electoral process. Thus, we can conclude, as another expert has, that:

If indicators of maturity in an electoral system include the ability of that system to allow different parties to acquire power, to permit a peaceful transfer of power when an incumbent is defeated, and to keep the military out of the political arena when its historical enemy [APRA] wins an election, then Peru has taken some significant strides toward political development.⁹⁴

How did Peru's elites, who had traditionally fought bitterly for political power and clung to it once they acquired it, undergo such a drastic change in such a short period of time? Certainly, the 1980 elections and the preceding 1978 Constituent Assembly represent a historic juncture. After all, every political party, was allowed to participate in the Assembly and in the drafting of a new constitution. The 1980 elections represent the first truly competitive elections where the victorious party was allowed to remain in office for the duration of its

⁹³Cynthia McClintock, "Perspectivas . . .," pg. 62.

⁹⁴Dietz, pg. 157.

tenure. Thus, if an elite settlement is to be found, we should find traces of it in the period covering the constituent assembly and the subsequent national elections. The following chapter explores in detail the workings of the Constituent Assembly, and the preparations by the political parties for the 1980 elections.

Chapter Seven

The 1978 Constituent Assembly and Peruvian Democracy

This chapter examines the 1978 Constituent Assembly and the subsequent 1980 national elections. The political situation prior to the Assembly elections was chaotic, primarily owing to a high level of strike activity, that resulted in intense government repression. Many doubted whether the elections would be held at all. Nevertheless, after a short postponement, they were held as promised by the GRFA. The Constituent Assembly, once installed, precariously (owing to continued strike activity and government repression) but eventually carried out its task of developing a new constitution. After some hesitation on the part of the GRFA, the constitution was finally accepted, and national elections were held in May 1980.

The Assembly that Almost Wasn't

Even though the GRFA had agreed to transfer power to civilians, many leftist political and labor groups continued to mobilize in protest against the government's economic programs and against its repression, and to demand pay increases. The left for the most part was more concerned with strike activity than with the electoral process.¹ By April, the political campaign had begun in earnest, as the government had authorized free television time for all political parties and granted a political amnesty in

¹Jorge Nieto, Izquierda Y Democracia en el Peru, 1975-1980 (Lima: DESCO, Centro de Estudios y Promocion del Desarrollo, 1983), pg. 100.

preparation for the elections scheduled for 4 June. However, the renewed social turmoil prompted the GRFA to temporarily discontinue the political activity, fearing that it would lead to further social unrest.

On 8 May 1978, the *Sindicato Unico de Trabajadores de la Educacion del Peru* (SUTEP, or Sole Syndicate of Workers of Peruvian Education,) controlled by the PC del P, began a strike that would last until 27 July, after the Constituent Assembly had been installed. The strike involved approximately 100,000 primary and secondary school teachers², and was ultimately supported even by private schools in Peru. Then on 22 and 23 May, twenty labor organizations, including the CGTP, the CNT³, and the CNA, banded together and carried out a general strike to protest the GRFA's economic measures, to ask for higher wages, and to demand union liberties and rights.⁴ It was estimated that the strike, although not as effective as the 1977 strike, cost the nation over 16 million man-hours, and approximately 63.8 million soles.⁵ While these were the two most important strikes, in the first half of 1978 Peru was plagued with strikes. For example, in January the CGTP had called a national strike (that was not very successful), in March municipal employees in

²Grace M. Ferrara, ed., Latin America, 1978 (New York: Facts on File, Inc., 1979), pg. 157.

³The CNT (Confederation Nacional de Trabajadores, or National Worker's Confederation) was the PDC's labor confederation.

⁴Henry Pease Garcia and Alfredo Filomeno, Peru, 1978: Cronologia Politica, volume 7 (Lima: DESCO, Centro de Estudios y Promocion del Desarrollo, 1980), pp. 3056-3057.

⁵*Ibid*, pg. 3077.

Lima were on strike for twelve days, and in April there was a nine-day general strike in the city of Arequipa.

The GRFA was virtually besieged by the public mobilization and repudiation. In a March interview, the Interior Minister, General Luis Cisneros, stated that "... compliance with the *cronograma politico* depends on national peace, order and tranquility."⁶ That tranquility, however, would not materialize. On the contrary, as a result of austerity measures in mid-May, violent demonstrations took place in Lima, Arequipa, Cuzco, and Huanuco, claiming the lives of seventeen people.⁷ The government reacted by arresting labor leaders, installing a state of emergency, banning campaign speeches for the Assembly elections, and closing down political publications and magazines.⁸ It also arrested or deported many leftist leaders who were campaigning to become constituents in the Assembly. The May general strike in many ways was the direct result of these repressive government measures. The GRFA's main concern was that strike activity was being used in the political campaign. For example, the GRFA disallowed free television political advertisement for two leftist fronts "... for not knowing how to use in a constructive form the platform that has been granted to them ..."⁹ The fronts had encouraged strike activity in their television programs.

⁶*Ibid*, pg. 3033.

⁷Latin America: Political Report, 26 May 1978, no. 20, pg. 1.

⁸Ferrara, pg. 156.

⁹Pease Garcia and Filomeno, volume 7, pg. 3026-3027.

The government repression and the strike activity of May, however, placed the conflict in a different perspective. The generals realized that despite its efforts to turn power over to civilians, there was still intense public hostility toward the GRFA. On the other hand, the political parties and labor organizations also saw that, if pressed hard enough, the government would retrench and intensify its repression. Political elites had to decide whether continued strike activity was worth the cost of losing the electoral process. And the GRFA was faced with the social consequences it would inherit if it canceled the elections for a Constituent Assembly.

The political parties then turned their attention to political rights, rather than strikes, so that the *cronograma politico* could continue. The left, in general, decided that "if it did not participate in the Constituency it would lose the political space" it had acquired in the last few years.¹⁰ At the end of May, to allay the fears of the GRFA, the Coordinating Committee for the May national strike denounced rumors that a new strike would take place as "totally lacking in substance."¹¹ Two weeks prior to the elections, now scheduled for 18 June, the *Unidad Democratico Popular* (UDP, or Popular Democratic Unity,) a front composed of 14 leftist parties, called on the *Jurado Nacional Electoral* (JNE, or National Electoral Board,) to urge the GRFA to reinstate "democratic liberties," so that

¹⁰Interview with Julio Cruzado Zavala, ex-constituent for APRA and President of CTP, Lima, Peru, 6 February 1989.

¹¹Pease Garcia and Filomeno, volume 7, pg. 3067.

they could participate effectively in the elections.¹² For its part, the GRFA made a very important personnel change: General Cisneros, the hard-liner, was replaced with General Pedro Richter Prada, as Interior Minister, who stated that the situation was now "peaceful and controlled."¹³ By mid-June, just days before the elections, the GRFA had allowed the political magazines to reopen, returned free television and printed advertisements to all political parties, and partially reinstated constitutional guarantees. Nevertheless, on the eve of the elections, several political leaders who were on the ballots were still in exile or in hiding.

The limited truce, if strained, allowed the elections to take place on 18 June 1978. Although some parties questioned the integrity of the elections, voting irregularities were probably more the result of "incompetence and inexperience than of fraud."¹⁴ However, retired-General Leonidas Rodriguez Figueroa, President of the PSR, was arrested and exiled to Argentina as he cast his ballot.¹⁵ And the day after the elections, other leftist leaders were arrested. Nevertheless, twelve political organizations, representing the entire political spectrum, participated in the elections.

¹²*Ibid*, pg. 3082.

¹³*Ibid*, pg. 3075.

¹⁴Latin America: Political Report, volume 12, 14 July 1978, no. 27, pg. 215.

¹⁵The PSR, formed by followers of Gen. Velasco, represented the revolutionary faction in the army that had been purged by Gen. Morales Bermudez, and was being persecuted by the GRFA because of its anti-government strike activity.

The electoral results demonstrated APRA's continuing importance as a political institution, but also showed the emerging influence of the left. AP was notably absent from the elections, since it had pulled out in March, claiming that the GRFA "... had not given sufficient guarantees of respect for the sovereignty of the assembly,"¹⁶ and that national elections should be held immediately.¹⁷ APRA commanded the results, winning 35.5% of the vote, and capturing thirty-seven of the one-hundred seats in the Assembly. The PPC came in second, getting 23.8% of the vote, and a total of twenty-five seats. The variety of leftist parties managed to tally approximately 33% of the vote. The *Frente Obrero Campesino Estudiantil y Popular* (FOCEP, or Worker Peasant Student and Popular Front,) composed of eight leftist organizations, captured twelve seats. This surprising performance was due, to a large extent, to the popularity of Hugo Blanco, a well-known and flamboyant Trotskyite, who was actively involved in strike activity. The PCP and PSR tied, both receiving six seats in the Assembly. The remaining seats were distributed as follows: UDP, four seats; the *Frente Nacional de Trabajadores y Campesinos* (FNTC, or National Front of Workers and Peasants,) four seats; and the PDC, with two seats. Two traditional rightist parties also participated and won two seats each: the

¹⁶Latin America: Political Report, 24 March 1978, no. 12, pg. 94.

¹⁷Interview with Fernando Belaunde Terry, Peruvian President 1963-1968 and 1980-1985, Lima, Peru, 8 February 1989. Belaunde believed that national elections should be held immediately, since in his view the 1933 constitution did not need to be amended.

Partido Union Nacional (PUN, or National Union Party,) composed of supporters of General Odria; and the *Movimiento Democratico Popular* (MDP, or Popular Democratic Movement,) made up of followers of former President Manuel Prado. These results would have an important consequence in the Constituent Assembly, since it gave APRA and the PPC, with sixty-two seats, a working-majority.

Once the elections had designated the one-hundred assemblymen, the Constituent Assembly began to take on a great deal of importance and attention in Peruvian politics. In July, before the assembly began its deliberations, the GRFA announced that those individuals in exile who had been elected as constituents could return to Peru to fulfill their obligations as national constituents. Surprised by the results of the elections, FOCEP and UDP leaders, in a press conference in Paris on 21 June, stated that the results of the elections "create a new political situation in Peru."¹⁸ Thus, the Constituent Assembly became an accepted and legitimate political forum for the military government, the traditional right, the traditional populists, and the left.

On 18 July 1978, a Preparatory Council was installed to make the necessary preparations for convoking the Constituent Assembly. Haya de la Torre, having attained the largest popular vote, was elected president. He immediately stated that the Assembly's budget would be used to return to Peru those exiled political leaders who had been elected as

¹⁸Pease Garcia and Filomeno, volume 7, pg. 3103.

constituents.¹⁹ The following week, a rules committee, composed of twenty constituents according to proportional representation, was established to determine the parliamentary rules that would be employed by the Assembly. The full Constituent Assembly met for its inaugural, and primarily ceremonial, session on 28 July 1978.

The Politics of the Constituent Assembly

Finally, on 10 August 1978, the much awaited Constituent Assembly convened its first plenary session. Immediately, the debate was heated and conflictual. All Constituents were in agreement that the Assembly should act as a "supreme and sovereign" body, "... intervening in all aspects of political and economic life."²⁰ However, in order to accomplish these goals, APRA, PPC, MDP and UNO - or right and center - wanted the Assembly simply to draft a new constitution, as the GRFA mandated. However, PDC, UDP, PCP, PSR, and FOCEP - or left and center left - demanded that the Assembly become the sovereign force in the nation, that it reject the legitimacy of the GRFA, that it take on legislative powers, and that it "achieve extensive transformation of national economic and social structures."²¹ FNTC, alone, pushed for an Assembly that would accomplish both tasks. The difference in opinion on the basic functions of the

¹⁹Ibid, pg. 3141.

²⁰Latin America: Political Report, no. 30, 4 August 1978, pg. 238.

²¹Pease Garcia and Filomeno, volume 7, pg. 3172.

Assembly precluded that body from accomplishing any concrete acts for three weeks.

After some compromising, on 25 August, the Assembly agreed upon the rules that would regulate its deliberations. The rules did not give the Assembly legislative powers as the left had wanted. Its primary mission would be to create a new constitution. However, with help from the PPC, a motion introduced by the left was passed that allowed the Assembly to debate issues of national importance, such as human rights, the economy, and strike activity.²² The left was also pleased with the formation of two commissions, one that would study violations of human rights under the military government, and another would attempt to determine blame for the economic crisis. Thus, toward the end of August, the left dropped its demands that the Assembly become the legitimate government in Peru - something that the GRFA was not about to let happen.

The plenary sessions, replete with debates over fundamental issues, developed a sort of circus atmosphere, primarily because its sessions were open to the public and were extensively covered by the press. The plenaries would begin around 6:30 p.m., normally last until 2 a.m., and at times until 5 a.m. Constituents themselves tend to agree that the plenary sessions were primarily theatrical because of their open nature.²³ Often the left would walk out in mass

²²Howard Handelman and Thomas Sanders, eds., Military Government and the Movement Toward Democracy in South America (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1981), pg. 125.

²³Interviews with Miguel Angel Echeandia Urbina, ex-constituent for the PSR, Lima, Peru, 30 January 1989;

to protest some action or vote by the majority, or to denounce some government act. The plenary sessions, for the most part, precluded the emergence of any sort of mutual understanding between the leaders of the various political parties.

Nevertheless, some cooperation between the left and the right did take place. For example, in October, the PPC and APRA took opposing positions for the first time, when the PPC voted with the left on a motion introduced by the PSR that would grant free media advertisement to all parties participating in the upcoming general elections.²⁴ The PPC also disagreed with APRA, this time united with the left, on the issue of emancipating illiterates. Also, the PCP ultimately left the ranks of the more radical left and agreed with the majority - APRA and PPC - that the assembly should simply write a new constitution rather than "dictate laws."²⁵ And after the GRFA had instituted price increases in mid-October, APRA and PPC, in a surprise move, voted with the left on a motion that urged the

Andres Townsend Ezcurra, senator, ex-constituent for APRA, and member of Principal Commission, Lima, Peru, 8 February 1989; Antonio Meza Cuadra, ex-constituent for PSR, and member of Principal Commission, Lima, Peru, 13 February 1989; Enrique Chirinos Soto, senator, ex-constituent for APRA, and author of book on the 1979 Peruvian Constitution, Lima, Peru, 15 February 1989; Hector Cornejo Chavez, ex-constituent for PDC, and member of Principal Commission, Lima, Peru, 15 February 1989; Ernesto Alayza Grundy, senator, ex-constituent for PPC, and member of Principal Commission, Lima, Peru, 22 February 1989; Genaro Ledesma, senator, former constituent and President of FOCEP, Lima, Peru, 10 February 1989; and Cruzado Zavala.

²⁴Pease Garcia and Filomeno, volume 7, pg. 3244.

²⁵*Ibid*, pg. 3242.

government to "reconsider" the austerity measures.²⁶ Aside from these few instances, the left and the majority - APRA and PPC - were normally in disagreement in the plenary sessions, and seemed to go out of their way to show that they had strong differences.

Those differences derived from the fact that most of the leftist Assemblymen were intimately involved in strike activity, while the Constituent Assembly was attempting to create a new constitution, and preparing for the transfer of power. After the austerity measures of mid-October, FOCEP and UDP leaders, including several assemblymen, staged protests against the GRFA's economic measures.²⁷ The GRFA, to discredit the leftist leaders, began a publicity campaign against those Constituents who were involved in strikes, by publishing their pictures in most newspapers.²⁸ The government hoped that they would be discredited by making them appear as disruptive radicals. The GRFA would also arrest assemblymen who participated in strikes, but then they would be turned over to the Assembly, which would immediately release them.

Tensions significantly increased in January 1979 when new austerity measures provoked the CGTP to call for a new general strike. In the first week of January, the government raised the price of gasoline by 20%, rice by 22%, and electricity by 30%.²⁹ When the

²⁶Latin America: Political Report, no. 43, 3 November 1978, pg. ?

²⁷Pease Garcia and Filomeno, volume 7, pg. 3239.

²⁸*Ibid*, pp. 3177-3178.

²⁹Henry Pease Garcia and Alfredo Filomeno, Peru, 1979: Cronologia Politica, volume 8 (Lima: DESCO, Centro de Estudios y Promocion del Desarrollo, 1980), pg. 3334.

GRFA discovered that the CGTP was about to organize a general strike, it arrested labor leaders, suspended constitutional guarantees, and closed down leftist political magazines. One day before the strike, the Assembly majority passed a resolution introduced by APRA that repudiated the upcoming strike, since it would "provoke chaos" and "impede the transfer of power to the people."³⁰ The strike that began on 9 January, scheduled to last for three days, was called off on the evening of the 10th, because of lack of support, but also because the GRFA on that same day entered PCP headquarters and arrested thirty people.³¹

There were several reasons for the failure of the strike. First, the military had decided to take a strong stand, and made the strike organizers pay heavily for their efforts. Second, APRA and PPC leaders, who had supported the 1977 general strike, were strongly opposed to this strike. And third, the CGTP had not included other, more radical, labor organizations for fear that things would get out of hand.

The strike's failure forced a decision on leftist assemblymen. They would either have to continue to be primarily concerned with fostering and supporting strikes, inviting GRFA repression and perhaps precipitating an end to the *cronograma politico*, or they would have to turn their attention toward the

³⁰*Ibid*, pg. 3340.

³¹*Ibid*, pg. 3341.

Constituent Assembly. Many opted for the latter.³² Nevertheless, Assemblymen would still become engaged in strike activity, and be arrested throughout the Constituent Assembly's tenure. In addition, the closing down of magazines became an extremely contentious issue. In protest, hunger strikes were staged in the Assembly by journalists, and in February the Assembly passed a PPC resolution that denounced the closure of the magazines.³³ After prolonged pressure, the GRFA eventually allowed the magazines to reopen in May 1979.

Behind the virulence of the public plenary sessions, there was a quite, more consensual side to the Constituent Assembly. In order to accomplish the task of writing a new constitution the Assembly established the *Comision Principal De Constitucion* (the Principal Commission of the Constitution), composed of twenty-five members according to proportional representation.³⁴ In addition to the Principal

³²Interview with Michael Smith, political correspondent for Lima Times during Constituent Assembly, Lima, Peru, 3 February 1989.

³³Pease Garcia and Filomeno, volume 8, pg. 3377.

³⁴Representing APRA was Luis Alberto Sanchez, a party founder and first vice-president of the Assembly, along with nine other party leaders, including another founder, Ramiro Priale (now deceased,) and Julio Cruzado Zavala, secretary general of the party's CTP. The PPC membership included three influential founders, Mario Polar Ugarteche (now deceased,) Ernesto Alayza Grundy, and Roberto Ramirez del Villar, and four other representatives. FNTC's leader and founder, Roger Caceres Velasquez, was the sole representative of that organization. The PCP was represented by its leader Jorge Del Prado Chavez. Hector Cornejo Chavez, paramount leader of the PDC, was that party's solitary spokesman. FOCEP was represented by that

Commission, which was primarily responsible for producing the constitution, fourteen other constitutional sub-commissions were established to address particular sections of the new constitution. In these commissions, which met behind closed doors, "... there was more inter-party cooperation and less APRA-left confrontation than in the floor debates."³⁵

The Principal Commission was established on 12 September 1978. It began deliberations on 25 September 1978, finished the draft of the constitution on 27 March 1979, but continued its work until 9 July 1979, when the constitution was ready for approval and signing. For that entire period, the members of the Commission, representing the entire political spectrum, met for approximately four hours, five days a week. The Commission's debates, unlike those of the plenary sessions, were "arduous but cordial."³⁶ The members of the Principal Commission, away from the galleries of the Assembly and the news media, conducted themselves

organization's president, Genaro Ledesma, and Ricardo Napuri Schapiro, a leader of a Castroite faction of MIR. Antonio Meza Cuadra, a founder, was the PSR spokesman. And, the UDP's sole representative was Carlos Malpica Silva.

³⁵Handelman and Sanders, pg. 127.

³⁶Congreso Nacional Del Peru, Comision Principal: Diario del los Debates, Tomo 1 (Lima: Congreso Nacional Del Peru, 1988), pg. 3. Quotation by Luis Alberto Sanchez, President of the Comision Principal, in the Introduction. In reading the transcripts of the Plenary sessions and the debates of the Principal Commission, it is clearly evident that the floor debates were primarily for external or public consumption, and represented political rhetoric at its finest. On the other hand, the debates in the Principal Comision, even though they included several of the same people, were for the most part very serious and respectful.

"differently"³⁷ - the speeches and diatribes were replaced by "civilized"³⁸ discussions concerning the nature of the new Carta Magna. One member of the Principal Commission, not particularly fond of the left, admitted: "We all became great friends."³⁹ According to two leftist members of the Commission, the left was "very active",⁴⁰ and "had a brilliant role"⁴¹ in the Principal Commission.

The various sub-commissions also exhibited the serious manner of the Principal Commission. The Economic and Financial Regime Commission decided to bring in economic experts for advice. The members agreed that the best economic minds were to be found in the two most prestigious universities in Lima - *Universidad Catolica* and *Universidad del Pacifico*. As the commission worked on its part of the constitution, experts from these universities were consulted.⁴² There was also a good deal of agreement in the Agrarian Regime Commission. Toward the beginning of its work, the president of the commission stated: "There is a firm and immovable position on the irreversibility of the agrarian reform, and for now unanimous consensus to prevent the return of the previous owners of the

³⁷ Interview with Roberto Ramirez Del Villar, senator and ex-constituent for the PPC, Lima, Peru, 20 February 1989.

³⁸ Interview with Cornejo Chavez.

³⁹ Interview with Alayza Grundy.

⁴⁰ Interview with Carlos Malpica Silva, senator, ex-constituent for UDP, and member of Principal Commission, Lima, Peru, 14 February 1989.

⁴¹ Interview with Ledesma.

⁴² Interview with Alayza Grundy. Grundy was the president of this commission.

land."⁴³ Positions were even changed through dialogue in the various commissions. One Constituent recalls that his political allies "almost hanged him," when he voted with the opposition - APRA - on one particular vote, after a prolonged discussion with a political opponent convinced him to do so.⁴⁴

While these commissions exhibited a great deal of prudence compared with the rhetorical style of the plenaries, they were also plagued by some inattention on the part of some leftist leaders. In the Labor and Union Rights Commission, where the left should have been extensively involved, only one leftist member out of four participated actively throughout the commission's tenure. The basic problem was that the various leftist organizations tried to reach an agreement on a unified course of action, but were unable to do so.⁴⁵ Therefore, in the sub-commissions, much more so than in the Principal Commission, there was a good deal of absenteeism by the left.⁴⁶ As one self-criticism of the left has concluded:

...the persistence of previous errors [lack of unity] brought the majority of the left (if not the totality) to neglect the constitutional debate, concentrating its activities above all in the political gesture of supporting union activities ...⁴⁷

⁴³Pease Garcia and Filomeno, volume 7, pg. 3253.

⁴⁴Interview with Echeandia.

⁴⁵Interview with Isidoro Gamarra Ramirez, ex-constituent for PCP and President of CGTP, Lima, Peru, 16 February 1989.

⁴⁶Interview with Malpica.

⁴⁷Nieto, pg. 100.

Despite early efforts to develop a unitary position by various leftist leaders, such as Jorge Del Prado of the PCP and Genaro Ledesma of FOCEP, the left in the Assembly never formed a united front that could effectively combat the APRA-PPC majority. When asked about the left's efforts in the Constituent Assembly, one former assemblyman put it very simply: "We were not prepared for that task."⁴⁸

Creating a Constitution

The new constitution was not prepared in a vacuum. The Principal Commission asked for and received many inputs from a variety of groups and individuals. Once the chapters were finished by the sub-commissions they were published in the press to give anyone a chance to comment on them. Luis Alberto Sanchez, the President of the Principal Commission, told the nation that he received comments and suggestions from "the public, the institutions ... two ex-presidents of the republic [Bustamante and Belaunde], and various professional colleges."⁴⁹ In September 1978, a Commission of the Catholic Church met with Haya de la Torre to express their ideas on the constitution, especially to urge the incorporation of separation of church and state and freedom of religion. In that same month a commission of the Council of University Rectors asked the Assembly to incorporate university autonomy into the constitution. And in December, the leadership of the National Federation of Workers in Social Property Industries urged the Economic and Financial Regime

⁴⁸Interview with Malpica.

⁴⁹Caretas, no. 554, 28 May 1979, pg. 25.

Commission to include social property as a national economic sector in the new constitution.⁵⁰

The Assembly was of course more interested in the ideas of someone like former president Belaunde, and his AP party. Sanchez sent a personal letter to Belaunde requesting his inputs. Belaunde replied with AP's position on 18 October 1978, in plenty of time for the commissions to consider his ideas. Belaunde argued that the 1933 constitution should be amended rather than rewritten, since that constitution contained the values that were currently emphasized by most political groups and the nation as a whole, such as agrarian reform, social property, worker's rights, and individual liberties.⁵¹ He nevertheless provided the Principal Commission with his thoughts on how the 1933 constitution should be amended. Sanchez termed his inputs as "very important."⁵² Thus, while AP leaders did not actively participate in the drafting of the constitution, they were able to make their ideas known to the Assembly, and eventually Belaunde would be the one to proudly promulgate the new *Carta Magna* in 1980.

Like other national institutions, the GRFA did not simply watch from the sidelines. There was extensive contact between the military government and the political parties, especially APRA, while the Assembly

⁵⁰Pease Garcia and Filomeno, volume 7, pp. 3201 and 3282.

⁵¹Interview with Belaunde. His exact statements to the Principal Commission are in Fernando Belaunde Terry, Accion Popular Y La Carta Magna (Lima: Accion Popular, Editora Minerva, 1978.)

⁵²Luis Alberto Sanchez, Testimonio Personal, 6: Adios A Las Armas, 1976-1987 (Lima: Mosca Azul Editores, 1988), pg. 90.

was in session. In a mid-October 1978 press conference, General Morales Bermudez stated that the Prime Minister had been authorized to meet with the political parties involved in the Constituent Assembly.⁵³ The Prime Minister, General Oscar Molina, along with the commanding generals, began a practice of meeting with political leaders once a week. Weekly meetings were scheduled with regularity with APRA and PPC leaders, and with less regularity with the other, leftist, political parties.⁵⁴ As early as 2 August 1978, General Molina met with FOCEP President Genaro Ledesma to establish regular meetings.⁵⁵ The GRFA wanted to ensure that it kept its pulse on Assembly proceedings, lest the Constituents run amuck.

There is no doubt that the GRFA maintained stronger contacts and held more meetings with APRA than with any other political party. In fact, General Morales Bermudez met personally with Haya de la Torre on three separate occasions while the Assembly was preparing the constitution.⁵⁶ The GRFA argued that meetings with APRA were of paramount importance since it was the dominant party in the Assembly and Haya was that body's president, but it became apparent to many that some sort of *convivencia* was developing between the GRFA and its historic enemy - APRA. By March 1979,

⁵³Pease Garcia and Filomeno, volume 7, pg. 3239.

⁵⁴Sanchez, pg. 108; and interviews with Roger Caceres Velasquez, senator, ex-constituent for FNTC, and member of Principal Commission, Lima, Peru, 7 February 1989, and Belaunde.

⁵⁵Pease Garcia and Filomeno, volume 7, pg. 3164.

⁵⁶Interview with Francisco Morales Bermudez, general (retired), President and leader of GRFA, 1974-1980, Lima, Peru, 22 February 1989.

rumors were rampant that there was some sort of pact between APRA and the GRFA. One month earlier, the weekly magazine *Oiga* reported that a pact existed between the generals and the *apristas*. Luis Alberto Sanchez denied the allegations, stating that only discussions were taking place, and that it was "possible to talk even with the devil."⁵⁷ The following month, in an interview in Paris, General Morales Bermudez also denied that a pact existed, but admitted that the long-standing hatred between the military and APRA no longer existed.⁵⁸ While there might not have been an explicit agreement between the GRFA and APRA, there was clearly some form of "understanding"⁵⁹ or "*modus vivendi*."⁶⁰

There was also a great deal of understanding among the dominant parties - the PPC, APRA, and even AP. Almost immediately after the results of the Assembly elections were announced the PPC leadership visited the APRA leadership in July 1978. The party leaders knew that united (37+25 seats) they could command the Assembly. Sanchez recollects that the meeting "marked a new criteria for judging political acts; its consequences would be noteworthy."⁶¹ Belaunde also met with PPC and APRA leaders in July 1978, and the parties even discussed the possibilities of establishing a

⁵⁷Pease Garcia and Filomeno, volume 8, pg. 3396.

⁵⁸*Ibid*, pg 3431.

⁵⁹Interview with Cesar Levano, editor for Marka during Constituent Assembly, currently Director of Information for the newsweekly magazine Si, Lima, Peru, 9 February 1989.

⁶⁰Interview with Belaunde.

⁶¹Sanchez, pg. 74.

transitional government that would rule until the national elections were held in 1980.⁶²

The serious manner of the commissions, the inter-party cooperation (especially between APRA and PPC,) and the constant GRFA contact with the political parties, greatly facilitated drafting the constitution in what normally would have been considered a politically hostile environment. The Principal Commission finally produced a draft constitution, on 27 March 1978, to be submitted to the plenary for approval. On the 10th of March, Haya had left for Houston Texas, suffering a grave pulmonary disorder. The acting President, Luis Alberto Sanchez, a fellow APRA founder, did everything possible to hasten the constitutional process to ensure that Haya would be able to sign the constitution before his imminent death.⁶³ The Assembly majority decided that the constitution would be debated chapter by chapter, rather than by individual article, and that debates would be limited, in order to speed up the approval of the *Carta Magna*. This decision prompted many leftist assemblymen to concentrate their time on supporting strikes and on preparing for the upcoming elections, rather than on the constitutional debates.⁶⁴

Since the GRFA had granted the Assembly a one year tenure, the constituents had only three and one half months to approve the new constitution. While the

⁶²Latin America: Political Report, no. 26, 7 July 1978, pg. 206.

⁶³Sanchez, pp. 117-132.

⁶⁴Latin America: Political Report, no. 14, 6 April 1979, pg. 111.

Assembly could have conceivably extended its tenure (at the cost of some criticism), APRA leaders were bent on pushing the process ahead for the sake of their patriarch, Haya de la Torre. But even though the acting-president Luis Sanchez believed that the Carta Magna "had its principal problems resolved through consensus"⁶⁵ in the commissions, when the constitution reached the plenary, the road to approval became contentious.

On 3 April 1979, when the constitutional debate was to commence, the left refused to participate until the GRFA allowed the political magazines to reopen. On 10 April, the left returned to the Assembly after journalists ended a hunger strike to protest the closure of the magazines. The first two constitutional chapters were quickly approved on the next day.

Soon, however, the method of selecting the next president created friction between APRA and the PPC, and moved the left into a strategic position. APRA leaders began to court the left because the apristas favored a formula that called for a simple plurality of 33% to win the presidency, and rejected the idea of a run-off between the top two vote-getters. The PPC, knowing that APRA's share of the vote was historically under 36%, wanted that to be the necessary plurality, and demanded that a run-off be held if no one candidate achieved that percentage. Eventually, most of the leftist constituents rejected APRA's initiatives and sided with the PPC. When the vote for the presidential run-off came up in the Assembly, the left was not

⁶⁵Sanchez, pg. 97.

physically present on the floor, so that it would not be seen voting with the right.⁶⁶

APRA also lost support from the left for the establishment of one of Haya's long-standing dreams - an Economic Congress that would be composed of representatives from the economic sectors rather than from the political parties.⁶⁷ Ironically, despite APRA's electoral strength, it was unable to get through the Assembly three projects or proposals of utmost importance to the party. The left and the PPC blocked the Economic Congress, and forced APRA to compromise on the definition of the state, and on the rules for electing the next president.⁶⁸ The party that had been banned from the Constituent Assembly of 1933 had a large plurality of the vote in the new 1978 Assembly and the confidence of the military regime, but was still unable to impose what it wanted on the minority parties.

Despite the political conflicts, the constitution was completed and approved by the second week of July 1979. By the first week all the chapters had been approved. When the Assembly's second vice-president, Ernesto Alayza Grundy, announced to the constituents

⁶⁶Caretas, no. 554, 28 May 1979. FOCEP was the only leftist group that voted with APRA, believing that it was better to unite with APRA than with the right.

⁶⁷Miguel Angel Echeandia, a PSR constituent, admits that the left probably should have supported APRA's economic congress since it would have been better suited to meet the demands of the working class and peasants. However, at the time of the Assembly, most leftist constituents were antagonistic toward APRA because of that party's anti-communism.

⁶⁸Interview with Ramirez del Villar.

that the entire text had been approved, the Assemblymen came to their feet and began to applaud. Then, the public in the galleries spontaneously stood and sang the Peruvian national anthem.⁶⁹

The GRFA, having kept its pulse on the proceedings, was not rejoicing, since it was very concerned over certain parts of the constitution. The generals asked the Assembly's Directive Commission for a meeting on 10 or 11 July to discuss the constitution. The Prime Minister, General Pedro Richter Prada, met with the Assembly's leadership on 11 July to express their objections. The Assembly leaders became very concerned, realizing that the GRFA would, if it could, prevent the constitution as approved from being promulgated. An emergency session could not be held on the night of the eleventh for lack of a quorum, but the Constituents hurriedly met on the following day. The apristas had already taken the finished document to Haya's residence, Villa Mercedes, for his signature, and it was now ready for final approval. The left refrained from signing the finished document, calling it a "pro-capitalist" and "anti-popular" Constitution.⁷⁰ The new Carta Magna, signed by all the APRA, PPC, MDP, and PUN constituents who were present, was promulgated and sent to the GRFA at 6 p.m. on 12 July 1979.⁷¹

The GRFA returned the constitution on the following day, charging that the Assembly had "exceeded

⁶⁹Caretas, no. 560, 9 July 1979, pg. 24.

⁷⁰Latin America: Political Report, no. 28, 20 July 1979, pg. 222.

⁷¹Sanchez, pg. 144.

its specific function."⁷² The military did not object to the text, but rather with the eighteen "transitory decrees" that were attached to the constitution that would come into effect immediately after the constitution was promulgated. The GRFA viewed these transitory decrees as an encroachment on the *de facto* GRFA government.⁷³ The generals were primarily concerned with five policy implications of the decrees. First was the immediate abolition of the death penalty, except for treason during conflict with a foreign nation. Second was the prohibition of summary arrests or deportations. Third was a refusal to let civilians come under the jurisdiction of military law (a GRFA law that had recently been decreed.) The GRFA was particularly concerned with these transitory provisions because, if accepted, they would hinder the government's ability to combat labor and subversive activity. The government was also concerned with two other provisions that forgave the debts of peasants who had received land under the agrarian reform, and that allowed state employees to form unions.⁷⁴

On 13 July the Assembly met to decide upon its course of action. The constituents "without exception ... and by unanimity rejected the observations of the military government."⁷⁵ The Assembly sent a letter to the GRFA, along with the approved constitution, stating

⁷²Pease Garcia and Filomeno, volume 8, pg. 3543.

⁷³Francisco Morales Bermudez, Apuntes Sobre Autoritarismo Y Democracia (Lima: Iberoamericana de Editores S.A., 1989), pg. 283.

⁷⁴Latin America: Political Report, no. 28, 20 July 1979, pg. 222.

⁷⁵Sanchez, pg. 148.

that "the constitution of Peru has been approved and promulgated on 12 July 1979, and can only be reformed by the procedure delineated in article 306 of the same."⁷⁶ Article 306 specifies that the constitution can only be amended by the national legislature. The GRFA was being put on notice that the new constitution was inviolable. However, the Assembly, in a conciliatory move, approved a motion, without the support of the left, that recognized the *de facto* government's right to suspend constitutional guarantees in times of national emergency.⁷⁷ The acting-president, Luis Alberto Sanchez, then dissolved the Assembly one day early in order to present the government with a *fait accompli*. The GRFA reacted by announcing that the 1933 constitution was the law of the land until the new constitution was officially promulgated by the new civilian government in 1980. The political parties, exhibiting a great deal of prudence, quietly accepted the military's stance "... in order not to antagonize the regime and jeopardize the transfer of power."⁷⁸ With the constitution written, and the GRFA pacified, only one thing stood in the way of the transition begun in 1976: a national election.

⁷⁶Alvaro Rojas Samanez, Partidos Politicos en el Peru, first edition (Lima: Centro de Documentacion Andina, 1982), pg. 123.

⁷⁷Pease Garcia and Filomeno, volume 8, pg. 3544.

⁷⁸Luis A. Abugattas, "Populism and After: The Peruvian Experience," in Authoritarians and Democrats: Regime Transition in Latin America, James M. Malloy, and Mitchell A. Seligson, editors (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1987), pg. 137.

Down the Shining Path of Electoral Politics

Once the new *Carta Magna* was completed and accepted (at least tacitly) by most political groups and the GRFA, the political parties turned their attention to the upcoming national elections. The parties began the difficult processes of selecting presidential candidates and of seeking alliances with other parties in order to increase their electoral base of support. The smaller leftist parties were particularly compelled to seek electoral partners if they were to challenge the strength of APRA, the PPC and AP.

The death of Haya de la Torre in July 1979 created an unprecedented struggle for succession within APRA. The party's patriarch had in the past prevented the emergence of intra-party power struggles since he was accepted as the only true leader of APRA. With Haya gone, the party divided along two lines: the "conservatives," led by Andres Townsend and Luis Alberto Sanchez, and the "populists," led by Armando Villanueva. Villanueva decisively beat Townsend for the party nomination at the party's national convention in October 1979.⁷⁹ Although many observers predicted that APRA would not survive the death of Haya, party leaders were able to hold the political organization together. Although Townsend eventually left the party, Luis Alberto Sanchez remained loyal and was able to ameliorate the differences between the conservatives

⁷⁹ APRA had held a national congress in July 1979 where Haya was named as the presidential candidate. However, after his death, a national convention with democratic procedures was necessary in order to elect a successor.

and populists by supporting the nomination of Armando Villanueva.

The other major parties also held conventions or congresses to elect their presidential nominees. In December 1979, the PPC held its second National Assembly which proclaimed Luis Bedoya Reyes as the party's presidential nominee. As expected, AP selected Belaunde as its presidential candidate. And the PCP's seventh National Congress, composed of 400 delegates, elected Jorge Del Prado as the party's presidential hopeful in October 1979.

Prior to the elections, the major parties of the right and center attempted to create an electoral front. As early as late-August 1979, Belaunde called for the political parties to consider the negotiation of a "Pact of Punto Fijo," like the one that brought democracy to Venezuela. The former president was actively courting APRA and PPC leaders in order to create such an accord.⁸⁰ On 20 November 1979, Belaunde, Villanueva, and Bedoya met to discuss the possibility of achieving an electoral front of the center and right. After the meeting, Bedoya explained that the three presidential hopefuls had discussed the "rules of the game."⁸¹ A formal pact between the three major parties did not materialize, however, owing to APRA's hesitance to align itself with the right. In January 1980, Belaunde continued his efforts to develop inter-party unity by offering Bedoya the first vice-presidency in the AP ticket, but the PPC hopeful

⁸⁰Pease Garcia and Filomeno, volume 8, pg. 3588.

⁸¹*Ibid*, pg. 3686.

rejected the former president's offer, deciding to go it alone under the banner of his own party.⁸² Thus, inter-party unity in the center and right never materialized as Belaunde had hoped for.

While the center and right attempted to achieve a political alliance, leftist leaders also tried to achieve a united electoral front. Leftist leaders had begun to coalesce the various leftist organizations even prior to the Assembly elections by forming multi-party/organizational fronts such as FOCEP and UDP. Now that national political power was at stake, stronger efforts were made by leftist leaders to galvanize the many leftist organizations that had emerged in Peru. Unfortunately for those like Alfonso Barrantes of the UDP, who called for a united front, "doctrinal and personal differences" precluded the emergence of a united left for the elections of 1980.⁸³

In August 1979 almost all leftist parties and political organizations took part in meetings designed to discuss the unification of the left.⁸⁴ In October, the *Union de la Izquierda Revolucionaria* (UNIR, or Union of the Revolutionary Left) was formed by the PC del P and a VR faction. Although PC del P had not participated in the Constituent Assembly, its leaders decided to compete in the 1980 national elections. MIR and the FLN joined UNIR in December 1979. UNIR

⁸²Lima Times, no. 257, 15 February 1980, pg. 3.

⁸³Sandra L. Woy-Hazleton, "The Return of Partisan Politics in Peru," in Post-Revolutionary Peru: The Politics of Transformation, Stephen M. Gorman, editor (Boulder: Westview Press, 1982), pp. 50-51.

⁸⁴See Pease Garcia and Filomeno, volume 8, pp. 3590-3599.

supported the candidacy of Alfonso Barrantes, who was associated with UDP. However, on 5 December 1979, Barrantes proposed that all leftist candidates forego their candidacies so that a multi-party congress could elect one candidate to represent the entire left.⁸⁵

By January 1980 the impetus for unity had grown. The *Alianza Revolucionaria de Izquierda* (ARI, or Leftist Revolutionary Alliance) was formed by three maoist fronts, including UDP and UNIR, and three trotskyite political organizations, including Hugo Blanco's PRT. ARI, the quechua word meaning yes, brought together virtually all maoist and trotskyite political organizations of any import. However, it also brought together men of paramount political ambition like Barrantes and Blanco.

The more traditional or conservative left also attempted to bring about a united front. In January 1980, the *Frente de Unidad de Izquierda* (FUI, or Front of the United Left) was created by the PCP, the PSR, FOCEP and four other small leftist groups. FOCEP, however, was already experiencing internal problems and pulled out of FUI by late-February.⁸⁶

Despite valiant attempts to unite the left, leftist leaders were unable to put aside political,

⁸⁵*Ibid*, pp. 3701-2.

⁸⁶Some of the integrants of FOCEP were trotskyite organizations which joined ARI. Eventually trotskyite leaders attempted to prevent Ledesma, FOCEP's president, from using the FOCEP label. Ledesma argued that as president of the organization he had the right to employ the FOCEP name even though some of its organizations had left the front. FOCEP pulled out of FUI primarily because it believed that the PSR was conservative.

personal and ideological differences, resulting in the eventual fragmentation of the left just prior to the national elections. In February 1979, UNIR pulled out of ARI owing to disputes over the list of candidates for the national elections.⁸⁷ The two major leftist coalitions, ARI and FUI, were unable to agree upon a unified list of candidates for the elections. The dominant controversy was over how many congressional seats each party in the coalition would receive. Just prior to the deadline for the parties to present their lists of candidates to the JNE, ARI members conducted a "seven-day, round-the-clock, whirlwind of talks"⁸⁸ before the front finally disintegrated. One leftist leader was quoted as saying: "We can no longer claim that the right wing's accusations that we are sectarian and dogmatic are just propaganda. It's true."⁸⁹ The newsweekly *Caretas* reported that Javier Diez Canseco, prominent leader of UDP, literally wept while reading telegrams from provincial organizations that begged the national leadership to preserve unity.⁹⁰

Although neither the left, center, or right was able to achieve an electorally viable united front with other political parties, one thing was for certain: all parties were preparing in earnest to compete for power in the upcoming elections.

⁸⁷ See Henry Pease Garcia and Alfredo Filomeno, Peru, 1980: Cronologia Política, volume 9 (Lima: DESCO, Centro de Estudios y Promoción del Desarrollo, 1982), pp. 3837-8.

⁸⁸ Lima Times, no. 260 (incorrectly numbered as no. 530 in the newspaper), 7 March 1980, pg. 3.

⁸⁹ Ibid

⁹⁰ Caretas, no. 590, 3 March 1980, pg. 13.

For its part, the GRFA continued its previous policies of caution. It allowed the political parties free advertising in the news media from 17 March to 16 May. However, the GRFA would censure the advertisements to ensure that they would not "incite violence."⁹¹ In April, just one month before the elections, the government fined several leftist parties and suspended their free advertisement because of libel and their support of strikes.⁹² The GRFA also continued its contact with the political parties. Now that AP was involved in the political process, the GRFA held talks with its leaders as well. In November 1979, General Richter, the prime minister, and members of the military junta, met with Belaunde and three other AP leaders. The discussion covered the social and economic situation and the electoral process.⁹³

For the most part, the political parties campaigned without becoming involved in inter-party political violence. However, as the campaign neared its close, tensions grew and some conflict emerged. In March there were several violent confrontations between the political parties. But for the most part, these altercations involved party thugs that remained active, but belonged to a time when political disputes were resolved through violence rather than through the ballot. On 13 March, FOCEP claimed that AP "coyotes" assaulted its party headquarters in Huanuco; one day

⁹¹Pease Garcia and Filomeno, volume 9, pg. 3821.

⁹²The parties - PRT, POMR, PST, and UDP - quickly paid their fines so that they could continue their political campaign.

⁹³Pease Garcia and Filomeno, volume 8, pg. 3667.

later, *Accion Politica Socialista* (Socialist Political Accion) charged that APRA "bufalos" attacked its headquarters; and, on the 15th, UNIR denounced APRA as responsible for an assault at a party rally.⁹⁴ Toward the end of March, FOCEP and UDP accused APRA of instigating political violence; FUI claimed that the PPC had committed an assault; AP charged APRA with a violent act; and there were other charges as well.⁹⁵

Party leaders became very concerned with the rising violence. Believing that such violence could jeopardize the elections, they called for a political truce. By early March, Luis I loya was urging all parties to come to an understanding and to create a "code of conduct" for the elections.⁹⁶ He also argued that the party's political thugs - AP's *coyotes*, APRA's *bufalos*, and the PPC's *chitos* - should be disbanded because they were "time bombs."⁹⁷ Late in March, FOCEP's president, Genaro Ledesma, and the PPC's first vice-presidential candidate, Ernesto Alayza Grundy, declared that their parties would be in favor of reaching an accord of "no aggression," something that APRA had recently suggested.⁹⁸ Thus, political leaders demonstrated a strong desire to control the violence of their party militants. Although a formal agreement did not materialize, the violence subsided and the elections were held as scheduled on 18 May 1980.

⁹⁴Pease Garcia and Filomeno, volume 9, pg. 3867.

⁹⁵*Ibid*, pp. 3877-3878.

⁹⁶*Ibid*, pp. 3860-3861.

⁹⁷*Ibid*.

⁹⁸*Ibid*, pg. 3878.

Belaunde's substantial victory was at first questioned by APRA leaders. At one in the morning, on the 19th, Villanueva charged that there had been serious flaws in the electoral process, suggesting that AP and the GRFA were responsible. He invoked Haya de la Torre's words from 1931, saying: "The pages of our history we will write in blood."⁹⁹ The situation was serious, but at daylight the party leadership appeared to have accepted defeat. APRA leader Carlos Enrique Melgar urged *aprista* militants to be "calm and serene," and added that "political power is held not just as the government, but political power is held as opposition."¹⁰⁰ The situation was totally under control on 21 May when APRA leader Ramiro Priale recognized Belaunde's victory and declared that APRA would not ask that the elections be annulled.¹⁰¹ The left also accepted the election results. Rather than blaming the left's poor performance on fraud, UDP leader, Javier Diez Canseco, stated: "The left self-eliminated itself as a governing alternative in these elections by not uniting itself even in the original blocks: FUI and ARI."¹⁰² Other leftist leaders, like Hugo Blanco and Rolando Breña Pantoja (PC del P leader,) reacted similarly, criticizing the left rather than the elections.

His presidency assured, Belaunde immediately began a campaign of conciliation. On 21 May, AP created the *Comision de Punto Fijo*, with the goal of achieving a

⁹⁹*Ibid*, pg. 3960.

¹⁰⁰*Ibid*, pg. 3961.

¹⁰¹*Ibid*.

¹⁰²*Ibid*, pg. 3967.

national consensus by creating a government of a broad front and by communicating with all the political parties. On that same day, the Commission offered the PPC two ministries in the AP government, and stated that it would make the same offer to APRA. On 26 May, Villanueva made a protocol visit to Belaunde, rejecting the offer of two ministries, but promising that APRA would act as a "constructive opposition" in the legislature.¹⁰³ Prior to taking power, AP carried out discussions with virtually all political groups, including UNIR, SUTEP, and even Hugo Blanco's PRT.

Belaunde did not forget the GRFA either. In May and June, the president-elect had several meetings with the GRFA. On 23 May, Belaunde met with General Morales Bermudez and his military junta. The general agreed that the GRFA would not take any important policy actions without first consulting with Belaunde.¹⁰⁴ On 5 June, Belaunde met with key military leaders, including the Army's chief of staff, General Rafael Hoyos Rubio, who as a colonel in 1968 planned the operation that captured the government palace and ended Belaunde's government. The secret meeting began at 9 p.m. and ended at 1:15 a.m.¹⁰⁵ Belaunde met with the military leadership on two other occasions, on 16 and 19 June. Belaunde classified one of the meetings as "very fruitful."¹⁰⁶ During these encounters, it is believed that Belaunde "promised not to interfere with

¹⁰³*Ibid*, pg. 3969.

¹⁰⁴*Ibid*, pg. 3968.

¹⁰⁵*Caretas*, no. 602, 9 June 1980, pg. 22.

¹⁰⁶Pease Garcia and Filomeno, volume 9, pg. 4004.

the Army's command structure."¹⁰⁷ Belaunde had not only appeased the political parties, but the generals as well.

On 28 July 1980, Fernando Belaunde Terry became president of Peru for the second time. While it appeared that Peru had gone back to the past, nothing could be further from the truth. The president was the same, but the political system had changed dramatically. In the next chapter, we will propose that the changes were the result of a partial elite settlement among the GRFA, APRA and the PPC.

¹⁰⁷Lima Times, no. 274, 13 June 1980, pg. 1.

Chapter Eight

Partial Elite Settlement in an Unintegrated Peru

Did an elite settlement take place in Peru prior to the transition to electoral politics in 1980? A settlement among all political factions, similar to those that occurred in Venezuela and Colombia, did not occur in Peru. However, there was certainly agreement among the GRFA, APRA and the PPC during the Constituent Assembly. Therefore, we are compelled to ask whether the characteristics and preconditions of elite settlements were present in the Peruvian situation prior to the return to democratic politics. If some sort of agreement occurred in Peru, it most likely was a partial elite settlement.

Characteristics of Elite Settlements

The return to democracy in Peru was a relatively slow process compared to the settlements in Colombia and Venezuela. The GRFA promulgated Plan Tupac Amaru in late-1977. The Constituent Assembly began its deliberations in July of 1978 and completed a new Carta Magna exactly one year later. By May of 1980 national elections had been held and a new democratic regime was in power in July. For the most part, the Assembly constituted the authoritative forum for the political elites to iron out their differences and to agree upon the rules of the game for the new political system. The creation of the new constitution took approximately six months, since the Principal Commission did not begin its work until late September 1978 and completed its work in late March 1979. The transitions that

began in late-1977 did not conclude until July 1980, when Belaunde took office.

Many "face-to-face, partially secret, negotiations among paramount leaders of the major elite factions"¹ characterized the transfer of power in Peru.

Virtually thousands of meetings took place during the transfer of power. Prior to the installment of the Constituent Assembly, the GRFA met on several occasions with the major political parties. Additionally, the parties themselves conducted many meetings to determine their strategies for the assembly, and to create coalitions with other political parties and organizations. As early as the mid-1970s, leftist parties and political organizations began to establish contacts with other forces on the left.² The leftist fronts that participated in the Assembly - FOCEP and UDP - were the result of many meetings between leaders of the twenty-two political organizations that comprised them. While the Assembly was in session, its commissions conducted hundreds of meetings behind closed doors, involving the major leaders of the principal political organizations. Once the Assembly had completed its task, all political parties became involved in extensive negotiations with other parties, and also held many meetings and conventions in preparation for the 1980 electoral contest. During this period, mid-1970s to 1980, leaders of virtually

¹Michael G. Burton, and John Higley, "Elite Settlements," American Sociological Review 52, no. 3 (June 1987) pg. 299.

²Interview with Isidoro Gamarra Ramirez, ex-constituent for PCP and President of CGTP, Lima, Peru, 16 February 1989.

all political parties had face-to-face contact³, something that had previously been out of the question.

The extensive negotiations that took place certainly involved the principal political leaders in Peru. As we have seen, the GRFA was intimately involved in the transfer of power. The military leaders first met with the major political parties in 1976 to devise Plan Tupac Amaru. Then, once a Constituent Assembly was elected, they maintained continuous contact with the leadership of the Assembly to ensure that they knew what was transpiring. Even after the Assembly completed the constitution, the GRFA was involved. The generals interpreted the new constitution as they wished, but they nevertheless pressed on with the transfer of power, maintained contact with the parties, preserved order, and ensured that their institution would be respected.

The paramount leaders of all the major civilian political organizations were also involved in the negotiations. APRA was represented by its patriarch Haya de la Torre, and his most respected lieutenants, Luis Alberto Sanchez, who served as interim president of the Assembly and as president of the Principal Commission, and Ramiro Priale and Andres Townsend, both of who served in the Principal Commission. Haya led the Assembly and maintained personal contact with the GRFA, while Sanchez, Priale and Townsend helped create the new law of the land. Although AP was not directly involved in the Assembly, the party's founder and

³Interview with Miguel Angel Echeandia Urbina, ex-constituent for the PSR, Lima, Peru, 30 January 1989.

leader, Fernando Belaunde Terry, provided his thoughts on the constitution to the Assembly, and fully supported the Carta Magna when he took office in 1980.⁴ The PPC's principal leaders were also involved in the Assembly and in discussions with the GRFA. Luis Bedoya Reyes, Ernesto Alayza Grundy, and Roberto Ramirez del Villar, all party founders, were extensively involved in the transfer of power process and the writing of the constitution.⁵

The paramount leaders of the leftist parties were also represented in the Assembly, and participated fully in the transfer of power. The PCP was led by its principal and unchallenged leader Jorge del Prado, who was a member of the Principal Commission. Hector Cornejo Chavez, the leader of the PDC, was a member of the Principal Commission and had direct contact with the GRFA.⁶ The president of FOCEP, Genaro Ledesma, had contact with the GRFA, and was also a member of the Principal Commission, as was Roger Caceres Velasquez, founder and paramount leader of FNTC. The PSR's key leader, retired-general Leonidas Rodriguez, was a

⁴Interview with Fernando Belaunde Terry, Peruvian President 1963-1968 and 1980-1985, Lima, Peru, 8 February 1989.

⁵According to Ramirez, surprisingly enough, only the PPC had a constitutional plan when the Principal Commission began its deliberations. Not even APRA had developed a proposed constitution. So, the PPC plan was used as the guideline by all the commissions. Interview with Roberto Ramirez Del Villar, senator and ex-constituent for the PPC, Lima, Peru, 20 February 1989.

⁶Interview with Hector Cornejo Chavez, ex-constituent for PDC, and member of Principal Commission, Lima, Peru, 15 February 1989. Cornejo Chavez retired from politics after participating in the Assembly.

constituent, and one of his political lieutenants, Antonio Meza Cuadra, served on the Principal Commission. Other key leftist leaders were constituents in the Assembly, and were members of Assembly commissions, such as the popular Hugo Blanco, Javier Diez Canseco, and Carlos Malpica, who served on the Principal Commission. All in all, the left in Peru was provided with the opportunity to participate fully in the Constituent Assembly⁷, and most leftist organizations took advantage of that opportunity by participating in the Assembly elections.

Despite the extensive participation of leftist leaders, some aspects of their participation clearly do not fit the concept of an elite settlement. First, unlike the parties of the right and center, most of the leftist political organizations did not have two or three key leaders who could authoritatively speak for the entire left. In simple terms, the left was highly fragmented. FOCEP and UDP were composed of seven and

⁷ Interviews with Genaro Ledesma, senator, former constituent and President of FOCEP, Lima, Peru, 10 February 1989; Julio Cruzado Zavala, ex-constituent for APRA and President of CTP, Lima, Peru, 6 February 1989; Roger Caceres Velasquez, senator, ex-constituent for FNTC, and member of Principal Commission, Lima, Peru, 7 February 1989; Andres Townsend Ezcurra, senator, ex-constituent for APRA, and member of Principal Commission, Lima, Peru, 8 February 1989; Carlos Malpica Silva, senator, ex-constituent for UDP, and member of Principal Commission, Lima, Peru, 14 February 1989; Enrique Chirinos Soto, senator, ex-constituent for APRA, and author of book on the 1979 Peruvian Constitution, Lima, Peru, 15 February 1989; Ernesto Alayza Grundy, senator, ex-constituent for PPC, and member of Principal Commission, Lima, Peru, 22 February 1989; Cornejo Chavez; Echeandia; and Belaunde.

fourteen political organizations respectively. While each front was represented in the Assembly, those representatives could not speak for all the organizations that composed the fronts. Second, only certain "sectors" of the left participated seriously in the Assembly; the "new left" was not disposed to participate."⁸ The more traditional leftist parties, like the PCP and PDC, and some leftist leaders, like Genaro Ledesma, took the Assembly quite seriously. However, the "new left" - leftist groups that emerged in the 1960s and later - were more concerned with strike activity than with creating a constitution. Third, the PC del P did not participate at all in the Constituent Assembly. Additionally, the CNA, which had become an important agrarian popular organization, was not allowed to participate in the Assembly elections because the GRFA judged that it was not a political organization but a labor union.⁹

While the left was allowed to participate in the transfer of power, many of the leftist organizations were simply not prepared to do so, or did not desire to do so. Leftist leaders did not make a "deliberate" decision to participate in the Assembly elections, but rather they were overcome by a "spontaneous impulse."¹⁰ Once they had become involved, some became engaged in the creation of the new constitution, while others used

⁸Interview with Cesar Levano, editor for Marka during Constituent Assembly, currently Director of Information for the newsweekly magazine Si, Lima, Peru, 9 February 1989.

⁹Latin America: Political Report, Volume 12, no. 6, 10 February 1978, pg. 44.

¹⁰Interview with Levano.

their new political status to advance their political causes. The result was that the left had neither a unified plan nor a small, coherent group of leaders that could develop such a plan once they became members of the Constituent Assembly.

Despite this absence of participation by all ideological groups, a new constitution was written and approved by the Constituents in less than one year. While the 1933 constitution had been imposed by the military regime then in power, the 1979 constitution was influenced by "all political and social movements" in Peru.¹¹ Although the Assembly "ratified the foundations of a liberal, capitalist system" (to the delight of APRA and the PPC as well as the absent AP), it nevertheless addressed many of the proposals of the left.¹² The major structural reforms that the GRFA had made were institutionalized in the new constitution. These reforms had eliminated the traditional landed oligarchy, created a strong state, and nationalized many industries. We have seen that even APRA with its large plurality was unable to achieve several of its key goals in the Assembly. Most notably it was unable to succeed in establishing the economic congress that Haya had proposed. On the other hand, the left was able to eliminate the death penalty, enhance the rights of labor, and incorporate human rights into the new Carta Magna.¹³ Thus, even if many leftist Constituents

¹¹Interview with Cruzado Zavala.

¹²Sandra L. Woy-Hazleton, "The Return of Partisan Politics in Peru," in Post-Revolutionary Peru: The Politics of Transformation, Stephen M. Gorman, editor (Boulder: Westview Press, 1982), pp. 41-42.

¹³Interview with Ledesma.

did not take the Assembly as seriously as others, the 1979 constitution embodied the aspirations and ideals of the entire political spectrum.

Limited Forbearance and Conciliation

During the transition to democracy, forbearance and conciliatory behavior could be found on the part of certain elites and organizations. However, along with this behavior, there was also a good deal of intransigence and belligerence, especially in the relationship between the GRFA and the "new" left.

For the most part, APRA, the PPC, and AP accepted with open arms the GRFA's Plan Tupac Amaru. While AP did not participate in the Assembly, the party did not in any way attempt to forestall the government's plan to return power to civilians. The center and right were more than willing to accommodate the GRFA so that Plan Tupac Amaru could go on as scheduled. This conciliatory attitude is best exemplified by the relationship between APRA and the military. If these two traditional enemies could come to an understanding, certainly the PPC and AP could do likewise.

During the Assembly's tenure it became obvious to informed observers that APRA had become the GRFA's favorite political organization. The reasons for this were strickly rational, having nothing to do with past history. The military government wanted to ensure that Peru did not revert back to its traditional socioeconomic system, and it wanted its social reforms to be institutionalized in order to prevent such a return. Thus, the parties of the right were perceived by the generals as a possible threat to the reforms.

On the other hand, the military feared the parties of the left, since their ideologies were either communistic or socialistic. APRA was the only political institution that was in favor of the reforms and at the same time was anti-communist.¹⁴

The result was that the former enemies became partners in the plan to return power to civilians, and in some ways even became friends. When Haya de la Torre became ill in March 1979, General Richter, the Prime Minister, offered GRFA assistance to the ailing political chieftain. Haya declined the assistance, but asked the general to continue the GRFA's bilateral talks with other APRA leaders in his absence; the general complied.¹⁵ When Haya died in July 1979, the GRFA posthumously granted him the highest military decoration in Peru. The armed forces awarded the Order of the Sol in the Grade of the Gran Cruz to Haya de la Torre in "recognition by the people and the Peruvian government of the high qualities of the recipient and the significance of his public service for the nation."¹⁶ The newsmagazine *Caretas* editorialized:

Forty-seven years after the Trujillo revolution
... an institutionalist military government admits
the merits of its old and mortally sick enemy.
There is something of greatness in this.¹⁷

¹⁴Interview Chirinos Soto.

¹⁵Luis Alberto Sanchez, Testimonio Personal, 6: Adios A Las Armas, 1976-1987 (Lima: Mosca Azul Editores, 1988), pg. 109.

¹⁶Henry Pease Garcia and Alfredo Filomeno, Peru, 1979: Cronologia Politica, volume 8 (Lima: DESCO, Centro de Estudios y Promocion del Desarrollo, 1980), pg. 3561.

¹⁷Caretas, no. 563, 30 July 1979, pg. 14.

The parties of the center and right accepted the GRFA's repression of labor and accepted the *de facto* government for one simple reason: they did not want to jeopardize the return to civilian rule. These parties refused to accept the left's motion in the Constituent Assembly that the military government could be proclaimed as illegitimate. The more conservative constituents knew that such a motion would have meant the end to the Assembly and Plan Tupac Amaru.¹⁸ The center and right maintained cordial relations with the GRFA throughout the Assembly's tenure, as demonstrated by the numerous meetings that were held.

Most importantly, the military was accepted as a necessary institution in the transition process. In September 1979, APRA's Armando Villanueva stated that the procurement of military equipment by the armed forces was justified "as long as others [Ecuador and Chile] spend money on arms."¹⁹ Even Belaunde, who had not participated in the Assembly and who had been the principal political victim of the military *golpe* of 1968, "did not undertake any investigation of the military's administrative actions and allowed for the military's absolute autonomy in their internal affairs" when he took office in 1980.²⁰ Just prior to his inauguration, Belaunde stated: "... with respect to the previous government, I have no vengeful sentiment. My

¹⁸Interview with Townsend.

¹⁹Pease Garcia and Filomeno, volume 8, pg. 3615.

²⁰Luis A. Abugattas, "Populism and After: The Peruvian Experience," in Authoritarians and Democrats: Regime Transition in Latin America, James M. Malloy, and Mitchell A. Seligson, editors (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1987), pg. 139.

responsibility is now with the future."²¹ Owing to the forbearance on the part of the center and right, the GRFA was able to turn power over to the political parties without paying a heavy price for its twelve years of military rule.

The parties of the center and right also exhibited inter-party conciliation. APRA, the PPC, and AP attempted to develop a united electoral front for the 1980 national elections. Although the front never materialized, the meetings among the leaders of these parties were generally cordial. The animosity that had prevailed between APRA and AP leaders in the late sixties had for the most part disappeared by the late seventies. Two months prior to the 1980 elections, the Lima Times discovered an important change in the attitude of the political leadership during an interview with Armando Villanueva, the APRA presidential hopeful. The newspaper disclosed:

one of the main changes since the prior attempt at democracy is that there is a human relationship, even friendship, among leaders like himself [Villanueva], Fernando Belaunde of Accion Popular, Luis Bedoya of the Partido Popular Cristiano, and Genaro Ledesma of FOCEP."²²

When party militants from APRA, the PPC and AP became involved in political violence just prior to the national elections, party leaders quickly stepped in to prevent the disputes from jeopardizing the elections. The call by party leaders from the PPC, APRA, and AP to

²¹See Henry Pease Garcia and Alfredo Filomeno, Peru, 1980: Cronologia Politica, volume 9 (Lima: DESCO, Centro de Estudios y Promocion del Desarrollo, 1982), pg. 3971.

²²Lima Times, no. 262, 21 March 1980, pg. 3.

put an end to party thugs - Chitos, Bufalos, and Coyotes - was an admission that the violent ways of the past had come to an end.

The relatively cozy relationship that developed between the GRFA, AP, APRA, and the PPC only partially extended to the leftist organizations. Party leaders from the center and right developed good working relationships with leftist leaders like Genaro Ledesma and Hector Cornejo Chavez, owing to their diligent work in the Principal Commission and their moderate behavior. Luis Alberto Sanchez has written that Haya de la Torre developed an "understanding" of former enemies that included not just the GRFA and PPC, but also Cornejo Chavez and even Genaro Ledesma.²³ However, many of the young and more radical leftist leaders like Hugo Blanco did not develop working relationships with the leaders of the traditional parties.²⁴ In fact, the younger leftist leaders were antagonistic even toward the more traditional, but still Marxist, PCP. In many ways, it was not a problem of ideology but of generation.

In like fashion, while a sort of *modus vivendi* developed between the parties of the right and center and the GRFA, there was little forbearance and conciliation between the military and the new left. Time and time again, the leftist constituents would become engaged in strike activity and the government would repress the strikes; on several occasions the government arrested the constituents who were involved.

²³ Sanchez, pp. 81-82.

²⁴ Interview with Townsend.

Many leftist leaders were bent on embarrassing further an already humiliated military regime. And the generals were more than willing to exert their power to put down popular mobilization by the left, and to paint the radical leftist constituents as agitators and traitors to the nation. For all intents and purposes, "there was extensive harassment and repression against the leftist parties ... "²⁵ during the Constituent Assembly elections. During the Assembly's tenure the GRFA kept a tight leash on the left, and leftist political advertisements were censured by the military during the 1980 political campaign to ensure that the left would not "incite violence."

The military government could not help but be acutely aware that only the leaders of the new left discussed some sort of punishment or reprisal against the military regime. In April 1980, Carlos Malpica, the UDP presidential candidate, stated that the "abuses committed during the years of military dictatorship will not remain unpunished."²⁶ Malpica charged that the GRFA was guilty of "genocide, repression, *entreguismo*, fraud, and immorality."²⁷

The GRFA had wanted to exit power gracefully by allowing all parties to participate in a Constituent Assembly. However, most parties of the new left (even though they decided to participate) did not accept the GRFA's rules of the game. They wanted to make the GRFA pay for the twelve years of military rule, especially for their repressive treatment of labor after the 1977

²⁵Woy-Hazleton, pg. 37.

²⁶Pease Garcia and Filomeno, volume 9, pg. 3932.

²⁷*Ibid.*

general strike. At the same time, the GRFA wanted to exit power without being held accountable for its unpopular economic and political policies. For these reasons, the GRFA and the new left never came to an understanding prior to the transfer of power in 1980.

In sum, it appears that while several indicators of elite settlements were present in the period immediately preceding the transfer of power, three important characteristics were absent. First, the left was not sufficiently unified to allow leftist elites to reach any agreements with the GRFA and/or with the parties of the center and right. Second, and perhaps partly as a result of the left's fragmentation, certain sectors of the left did not participate in the Assembly, and some sectors that participated in the Assembly elections did not seriously participate in the creation of the new constitution. Third, very little if any conciliation or forbearance existed between certain sectors of the left and the GRFA. Whether the absence of these important characteristics might have prevented an elite settlement from taking place remains, however, still unsettled. To begin to explore this possibility requires us to see if the three preconditions of an elite settlement were present prior to and during the 1980 transfer of power.

National Crisis

Although Peru has never experienced a civil war in the classic sense, the nation has certainly experienced "decades of intense but inconclusive struggles for

factional ascendancy."²⁸ These struggles have certainly been costly. The most prominent example is the long-standing conflict between APRA and the military institution. The bitter feud between these two organizations began with the massacre at Trujillo and continued until the mid-1970s, when the GRFA was desperate to find a political party that could provide the generals a respectable exit from politics.

In addition to the factional conflict between APRA and the armed forces, at the beginning of the twentieth century Peruvian intellectuals and political leaders began to develop strong opposition to the traditional land-owning oligarchy. Manuel Gonzalez Prada, born to an aristocratic family, argued that Peru's development could not be accomplished by the traditional oligarchy which was "selfish" and without a sense of nationalism.²⁹ In 1912, Andres Belaunde, uncle to the future president of Peru, wrote that the "dominant culture" in Peru was harmful because it was bereft of "normative values suitable for creating national cohesion and legitimating authority."³⁰ Mariategui and Haya de la Torre tried to institutionalize this incipient anti-oligarchism by developing political

²⁸Burton and Higley, pg. 298.

²⁹Stephen M. Gorman, "The Intellectual Foundations of Revolution in Peru: The Anti-Oligarchic Tradition," in Gorman, pp. 197-199. See also Eugenio Chang-Rodriguez, La Literatura Politica de Gonzalez Prada, Mariategui y Haya de la Torre, (Mexico City: Ediciones de Andrea, 1957), for an excellent account of the origins of anti-oligarchic sentiment in Peru.

³⁰Victor Andres Belaunde, Meditaciones Peruanas (Lima: Compania de Impresiones y Publicidad, Editores, 1932), pg. 199.

parties that challenged the existing order and above all the existing elites. What developed was a stronger sense of nationalism arising from a rejection of the dominant elites.

The dominant elites - the landowners, exporters, the Church, and the armed forces - were perceived as traitors to the nation because of their close alliance with foreign capital, predominantly U.S. capital. Thus, the hatred that developed against the traditional elites led to a commensurate hatred against foreign (normally U.S.) investors, giving birth to the concept of *entreguismo*.

The factional struggle for ascendancy that dominates twentieth century Peruvian history thus represents the challenge to the dominant elites from emerging elites. Those who began to contest the power of the traditional system were the intellectuals, the politicians, the professionals, the journalists, and the industrialists, all of whom employed a strong sense of nationalism to challenge the existing power of the traditional elites. The traditional oligarchy, however, would not be defeated until it lost the support of those who had a monopoly over the means of coercion - the armed forces.

Factional struggles in Peru reached their apex in the late 1960s. In the 1960s, the dominant political parties - APRA, AP, PPC, and DC - were all anti-oligarchic in one form or another. However, inter-party rivalries precluded any sort of concerted action against the oligarchs, as evidenced by the APRA-UNO coalition against AP's reforms. The already

troublesome political situation was complicated by new revolutionary groups that attempted to bring down militarily the existing regime in 1965. Finally, when AP under Belaunde's leadership signed the Act of Talara, the already weak political situation deteriorated into a regime crisis. Virtually all political organizations - the armed forces, the press, and even most AP leaders - strongly criticized the IPC agreement as the ultimate case of *entreguismo*. Although there was almost unanimous consensus in 1968 that the landed oligarchy had to go and that economic dependence had to be diminished, there was insufficient understanding and cooperation among existing political elites to allow for a concerted action.

Nevertheless, by the late 1960s an important change had occurred: the armed forces were no longer supportive of the traditional oligarchy. The intense elite conflict present in 1968, along with the ever-growing sense of nationalism, prompted the armed forces to take control of the situation for "the sake of the nation." Thus, the GRFA instituted a regime that exemplified the nationalist goals of the majority of Peruvians. The regime attacked the landed oligarchy, United States economic influence in Peru, and promoted national integration by attempting to enhance the well being of all Peruvians, including the historically neglected indigenous population.

The GRFA did accomplish to an "impressive degree"³¹ many of the tasks it undertook. Generally,

³¹Cynthia McClintock, and Abraham Lowenthal, eds., The Peruvian Experiment Reconsidered (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1983), pg. 419.

it was able to affirm nationalism, modernize the economy, virtually eliminate the power of the landed oligarchy, and create a much stronger state. The military, however, was unable to implement an organic, corporatist regime with mass support. Eventually, the regime found itself in an extreme crisis. Its programs, had alienated economic elites, political elites, intellectuals, the press, labor, peasants, and the United States. Eventually, the GRFA even began to alienate many of its own officers, creating much internal conflict within the armed forces. By 1978, General Morales Bermudez admitted to the nation: "We [military men] are not made for politics."³² The culmination of the crisis was the 1977 national strike, which was even supported by the parties of the center and right. In 1968 the political elites had become convinced that the landed elites had to give up their power; in 1977 they had become convinced that the military too had to exit the political arena. Those who took part in the Constituent Assembly are unanimous in their opinion that the return to democracy was to a large extent due to the *desgaste* - wearing away - of the military regime.³³ Fortunately for the politicians, the generals had come to the same conclusion.

Peru's history thus supports the claim that a serious national crisis was present prior to the return

³²Henry Pease Garcia and Alfredo Filomeno, Peru, 1978: Cronologia Politica, volume 7 (Lima: DESCO, Centro de Estudios y Promocion del Desarrollo, 1980), pg. 3048.

³³Interviews with Caceres, Malpica, Chirinos, Gamarra, and Alayza.

to democracy. There was a long history of factional struggle among elites. There was also a strong sense of an external enemy, as evidenced by the strong national sentiment against U.S. economic penetration. To this should also be added the Peruvian fear of the Chilean and Ecuadorean militaries, owing to vividly remembered conflicts with both nations. Finally, just prior to the return to civilian rule, there was a grave regime crisis that turned all political and social organizations against the GRFA.

While a national crisis may have assisted in forming a political consensus among many elites, we cannot assume that a consensually unified elite exists in Peru. There is a social factor that no political or sociological analysis of Peru can neglect: the Peruvian nation, despite its relatively long history, cannot be considered an integrated nation-state. As early as 1931, Haya de la Torre warned: "We as a people ... do not constitute a homogeneous entity."³⁴ This lack of integration is partially explained by the large percentage of indigenous peoples (highland peasants, Amazon tribes) who inhabit the Andean and jungle regions in Peru. Unfortunately for both the nation's total population and for the sake of national unity, the indigenous groups in Peru have been subjected to "nearly universal prejudice" by the European and the mestizo population.³⁵ As a result, "... historically

³⁴Ignacio Campos, ed., Revolucion Sin Balas: 15 Discursos de Hay de la Torre (Lima: Okura Editores, S.A., 1984), pg. 31.

³⁵Richard Lee Clinton, "APRA: An Appraisal," Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs 12 (April 1970) pg. 289.

the state in Peru never expressed, or represented the totality of Peruvians."³⁶

This lack of integration has been compounded by the phenomenon of centralism in Peru. Since the 1920s, centralism has become much stronger. The power of Lima, and the other major cities such as Trujillo and Arequipa, has grown in relation to other areas because of "demographic, economic, technological and cultural" changes.³⁷ Centralism has produced a state, centered in Lima, that has for the most part neglected the interior regions, resulting in *anti-Limeñismo* in the predominantly indigenous and rural areas of Peru.³⁸ Perhaps it should not surprise us to find that the most anti-Lima regions have been the poorest provinces of the south: Ayacucho, Apurimac, Cusco, Puno and Huancavelica.³⁹ It should cause little surprise that Sendero Luminoso originated in Ayacucho and that it derived much of its initial support from the highland provinces of the south. One Peruvian scholar has observed:

The present violence, viewed solely in its ideological correlate, deserves to be analyzed from a more profound level. New contesting Andean forces have emerged, that not only question the economic and political system, but which also in

³⁶Raul Gonzalez, "La Violencia en el Peru," in Diego Garcia Sayan, ed., Democracia Y Violencia En EL Peru (Lima: Centro Peruano de Estudios Internacionales, 1988), pg. 23.

³⁷Jose Tamayo Herrera, Regionalizacion E Identidad Nacional (Lima: Centro de Estudios Pais Y Region, 1988), pg. 25.

³⁸*Ibid*, pg. 12.

³⁹*Ibid*, pg. 33.

larva form vindicate unconscious regional longings.⁴⁰

The persistence of centralism and the neglect of the interior provinces has prevented Peru from becoming an integrated nation-state, and has as well prevented the political parties in Peru from representing the entire nation. Even in the 1980s, the Peruvian state has been almost totally absent in some of the interior provinces, save for the presence of police forces and the armed forces. The vice-mayor of Ayacucho, Jaime Urrutia, a member of the leftist IU, bluntly stated in a recent interview: "Ayacucho is not a priority neither for the left, nor the right, nor for any political sector."⁴¹

Haya de la Torre called for decentralization as early as 1931 and the 1979 constitution directed that the state carry out a program of regionalization. But in January of 1989, the Peruvian Congress was forced to hold an extraordinary session because regionalization had still not been accomplished. Why the hesitation despite the awareness of the problem? Certainly Peru's political parties (including the parties of the left) fear that their power will be jeopardized if regionalization occurs, especially now that Sendero has become more powerful in the interior regions. Sendero and the anti-Lima sentiment it represents is a real

⁴⁰Ibid, pg. 142.

⁴¹DESCO, Que Hacer?, no. 57, February-March 1989, pg. 52. Urrutia was being interviewed because he was resigning his post as vice-mayor. He was leaving the country because he had received many death threats, including several from Sendero.

threat to the entire political spectrum and the whole of Lima's urban-coastal culture.

In conclusion, although a serious national crisis was present prior to the return to democracy in 1980, centralism and the lack of national identity in Peru militates against the development of a unified national elite. Even if urban elites reached consensual unity, their inability, or lack of desire, to be responsive to the interior provinces creates a situation where provincial elites will rebel against the dominant elites in the urban areas, especially in Lima. In the past, the provinces have been too weak and too disorganized to carry out a major military rebellion. However, *Sendero Luminoso* has in many ways changed that balance of power.

Moderation of Elites

The national crisis certainly encouraged the development of a genuine if incomplete consensus among many Peruvian elites by the end of the 1970s. But this consensus could not have been possible without the prior moderation of some Peruvian elites. This gradual moderation can best be expressed by examining the relationship between APRA and the Peruvian Armed Forces.

From 1930 to 1980, the *Aprista* party gradually "... jettisoned its earlier dedication ... to radical politics."⁴² There were moments (like in 1963 when it aligned itself with the conservative UNO) when the party could even be "described as reactionary."⁴³

⁴²Clinton, pg. 296.

⁴³*Ibid.*

APRA's move toward the right disenchanted many of its younger activists by the mid-1950s, compelling them to form APRA *Rebelde*. Apristas who became dissatisfied with the party usually did so because of "... APRA's abandonment of its anti-imperialistic and socialistic principles."⁴⁴ Even as early as 1954, prior to the *convivencia*, Haya had significantly moderated his positions. While in domestic exile in the Colombian Embassy, Haya wrote: "I believe that democracy and capitalism offer the surest road toward a solution of world problems, even though capitalism still has its faults."⁴⁵ Two years later Haya added that U.S. investments were "... contributing to the abolition of Peru's feudal-capitalist dualism," and thus were beneficial for the nation.⁴⁶ Over the years the party thus made many ideological about faces, and by 1979 APRA was clearly a centrist political party. At its XII National Congress held in early July of that year, party leaders affirmed their position on the political center by denouncing both "totalitarian communism," and the "reactionary right."⁴⁷ In summary, APRA, under the guidance of Haya de la Torre, had evolved from a position advocating armed struggle to being a staunch defender of representative democracy.⁴⁸

⁴⁴*Ibid*, pg. 286.

⁴⁵Victor Raul Haya de la Torre, "My Five-Year Exile in My Own Country," *Life*, 3 May 1954, pg. 164.

⁴⁶Julio Cotler, "A Structural-Historical Approach to the Breakdown of Democratic Institutions: Peru," in Juan Linz and Alfred Stepan, The Breakdown of Democratic Regimes: Latin America (Baltimore: The John Hopkins University Press, 1978), pg. 188.

⁴⁷Pease Garcia and Filomeno, volume 8, pg. 3537.

⁴⁸Interview with Alayza Grundy.

Although the armed forces remained conservative and virulently anti-aprista for most of the 1930s, 1940s and 1950s, by the 1960s the military leadership had taken a definite turn to the left. Initially, through the academic education at the CAEM, military officers became convinced that social inequity in Peru was generating social turmoil. Their position was affirmed by the rise of guerrilla groups in 1965. The armed forces, like many of the political parties, became convinced that the chief cause of inequality and underdevelopment was the dominance of the landed oligarchy and its connection with U.S. capital. Thus, the 1968 military golpe necessarily took a leftist orientation. In an ironic way, the armed forces in 1968 had moved to the left of APRA, which was in an alliance with the conservative UNO. The military leaders just prior to the golpe believed that APRA was "... too conservative to carry out the reforms required by the threat of latent insurgency."⁴⁹

After the failure of the GRFA to institutionalize a revolutionary military regime, the generals moved away from the left and into the center of the political spectrum. They became democrats not because of their love for the liberal ideology, but because of their inability to direct the nation, their desire to exit power gracefully, and their fear of a communist takeover.⁵⁰ Luckily for the prospects of democracy,

⁴⁹Richard F. Nyrop, editor, Peru: A Country Study (Wash. D.C.: The American University, 1981), pg. 38.

⁵⁰Cynthia McClintock argues that this strategic calculus had been the most important element in precluding another coup in Peru. See her "Perspectivas Para La Consolidation Democratica en el Peru," in Diego

the GRFA had not destroyed the political parties during its twelve-year rule.⁵¹

Owing to the ideological convergence of APRA and the armed forces a return to party politics became possible in 1980. The two institutions shared an ideology that was reformist, nationalist, democratic, capitalist, and anti-communist. Thus, in the late-1970s, Haya de la Torre became the GRFA's man. Luis Alberto Sanchez writes:

The armed Forces which vetoed him [Haya] during 40 years recognized in him the best conductor that could oppose the odious reactions of the wounded oligarchy and the chaotic preteptions of an aberrant and alienated leftism.⁵²

Yet the convergence of APRA and the armed forces alone would not be sufficient to allow for an elite settlement in Peru. Another important element was the virtual elimination of the landed elites by the GRFA. Of additional importance was the emergence of moderate parties during the 1950s and 1960s such as AP, the PDC, and the PPC. This simultaneous weakening of the extreme right and the emergence of centrist democratic parties certainly assisted in the development of a political convergenc or moderation in Peru. However, in the 1960s and 1970s another phenomenon mitigated against this moderation: the emergence of a radical, new left.

Garcia Sayan, ed., Democracia Y Violencia en el Peru (Lima: Centro Peruano De Estudios Internacionales, 1988), pg. 52.

⁵¹Woy-Hazleton, pg. 35.

⁵²Sanchez, pg. 122.

By the late-1970s, some sectors of the left had, like APRA and the armed forces, also experienced some moderation. For example, parties like the PSR, the PCP, the PDC, and FNTC participated in the Assembly elections with alacrity. Even some leaders of the new left, like Genaro Ledesma, had for the most part forsaken the revolutionary road to power. In July 1979, he stated: "There is no sector of the left that postulates absenteeism [from elections] nor are there tactics different from the electoral option."⁵³ Although some groups did in fact reject the electoral route, Ledesma was for the most part correct in his assessment of the left, because even the PC del P, which had boycotted the Constituent Assembly elections, decided to participate in the elections of 1980. On 11 June 1979, PC del P leader Horacio Zevallos stated that although he had criticized the Assembly elections as "anti-democratic," his party would "participate in the next elections."⁵⁴

The left's moderation, however, did not come gradually like the moderation of APRA; it did not come to some segments of the left until after the elections for a Constituent Assembly; and, it did not come at all for some groups, like Sendero Luminoso and the MRTA. This lack of moderation prior to the transition helps explain why the left did not exhibit conciliation and forbearance during the transition to democracy. It also helps to explain why the left did not come to an

⁵³Caretas, no. 559, 2 July 1979, pg. 13.

⁵⁴Caretas, no. 556, 11 June 1979, pg. 14.

understanding with the GRFA as did the parties of the center and right.

In conclusion, the evidence suggests that, although the parties of the left had entered the electoral game hesitantly and incompletely, the parties of the center and right and the armed forces had reached a significant degree of political consensus by the late 1970s. By early 1980, those parties demonstrated near-universal agreement with the GRFA and each other. Belaunde stated that if AP won the elections it would continue the "projects" initiated by the GRFA; Villanueva declared that the structural changes of the GRFA "would be irreversible and an Aprista government would not yield steps backward but would take more steps forward;" and Bedoya claimed that his party would support the revolution, because "the social context has been represented fundamentally by the reforms ..."⁵⁵ In many ways, the new left's hesitance to join the growing consensus was the result of the relatively high level of mass mobilization present in Peru in the late 1970s.

Low or Controlled Mobilization

The final precondition facilitating an elite settlement is the existence of low or controlled mass mobilization. Prior to the 1980 transfer of power, mass mobilization had increased dramatically in Peru. Although most labor organizations were firmly controlled by political parties, several labor and peasant organizations had recently emerged in the

⁵⁵Pease Garcia and Filomeno, volume 9, pp. 3826 and 3870.

social arena and were not specifically tied to political organizations.

The period from 1960 to 1978 represents "... the most important growth in labor unions in the history of Peru."⁵⁶ The number of officially recognized labor organizations grew from 706 in 1960 to 4589 in 1978. Along with their increased organization came a commensurate increase in their political power, manifested generally through strikes. In the late 1960s and early 1970s the popularity of the GRFA precluded the existence of strikes directed against the *de facto* government. However, with the initiation of austerity measures by the GRFA, strike activity blossomed.

The period from 1976 to 1980 witnessed the most intense and massive strike activity in the history of Peru.⁵⁷ Although the most successful national strike took place in July 1977, the greatest amount of strike activity occurred in 1978. In that year over 36 million man-hours were lost to strikes, while 6.5 million were lost in the previous year, 1977, and 9.3 million were lost in 1979.⁵⁸ Two successful general strikes occurred in 1978, in February and in May. Although strike activity decreased significantly in 1979, it nevertheless remained quite high. And in the

⁵⁶Martin J. Scurrah and Guadalupe Esteves, "The Condition of Organized Labor," in Gorman, pg. 106.

⁵⁷Teresa Tovar Samarez, Movimiento Popular Y Paros Nacionales: Historia del Movimiento Popular 1976-1980 (Lima: DESCO, Centro de Estudios Y Promocion Del Desarrollo, 1982), pp. 6-7.

⁵⁸*Ibid*, pg. 23.

month when Belaunde was inaugurated (July 1980) about 100,000 workers were on strike.⁵⁹

Although mass mobilization was extensive just prior to the transfer of power, much of it was controlled by a handful of the political parties. The major labor confederations - the CTP, the CNT, and the CGTP - were controlled by APRA, the PDC, and the PCP, respectively. These confederations took part in the highly successful general strike of 1977. However, once the parties were convinced that the GRFA was indeed going to turn power back to the civilians, they were much more hesitant to become engaged in strikes that could jeopardize Plan Tupac Amaru.

The best case in point is the national strike that was called by the PCP's CGTP in January of 1979. That strike was a "failure."⁶⁰ An important reason for the strike's lack of success was that both the CNT and the CTP did not participate. Secondly, PCP leaders did not seek the support of the more radical labor organizations, such as UDP, FOCEP and SUTEP, because they feared that those organizations would create undue violence.⁶¹ By 1979 the traditional parties had a stake in the *cronograma politico* and they were not about to jeopardize their return to political power. Thus, APRA and the PDC effectively demobilized their labor organizations to ensure that they did not antagonize the GRFA. For its part, the PCP carried out

⁵⁹Latin America: Weekly Report, WR-80-30, 1 August 1980, pg. 3.

⁶⁰Tovar, pg. 39.

⁶¹Latin America: Political Report, no. 3, 19 January 1979, pg. 20.

mobilizations that excluded the more radical unions. By the end of January 1980, a high-official in the Ministry of Labor, Julio Cesar Barrenechea, stated that there was "absolute calm and social peace," and that strikes were no longer politically motivated.⁶² Thus, the significant decline in mass mobilization from 1978 to 1979 represented the ability of several parties to control their labor organizations.

Despite the high level of demobilization that took place in 1979, the Peruvian transition to democracy took place in a climate of high levels of mass mobilization and strike activity. Two reasons help to explain why. First, the most confrontational strikes of 1978 and 1979 were carried out by SUTEP, a teacher's organization led by the party that did not participate in the Constituent Assembly - the PC del P. Second, the left was not sufficiently unified to carry out a program of demobilization, even if it desired to do so. The left's work in the Assembly was severely handicapped by its lack of unity, and the left was highly critical of itself after it was unable to achieve unity prior to the 1980 elections. In November 1978, Hugo Blanco admitted that FOCEP would undergo a reorganization of its national executive committee because in the past the front's organizations "have acted independently, creating great confusion."⁶³ Blanco was one of the constituents who was most involved in strike activity during the tenure of the Assembly. He was arrested on several occasions.

⁶²Pease Garcia, volume 9, pg. 3805.

⁶³Pease Garcia, volume 7, pg. 3272.

However, he was unable or unwilling to demobilize the left's following during the transition period.

In summary, the transition to democracy in Peru was not characterized by low mobilizaion. On the contrary the period immediately preceding the transition was marked by the highest level of mass mobilization in the history of the nation. Additionally, although several parties were successful at demobilizing their supporters in labor organizations, many labor and peasant unions were extremely active during the transition.

In conclusion, the transition to democracy in Peru fits only approximately the elite settlement model. Even though competitive democracy has survived in Peru for over ten years, several of the characteristics and preconditions of an elite settlement were and are absent. Nevertheless, Peruvian elites did demonstrate a substantial amount of consensus prior to the elections of 1980. The Peruvian transition exhibits the characteristics of a partial elite settlement. There can be little doubt that an "understanding" existed between the GRFA, and APRA. This understanding was crucial for the successful transition to democracy in 1980.⁶⁴ In contrast, during the first Belaunde administration APRA and the armed forces remained bitter enemies. By the time the 1980 campaign was under way, it became evident that the PPC and AP had joined in the understanding. Thus, only the left was insufficiently included in the elite consensus. The reason for this exclusion was the lack of understanding

⁶⁴Interview with Levano, Belaunde, Caceres. and Alayza.

between the left and the GRFA, the disunity of the left, and the unwillingness of some sectors of the left to become involved in the democratic transition. While these factors prevented a comprehensive elite settlement from taking place, they were insufficient to impede a settlement between the armed forces and the parties of the center and right. It should also not be forgotten that a significant portion of the left eagerly adopted the electoral route in 1980. The partial settlement that took place circa 1978-1979 allowed the left to freely participate in the electoral system and opened the way for the inclusion of the left in 1980 and in future elections, as evidenced by the left's move toward unity and its repudiation of radical leftist groups such as *Sendero Luminoso*. Thus, the partial elite settlement that took place prior to the 1980 democratic transition may possibly lead to consensual elite unity through the process of elite convergence.

Chapter Nine

Conclusions, Consequences, and Implications

We have seen that the transitions to democratic government in the Dominican Republic and Peru were preceded by significant changes in elite behavior. Elites in these two countries for the first time in decades came to an understanding over the rules of the game through establishing democratic political systems. In essence, elites in both countries arrived at a level of consensus that had not been previously achieved. Evidence suggests that these significant changes were at least partially the result of a settlement among key elites in both countries. Nevertheless, important differences exist between these two transitions to democracy. The historical context as well as the interaction among elites were strikingly different. In both cases, elite behavior and social conditions during the transition period do not neatly fit the theoretical model of elite settlements. Neither country completely exhibited the four characteristics of elite settlements: quickness, many meetings among the paramount elites, written documents, and conciliation and forbearance.

The transition period was much quicker in the Dominican Republic. The Peruvian transition, embodied in Plan Tupac Amaru, was the slower and more methodical program. The crisis in the Dominican Republic, which began on 17 May when the military stopped the vote-count, was resolved in less than two months by the *fallo historico* on 7 July. In Peru, the regime crisis began with the July 1977 national strike and did not

end until the second Belaunde government was installed in July 1980. Its slowness, compared to the Dominican transition, reflects a greater degree of elite disunity in Peru circa 1978. In the Dominican Republic negotiations were necessary only among the armed forces, the PR leadership and the PRD leadership. In Peru an elite settlement required the cooperation of the GRFA and a large number of political leaders, representing many, diverse political organizations.

There is no doubt that many "face-to-face, partially secret, negotiations among paramount leaders of the major elite factions" took place in both countries. For the first time key leaders from opposing factions had extensive and intensive discussions over issues of national importance. In the case of Peru, however, the existence of too many factions (the result of a fragmented left) militated against the inclusion of all groups in the negotiating process. For the most part, only the centrist and rightist parties and the armed forces were consistently involved in the negotiated solution in Peru. While the left was also excluded in the Dominican Republic, it was electorally weak in that country, whereas it was strong in Peru. So, exclusion of the left in Peru represented the exclusion of a major political force. Although the left was excluded from the actual settlements in both countries, the left was allowed to participate freely in the electoral political system. This inclusion, by the more conservative political parties and the armed forces, was of utmost importance, since the left in Peru was politically strong, and in

the Dominican Republic it would become stronger in the near future. To have excluded the left would have been to invite a future crisis.

The transition to democracy in Peru was assisted by the creation of a new constitution through the combined efforts of most major political forces in that country. The political diversity in Peru circa 1978 made it imperative that a constitutional document be negotiated by the contending factions. Although some political leaders, like Belaunde, did not believe that a new constitution was necessary, it appears that Peruvian political elites needed desperately to address their diverse concerns in a forum such as that provided by the Constituent Assembly. Haya de la Torre understood this national need well. When his lieutenant and Assembly vice-president, Luis Sanchez, complained to him about the time that was being wasted in the plenary sessions, Haya said to him: "Look, Luis Alberto, this loss of time is only a hair of the tail of the ten years of dictatorial silence."¹ The party patriarch knew that political leaders not only wanted the military government to relinquish power, but also needed to express their demands and resolve disputes among themselves. The Constitutional Assembly was an apt forum for such a political need. Dominican political elites had no need for a new constitution, since their disputes were not substantive, but rather concerned simply the rules of the political game. Thus, the non-aggression agreement signed by Balaguer

¹Luis Alberto Sanchez, Testimonio Personal, 6: Adios A Las Armas, 1976-1987 (Lima: Mosca Azul Editores, 1988), pg. 83.

and Guzman was probably sufficient to demonstrate the two leader's commitment to a democratic transition.

Political elites in both transitions exhibited uncommon forbearance and conciliation. Elites who had in the past been virtually mortal enemies began to cooperate in unprecedented ways. For the first time in Dominican history, the PRD leadership established a dialogue with Balaguer and the armed forces, and relied upon political compromise rather than mass mobilization to acquire political leverage. Similarly, during 1978-1979, rather than resorting to violence as in the past, APRA and the armed forces came to a political understanding. APRA, like the PRD in the Dominican Republic, refrained from using mobilization during the critical transition period. In Peru, there was also unprecedented cooperation among a variety of political parties, such as APRA, AP, the PDC, the PPC, and even the PCP - a list that includes a portion of the left and center-left, as well as the center and the right.

The situation in Peru, however, significantly differed from that in the Dominican Republic. While only two, centrist parties - the PRD and the PR - represented almost the entire Dominican political spectrum, in Peru there existed a very strong electoral left, representing one-third of the electorate. Unfortunately, at least for the prospects of a comprehensive elite settlement, that left was highly fragmented. Thus, the possibility of reaching an understanding that incorporated the right, the center, the left, and the armed forces was almost nil. No small group of leftist leaders existed that could

authoritatively speak for the entire left. Thus, the left could not take part in a settlement. This situation helped to create conflict among the leftist leaders and the armed forces, making it almost impossible for an agreement to be reached between sectors of the left and the ruling generals. As a result, conciliation and forbearance did not characterize the relationship between the left and the GRFA.

In summation, speed, meetings among key elites, written agreements, and conciliation were nearly all present prior to the democratic transitions in the Dominican Republic and Peru. The primary differences between these two cases are that in Peru there existed a significant but fragmented left and regional/ethnic differences that impeded a comprehensive settlement. The result was that the partial settlement in Peru excluded the fragmented left, and thus militated against conciliatory behavior on the part of the left and the armed forces.

Important preconditions for the emergence of elite settlements were also present in both the Dominican Republic and Peru prior to the democratic transitions in those countries. Major national crises existed in both the Dominican Republic and Peru prior to and during their transitions to democratic government. The most significant crisis present in both countries was the presence of a crisis for the incumbent regime. The Balaguer regime and the GRFA were in a state of crisis in the late-1970s. The 1978 Dominican electoral crisis brought the regime crisis to a boiling point,

motivating almost all important groups to express their objection to vote fraud. In essence, since Guzman was the popularly recognized winner, Dominicans let Balaguer know that they had had enough of *continuismo*. In Peru, the general strike of 1977 clearly demonstrated massive opposition to the military regime. The entire political spectrum participated in that strike and in other anti-regime activities. It was not until the political parties were certain that the GRFA would relinquish power that the parties of the right and center refrained from supporting strikes and anti-regime activity.

A legacy of severe elite conflict that had the potential of reemerging unless an agreement was reached motivated elites to reach a settlement during these crises. In the Dominican Republic, recent civil war was a clear reminder to all elites that the 1978 electoral crisis, unless properly resolved, could deteriorate into another domestic armed conflict. In Peru, the long history of conflict between APRA and the armed forces, and among the political parties themselves, along with the massive labor-mass mobilization directed against the GRFA, prompted many political and military elites to look for a peaceful way out of the regime crisis.

Our analysis suggests, however, that while a strong national crisis plagued Peru prior to the transition, centralism and ethnic diversity significantly militated against the emergence of a consensually unified elite. Peru still exhibits important cultural and regional cleavages that

undermine the emergence of national elite integration. Thus, in this manner, Peru differs from the model that we have proposed. The centrifugal forces supplied by the national crisis were in many ways countered and in opposition to the centripetal forces of social and regional diversity.

National crisis certainly appears to be an important precondition in compelling elites to settle former disputes. However, we have also found that elites exhibited gradual political moderation prior to the emergence of an elite settlement. In the Dominican Republic the PRD transformed itself from a revolutionary party to a centrist party, under the leadership of Peña Gomez. In addition, the rightist Dominican military became less intensively political and more professional, so that by 1978 many officers were in favor of constitutional government. Peru witnessed a similar political transformation by Haya de la Torre's APRA - a revolutionary party that eventually became "reactionary" or at least anti-communist. In Peru the military did not just moderate its conservatism, but eventually became convinced that only reformist policies would save Peru. But most of the leftist parties did not moderate during the Peruvian transition. In fact, the evidence convincingly demonstrates that only a few leftist leaders were solidly behind the Constituent Assembly and the *cronograma politico*. At the same time, the GRFA was intolerant toward those leftist leaders who used strikes and demonstrations as their preferred form of political participation. This lack of moderation on

the part of the left and the GRFA helps explain why a comprehensive settlement did not take place in Peru. It was virtually impossible for the left (especially the new left) and the GRFA to reach any sort of political compromise circa 1978.

Both nations also experienced the elimination of traditional political forces. In the Dominican Republic, the Trujillo regime virtually ceased with the dictator's assassination (although vestiges of the dictator's regime remained in the Dominican armed forces.) And in Peru, the traditional landed oligarchy was eliminated as a political force by the left-of-center Velasco regime. Trujillo's party died with the dictator. And by 1978, the rightist parties in Peru - the PUN and MDP - accounted for only about four percent of the vote.

The gradual political moderation that occurred in both countries made it possible for elites to reach an agreement during the crises of the late 1970s. However, it was much easier for elites to reach an accord in the Dominican Republic, owing to that country's comparatively low level of mass mobilization. The mobilization that had been achieved in the Dominican Republic was the result of the PRD's political efforts, and the potential for mobilization was under the control of PRD leaders. When the PRD reached an agreement with the PR and the armed forces, the party was able to demobilize and control its militants. In Peru, the situation was quite different. Mobilization in Peru had reached unprecedented levels by 1977, as exemplified by that year's national strike.

Although several of the major parties - APRA, PDC, and PCP - had tight control over their labor organizations, the fragmentation of the left and the enormous numbers of labor, student and peasant organizations made it virtually impossible for the major political parties to demobilize the masses during the transition period. They simply did not control the extant mobilization in the nation.

Can we conclude that an elite settlement, as described in chapter two, occurred in both the Dominican Republic and Peru, and that therefore stable democracy will continue to flourish in both nations? Certainly, the Dominican case closely approximates the theoretical model. On the other hand, we have seen that several important divergences from the model are evident in the Peruvian transition. It is clear that while a comprehensive settlement occurred in the Dominican Republic, only a partial settlement took place in Peru. Surprisingly however democratic politics have survived in Peru for over ten years, despite severe economic conditions, and the presence of extremist and violent subversive groups. This apparent paradox suggests that despite their variations from the theoretical model, the structure and behavior of Peruvian elites underwent important changes, enabling those elites to cooperate to a much greater extent than had previously been possible. We can conclude that the partial settlement that occurred in Peru greatly assisted in the 1980 democratic transition and the subsequent and unprecedented longevity of contemporary Peruvian democracy.

Consequences of Elite Settlements

We have proposed that the most important consequence of an elite settlement is the emergence of a stable political regime directed by a unified elite structure. We have seen that in both the Dominican Republic in 1978, and Peru in 1980 democratic political systems emerged that have survived to the present time. Granted, both countries are experiencing economic crisis, and the Peruvian regime is virtually besieged by intransigent guerrilla organizations. But despite these alarming conditions, since the respective transitions to democracy, irregular seizures of power have become a thing of the past and governmental power and authority has been acquired only through the ballot box. Latin American experts now give both countries high democratic marks. In 1980, Howard Wiarda ranked the nineteen nations of Latin America on a democratic scale. The Dominican Republic was ranked fourth, behind Costa Rica, Venezuela, and Colombia. Peru was ranked sixth, after the first four and Mexico.² In a more recent study, Myron Weiner classified both the Dominican Republic and Peru as "postauthoritarian democracies," along with Colombia and Venezuela.³ In essence, a wide range of elites in both countries

²Howard J. Wiarda, "Latin American Democracy: The Historic Model and the New Openings," in Wiarda, ed., The Continuing Struggle for Democracy in Latin America (Boulder: Westview Press, 1980), pg. 288. Many scholars would hesitate to rank Mexico so high owing to the historic dominance of one political party - the PRI.

³Myron Weiner, "Empirical Democratic Theory," in Myron Weiner and Ergun Ozbudun, eds., Competitive Elections in Developing Countries (Durham: Duke University Press, 1987), pg. 7.

appear to have accepted electoral politics as the authoritative method of selecting national political elites. We argue that this acceptance of democracy emerged from the settlements that occurred in the late-1970s.

What is most interesting about this acceptance of the rules of the (democratic) game is that it appears that some political elites who did not participate directly in the elite settlement have become incorporated into the political game as well. The elite accommodations in the Dominican Republic and Peru not only allowed the parties involved in the settlement the right to contest political power but allowed all political parties that right as well. The result was that parties that were not involved directly in the settlements have subsequently decided to participate in the electoral game.

In the Dominican Republic, Bosch's PLD, which before 1978 called those who participated in elections "traitors" and "crazy," now participates seriously in elections and in the national legislature.⁴ In Peru the change has been more dramatic and pervasive, owing to the electoral strength of the left in that country. The PC del P, which did not participate in the Constituent Assembly elections, has participated in the 1980 and all subsequent elections. After its poor electoral showing in the 1980 elections, leftist leaders placed the blame on their inability to unite for the elections.

⁴Interview with Hugo Tolentino Dipp, PRD vice-president, Santo Domingo, Dominican Republic, January 1989.

Since then, the left has continued to strive toward unity. In January 1989, the first congress of IU was held, bringing together approximately 3,500 delegates to vote for a National Directive Committee.⁵ While IU has internal problems, the front appears committed to the electoral road to power. During the IU Congress, one of the more radical integrants - the *Partido Unificado Mariateguista* (Unified Mariateguista Party)⁶ - proposed that the left call a general strike to force Alan Garcia from power. The radical measure was "soundly defeated" in a vote by the delegates.⁷

Elite consensus in the Dominican Republic and Peru (limited in some ways as it may be) has been possible through the moderation of key political elites and the subsequent incorporation and moderation of additional (leftist) political elites. The result is that these settlements have generated toleration on the part of national elites, and initiated "open but peaceful competition"⁸ through the establishment of democratic politics. Once bitter enemies now compete for political power without resorting to violence.

⁵For a good summary and analysis of the Congress, see Quehacer? no. 57, February-March 1989; and Resumen Semanal, no. 504, 20-26 January 1989.

⁶PUM was created in 1984 by the unification of the PCR, VR, and MIR. MIR, in turn, had absorbed the UDP by 1984.

⁷Interview with Cesar Levano, editor for Marka during Constituent Assembly, currently Director of Information for the newsweekly magazine Si, Lima, Peru, 9 February 1989.

⁸Michael G. Burton, and John Higley, "Elite Settlements," American Sociological Review 52, no. 3 (June 1987), pg. 295.

Dominican elites appear to have become tolerant of political opposition. The PR, the PRD and the Dominican Armed forces came to an understanding in 1978. As a result, the PR and the military accepted the PRD as a legitimate political force. The military came to understand that the PRD leaders "were not devils,"⁹ and ultimately even became fond of the PRD leadership. This toleration has come to include the PLD as well. In a recent press conference, Balaguer was asked how he would react if Bosch's PLD won the 1990 elections. The Dominican President responded: "... I personally would celebrate it as a success of Dominican democracy."¹⁰ And, a PR leader described Bosch as a "sincere and honest" man, while adding that the fifteen PLD deputies in the congress were "serious" representatives.¹¹ The fear of a communist revolution, historically associated with Bosch, has become virtually obsolete. One general, often classified as ultra-conservative, now asserts that the threat of communism in the Dominican Republic is no longer realistic.¹² Recently, in a television interview, Luis Homero Lajara Burgos, retired Trujillo-era admiral and leader of the *Partido Democrata Popular* (Popular Democratic Party), stated that he was carrying on conversations with all opposition parties in an effort

⁹Interview with Winston Arnaud, PRD-La Estructura Secretary General, Santo Domingo, Dominican Republic, January 1989.

¹⁰Listin Diario, 8 January 1989, pp. 1,11.

¹¹Hoy Mismo (television program), Channel 4, Santo Domingo, Dominican Republic, 11 January 1989.

¹²Interview (anonymous) with high-ranking retired general who was on the "loyalist" camp during the 1965 conflict.

to unify them against Balaguer's PR. To accomplish this effort, Lajara said he had met with communist party leaders for the first time, and was very surprised because their leaders were "educated people whom you could talk with."¹³ Thus, in the Dominican Republic toleration has expanded to include the PLD and even the communist parties which did not participate in the settlement of 1978.

In Peru, toleration also appears to have expanded to include the parties that did not participate in the 1978-1980 settlement, with the exception of the two political organizations that violently attack the democratic system - *Sendero Luminoso* and MRTA. IU has become a strong and democratic political force in Peru. A political poll in March 1988 placed IU ahead of APRA and the recently constructed *Frente Democratico* (FREDEMO, or Democratic Front,) composed of AP, the PPC, and *Movimiento Libertad* (Liberty Movement.)¹⁴

IU's popularity means that it is quite possible that this Marxist front can win the national elections in 1990. The important question is whether the armed forces, APRA and FREDEMO would accept an IU victory. Just because the settlement between the military and the center-right parties allowed for full participation does not ensure that those parties not included in the accord will be allowed to take power. Some indications, however, suggest that IU would be fully accepted into the political game. Recently, Morales

¹³ La Mañana en el 4 (television program), Channel 4, Santo Domingo, Dominican Republic, 20 January 1989.

¹⁴ Mario Vargas Llosa created ML. FREDEMO was created in February 1988.

Bermudez asserted that a Barrantes victory would be good for Peruvian democracy, because then Peru will have been ruled by the entire political spectrum.¹⁵

There are several reasons why an IU victory will most likely be accepted by the armed forces and other elites, and thus not result in another breakdown of democracy in Peru. First, the left, especially its popular leader, Alfonso Barrantes, does not appear to want, once again, to revolutionize Peruvian society - something that would threaten many economic, military and political elites.¹⁶ He "no longer is the revolutionary Barrantes" of the past.¹⁷ Likewise, IU in general has become less revolutionary. Javier Iguñiz, president of the commission that is planning the IU government, has stated: "In the first place, the democratic component of the government plan is an absolutely essential aspect."¹⁸ Even more significant is the fact that the plan "counts on the principle of the initiative of private capital."¹⁹ The left has moderated primarily because it has acquired a "large political space"²⁰ since its incorporation into

¹⁵Interview with Francisco Morales Bermudez, general (retired), President and leader of GRFA, 1974-1980, Lima, Peru, 22 February 1989.

¹⁶Interviews with Carlos Malpica Silva, senator, ex-constituent for UDP, and member of Principal Commission, Lima, Peru, 14 February 1989, and Levano.

¹⁷Interview with Isidoro Gamarra Ramirez, ex-constituent for PCP and President of CGTP, Lima, Peru, 16 February 1989.

¹⁸Quehacer?, no. 53, March-April 1988, pp. 12-23.

¹⁹*Ibid*, pg. 19.

²⁰Interview with Genaro Ledesma, senator, former constituent and President of FOCEP, Lima, Peru, 10 February 1989.

electoral politics. Antagonizing other powerful political elites and/or economic and military elites would jeopardize that coveted political space. Jorge Nieto, a Marxist, has convincingly argued that after the left's involvement in electoral politics in 1980, leftist leaders have become more concerned with problems of unification, democratization, and the electorability of the mass parties than with mass mobilization and participation.²¹

A second reason why democracy will most likely survive in Peru is that the military realizes that a coup would be a dangerous endeavor. Civil elites have developed a strong dislike for military government, as evidenced by the mass demonstrations and strikes against the GRFA in the late-1970s. A Peruvian expert, Cynthia McClintock, has written: "Clearly, the anti-military attitudes are so intense in Peru that a civil war could become a real possibility if ... a golpe de estado occurred."²² We have also seen that the military itself, through its experience of twelve years in government, concluded that military men were not made for politics. As one political expert recently

²¹See Jorge Nieto, Izquierda Y Democracia en el Peru, 1975-1980 (Lima: DESCO, Centro de Estudios Y Promocion del Desarrollo, 1983.)

²²Cynthia McClintock, "Perspectivas Para La Consolidation Democratica en el Peru," in Diego Garcia Sayan, ed., Democracia Y Violencia en el Peru (Lima: Centro Peruano De Estudios Internacionales, 1988), pg. 56; also, interview with Andres Townsend Ezcurra, senator, ex-constituent for APRA, and member of Principal Commission, Lima, Peru, 8 February 1989, who believes that a military golpe would result in the "worst crisis ever."

stated: "The atmosphere is not favorable for a golpe."²³

Finally, democracy has become the only viable option in Peru. Political and other elites appear convinced that the only way to prevent chaos or the return to military rule is by supporting the present democratic rules of the game. This realization has created a "democratic spirit" in Peru, despite the almost unanimous disappointment with the current Garcia government.²⁴ Political elites believe that democracy must be preserved because "there is no other exit,"²⁵ "elections are the only judge,"²⁶ and because "we must defend it."²⁷

Stable democracy appears to be the chief consequence of the elite settlements in the Dominican Republic and Peru. Forceful seizures of power have disappeared, to be replaced by transfers of power through elections. Elites who once were bitter enemies now debate issues of national importance in the national legislatures. Political democracy, however, has not produced the changes that many scholars and observers would have predicted or wanted.

²³Interview with Enrique Chirinos Soto, senator, ex-constituent for APRA, and author of book on the 1979 Peruvian Constitution, Lima, Peru, 15 February 1989.

²⁴Interview with Miguel Angel Echeandia Urbina, ex-constituent for the PSR, Lima, Peru, 30 January 1989.

²⁵Interview with Roger Caceres Velasquez, senator, ex-constituent for FNTC, and member of Principal Commission, Lima, Peru, 7 February 1989.

²⁶Interview with Julio Cruzado Zavala, ex-constituent for APRA and President of CTP, Lima, Peru, 6 February 1989.

²⁷Interview with Townsend.

In effect, the establishment of democracy has primarily helped elites. The rights of contestation and participation have benefited the intellectuals, political elites, economic elites, the press, and professional organizations. Certainly, citizens can now vote. But the vote, unfortunately, has not to date yielded material results for the masses. In the Dominican Republic

...the more formal aspects of democracy have been to a large extent achieved, but ... the large majority of the population lives in very precarious conditions and continues to be excluded from power.²⁸

The situation is identical in Peru. One expert writes:

In conclusion, the problems described as central in the sixties continue to be in effect in Peru today: territorial and cultural disintegration, misery, injustice, and extreme poverty.²⁹

Those who have studied democracy in Latin America have come to the same conclusions. John Peeler, who has examined the three most long-lived democracies in the region - Colombia, Costa Rica, and Venezuela - has concluded that "Liberal democracy functions as a

²⁸Rosario Espinal, "An Interpretation of the Democratic Transition in the Dominican Republic," in The Central American Impasse, Di Palma, Giuseppe, and Whitehead, Lawrence, eds. (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1986), pp.89-90.

²⁹Raul Gonzales, "La Violencia en el Peru," in Diego Garcia Sayan, ed., Democracia Y Violencia en el Peru (Lima: CEPEI, Centro Peruano de Estudios Internacionales, 1988), pg. 23.

flexible shield for the economic and social status quo."³⁰

What has gone wrong? Is democracy not really present in the Dominican Republic and Peru and the other Latin countries deemed to be democratic? Scholars have reacted to these paradoxical conditions by asserting that democracy in Latin America is in some way elitist and not true democracy. Describing the political system in Colombia, one expert writes:

Having learned from disunity, 1948-1957, the Conservative and Liberal parties agreed formally to share power to the accompaniment of elections that served to ratify the choices of the party leaders.³¹

Thus, pacted democracies have come to be dismissed as lesser democracies, owing to their elite nature.

Nevertheless, democracies in Latin America that have resulted from elite settlements or pacts have met the minimum conditions of contestation and participation set out by democratic theorists such as Robert Dahl. Contestation and participation exist today in the Dominican Republic and Peru. It is most remarkable that democracy in Peru has survived a legislature that encompasses the entire political spectrum, a continuing and severe economic crisis, the almost unanimous rejection of the current political leadership, and violent assault by extremist groups.

³⁰John Peeler, Latin American Democracies: Colombia, Costa Rica, Venezuela (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1985), pg. 153.

³¹Robert Wesson, Democracy in Latin America: Promise and Problems (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1982), pg. 186.

Indeed, one is left to wonder how peaceful Western democracies would be under similar conditions.

If a theoretical problem exists, it is most likely to be found in the assumptions of democratic theory than in the correctness of Latin American democracies. Dahl's inviolate assumption that "a key characteristic of a democracy is the continuing responsiveness of the government to the preferences of its citizens, considered as political equals," may just be wrong.³² Simply stated, national economic performance may be more important to the economic well being of citizens than the type of political regime.³³ And, democracy, like all political systems, may be the property of elites, and only elites.

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The Dominican elite settlement and the Peruvian partial settlement have assisted significantly in the establishment of stable, democratic political systems. The evidence suggests that consensual elite unity is a real possibility in the Dominican Republic. The Peruvian case, on the other hand, indicates that although elites took an important step toward consensual unity, it will be some time before we can tell if the partial settlement will lead to elite unity through the process of elite convergence. These accords have broken the traditional cycles of civilian

³²Robert Dahl, Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1971), pg. 1.

³³For an interesting empirical study of the effects of politics and economics on social equality, see Robert W. Jackman, Politics and Social Equality: A Comparative Analysis (New York: Wiley and Sons, 1975.)

and military rule that were prominent under a previously disunified elite structure. These settlements have also resulted in a near political consensus over the rules of the game, and have significantly changed elite behavior from one of violent conflict to one of tolerant competition. Such agreements have by no means created conditions of total elite unity. The Peruvian situation indicates that despite the existing consensus between urban elites, there still exists a lack of national integration that could in the future seriously jeopardize the current democratic political system. While the partial settlement greatly facilitated the 1980 democratic transition, the left and right in Peru will have to fully moderate before consensual elite unity can be achieved in Peru. We also cannot argue that current elite consensus will persist perpetually. New sources of social power could conceivably emerge in the future which could undermine the consensus of elites in the Dominican Republic and the partial consensus in Peru. Along with such important potential political changes is the sobering fact that the establishment of democratic regimes has not significantly changed the conditions of the non-elites, except for their ability to vote. Nevertheless, an elite settlement among the military, economic elites, and mass-based political parties that can guarantee full political contestation and participation should be considered a revolutionary social agreement, not easily to be undone, even under economic decline and social violence.

APPENDIX

Notes on Method: Personal Interviews

Much of the research in this thesis is historical. To understand any political context, we must know the history of political leaders and groups. Secondary works, magazines, newspapers, and journals were essential to piece together the events prior to the democratic transitions in each country. However, it would be impossible to understand the choices and attitudes of political and other elites without conducting personal interviews. Thus, the most important and illuminating sources in this study were the thoughts and recollections of those who took part or were indirectly involved in the transitions to democracy.

I tried to determine four things during the interviews:

1. Whether elites believe that democracy exists in their country. My first question was: Do you believe that democracy exists now in the Dominican Republic (Peru)? If not, why? Since there are many conceptions of democracy, I tried to determine whether the interviewee believed that all political parties could effectively participate in the political system and contest political power. For the most part, in both the Dominican Republic and Peru, those individuals I interviewed thought that the current regime was the most democratic that their country had ever experienced, even if it had many flaws. If an interviewee felt that democracy was lacking, he

normally referred to economic inequality or the lack of social justice as the source of his displeasure.

2. Determine why democracy has survived in the recent transition when it did not during the 1960s. I asked: what do you think were the key differences between the mid-60s and late-70s that allowed competitive politics - democracy - to succeed in the 1980s? Many of those who I interviewed pointed to the illegitimacy (crisis) of the regimes in the late 1970s. The *continuismo* of the Balaguer regime was perceived by many as detrimental to national stability. Most Dominicans pointed out that if Balaguer and the armed forces had not allowed Guzman to take office in 1978 that a civil war could have broken out. In Peru, most interviewees perceived that the GRFA was worn out - *desgastado*, and that if the GRFA did not exit the political arena that civil violence could increase.

3. Determine whether an elite settlement took place. I asked: Was there any sort of deal or common understanding among the political parties and the military prior to the establishment of competitive elections? [This question was rather sensitive, so I tailored it to the specific person I interviewed, ensuring that I did not make it sound like they were selling out their followers or doing something underhanded.] I also asked: If there was a deal or understanding, what were the particulars? In the Dominican Republic almost everyone I interviewed believed that there had been an agreement between Balaguer and Guzman that was accepted by the armed forces. Some interviewees even provided specific

details. In Peru, however, even though most individuals agreed that there was an understanding between the GRFA and APRA, details were not forthcoming. A good number of interviewees also felt the the understanding included the PPC.

4. Determine the attitude toward the political opposition, and the prospects for democracy in the future. I asked (depending on who I interviewed): What will happen if the left wins the next election? What will happen if the right wins the next election? By asking this question, I determined whether the opposition is perceived as a game player or as a social force to be stopped at all cost. In the Dominican Republic all persons interviewed believed that all political parties should be allowed to take power if elected. Most believed that it would be suicidal (nationally) to prevent Bosch from taking power if he should win in 1990. In Peru, a surprisingly large number thought that all parties should be allowed to take power if elected. However, some expressed a great deal of concern over the chances that both the right or the left could win the election in 1990. Certainly, that election will be an important test of Peruvian democracy, especially if the left wins. I also asked: do you think that this time democracy will survive in your country? Most Dominicans were very optimistic. In Peru the sentiment was more one of fear than of optimism. Many interviewees felt that it was crucial that the democratic regime last because the alternative was very menacing.

The interviews were not systematic. I interviewed those who were kind enough to offer their time. I conducted the Dominican Interviews in January 1989 and the Peruvian interviews in February 1989. Certainly, the number of interviews was small owing to the limited amount of time in each country. Nevertheless, I was able to interview a wide spectrum of primarily political elites. The individuals I interviewed are listed in the bibliography.

In the Dominican Republic I felt the interview process would be much simpler than in Peru. However, I was hindered by three factors. First, military officers were not willing to grant interviews. Granted, I only attempted to interview a few retired generals who had been involved in the 1978 crisis, and my limited time did not allow me to be as persistent as I may have wished. I did interview one retired general who asked to remain totally anonymous. However, he was not closely involved in the 1978 crisis. Second, I did not have any personal contacts in the Dominican Republic. Third, the legislature was not in session during my visit. Nevertheless, I was able to interview Peña Gomez, Balaguer's vice-president, Goico Morales, PR attorney (during the crisis) Castillo and several PRD leaders. I interviewed a total of twelve people in the Dominican Republic.

In Peru Henry Dietz, my dissertation supervisor, facilitated the process by providing excellent personal contacts. I also received excellent support from the U.S. Embassy. As a result I was able to interview seventeen individuals in Peru, including former-

president Belaunde, FOCEP president Ledesma, APRA founder Townsend, PPC founders Alayza Grundy and Ramirez del Villar, and GRFA leader and *de facto* president of Peru (retired general) Morales Bermudez.

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VITA

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[REDACTED] His family immigrated to the United States of America in May 1962. After graduating from Hialeah High School, Hialeah, Florida, in 1973, he entered the University of Florida at Gainesville, Florida. He received the degree of Bachelor of Arts and was commissioned a second lieutenant in the United States Air Force in June 1977. During the following years he served in the Air Force at Keesler Air Force Base, Biloxi, Mississippi, and Kelly Air Force Base, San Antonio, Texas. During the summer and fall semesters in 1979, he attended the Graduate School of St. Mary's University, San Antonio, Texas. In January 1981, he entered the Graduate School of the University of Texas at Austin, in the Department of Government. On 29 September 1981, he was promoted to the grade of captain. On 22 May 1982, the University of Texas awarded him the degree of Master of Arts. Thereupon, he taught political science at the U.S. Air Force Academy during the academic years 1982/3 and 1983/4, attaining the rank of assistant professor. He was then assigned to the Southern Air Division, Howard Air Force Base, Panama, as a politico-military affairs officer. In the fall of 1986 he resumed graduate studies at the University of Texas. On 1 September 1988, he was promoted to the rank of major.

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